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1508/1553.

*Anti-***ANTI-MACHIAVEL:**
OR, AN
EXAMINATION
OF
Machiavel's **PRINCE.**

WITH
NOTES *Historical and Political.*

PUBLISHED BY
Mr. DE *VOLTAIRE.*

TRANSLATED *from the* **FRENCH.**

L O N D O N;

Printed for T. WOODWARD, at the *Half-*
Moon, between the *Two Temple Gates,*
Fleet-street. MDCCXLI.



the former, and reports from that
of a Paraphrase, and reports from that
Simplicity of style which Machiavel keeps
up through the whole Book, and which we
have endeavored to imitate. There is a
Translation of this piece in French by Mr.
Amelot de la Houllaye, which has been
real Beauties; but they are rather his
own than his Author's; and we did not
think ourselves allowed to oblige any

164 A small extract

Advertisement.

IT may not be improper to acquaint the Reader, that the following Translation of Machiavel's PRINCE is newly made from the Original; and that the Quotations from Tacitus and other Authors are translated into English, to make this Book of more general Use.

There are already two English Translations of the PRINCE; the one by Dacres, though not unfaithful, is literal and antiquated; the other, by an unknown Hand, is more intelligible and spirited, but much less correct than the former; it has too much the Nature of a Paraphrase, and departs from that Simplicity of Style which Machiavel keeps up through the whole Book, and which we have endeavoured to imitate. There is a Translation of this Piece in French by Mr. Amelot de la Houffaye, which has several Beauties; but they are rather his own than his Author's; and we did not think ourselves allowed to abridge and

iv ° Advertisement.

curtail Machiavel so much as that Gentleman has done.

As for the ANTI-MACHIAVEL, the Author, who is said to be a Person of the highest Rank, has but little regarded his Stile: Nevertheless we have followed it as much as we could; and have not presumed to take any Freedoms but such as we thought absolutely necessary. It is hoped, that the Sentiments of Liberty, Humanity and Virtue, and the great Abhorrence of Tyranny, Cruelty, Craftiness, and every Abuse of Power, which run through the Whole of this Piece, and are so worthy of the Royal Author to whom the Publick ascribes it, will not fail to make it interesting and acceptable to all English Readers.

Nor can we forbear to take Notice of his touching so often upon English Affairs, and of the great Esteem he shews for the British Constitution, which he expressly prefers to every other Form of Government.

INTRO-

INTRODUCTION.

MACHIAVEL's PRINCE is in point of Morality, what *Spinoza*'s Work is with regard to Faith: *Spinoza* sapped the Foundations of Faith, and aimed at nothing less than overturning the whole Fabrick of Religion; *Machiavel* corrupted Politicks, and undertook to destroy the Precepts of sound Morality: The Errors of the one were but Errors in Speculation; those of the other regarded Practice: We find, nevertheless, that Divines have called out to Arms and sounded the Charge against *Spinoza*; that his Work has been formally refuted, and his Attacks opposed upon Principles of Divinity; whilst *Machiavel* has only been annoyed by a few Moralists, and has been able, in spite of them, and of his pernicious

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cious Doctrines, to maintain his Political System, down to our Days.

I venture to undertake the Defence of Humanity against this Monster, who would destroy it, to oppose Reason and Justice to criminal Sophistry, and publish my Remarks on *Machiavel's Prince*, Chapter by Chapter, that the Antidote may be found immediately after the Poison.

I have always looked upon that Work as one of the most dangerous that ever appeared in the World: 'Tis a Book that must naturally come into the Hands of Princes, and of those who have a Taste for Politicks: A young, ambitious Man, whose Heart and Judgment are not yet sufficiently formed to distinguish exactly between Right and Wrong, is but too liable to be corrupted by Maxims which so greatly flatter his Passions.

But if it is criminal to debauch the Sentiments of a private Person, who
has

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has but a small Influence upon the Affairs of the World; it is infinitely more so to corrupt the Morals of Princes, whose Business it is to govern Nations, to administer Justice, and to set Examples of Justice to their Subjects; and who by their Magnanimity, Mercy and Goodness, ought to be the living Images of the Deity.

Inundations which ravage Countries, Thunder and Lightning that reduce Cities to Ashes, the Pestilence which lays whole Provinces waste, are less fatal to the World than the vicious Morals and unbridled Passions of Princes. The Plagues of Heaven continue but for a Time; they only ravage some Countries; and these Losses, however grievous, are nevertheless repaired; whereas the Crimes of Kings entail a lasting Misery upon whole Nations.

As Kings have the Power to do Good or Evil according to their Choice

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and Inclination, how deplorable is the Condition of that People who have every thing to fear from the Abuse of Majesty, whose Properties are a Prey to the Avarice of their Prince, their Liberty to his Caprice, their Repose to his Ambition, their Safety to his Perfidiousness, and their Lives to his Cruelty? Such would be the tragical Situation of a Country governed by a Prince of *Machiavel's* forming.

I must not conclude this Introduction without saying a few Words to those who believe that *Machiavel* rather describes what Princes do, than what they ought to do: A Notion which has pleased many, purely because it is satirical.

Those who pass this peremptory Judgment upon Sovereigns, are no doubt misled by the Examples of some wicked Princes, the Cotemporaries of *Machiavel* who cites them, and by the Lives of some Tyrants who
have

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have indeed been the Disgrace of Human Nature. I beseech these censorious Persons to consider, that, as the Temptations to which a King is liable are very powerful, it requires a more than ordinary Degree of Virtue to resist them; and therefore it is not surprising, if, in so great a Number of Princes, there should be a Mixture of bad ones among the good. In the List of the *Roman* Emperors, where a *Nero*, a *Caligula*, and a *Tiberius* appear, the World still reflects with Pleasure on the sacred Names of a *Titus*, a *Trajan*, and an *Antoninus*.

It is therefore a cruel Injustice to impute to a whole Body of Men what is only applicable to some of them. As in History the Names of good Princes ought to be preserved, so those of all others should be suffered to sink in Oblivion, with their Indolence, Acts of Injustice, and other Crimes. This indeed would lessen the Number
of

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of Historical Books, but Mankind would gain by it: The Honour of living in History, and of seeing one's Name transmitted to all future Ages, would then only be the Reward of Virtue: *Machiavel's* Book would no longer infect the Schools of Politicks: His continual Contradictions would be treated with Contempt; and the World would be persuaded, that the true Policy of Kings, which is solely grounded on Justice, Prudence and Goodness, is in all respects preferable to that inconsistent and horrible System, which *Machiavel* has been so bold as to offer the Publick.



P R E

P R E F A C E

T O
M A C H I A V E L ' S P R I N C E ,
B Y

Amelot de la Houffaye.

*Containing some apologetical Remarks
upon that Piece.*

AS *Machiavel* is an Author whom few People read, and fewer understand, it is not surprising that the Vulgar should be prejudiced against him. I say, prejudiced; for you will find, that those who censure him, either own that they never read him; or if they pretend to have read him, never understood his Meaning; as is evident from the literal Sense they put upon several Passages which Politicians explain in a very different manner. The Truth is, *Machiavel* is censured only because he is ill understood; and ill understood by many who are capable of understanding him better, only because they read him with a sort of Prejudice; whereas, if they read him like impartial Judges, I mean, if they held the Balance

Balance even between him and his Adversaries, they would perceive, that most of his Maxims are absolutely necessary to Princes, who, as was said by the great *Cosmo de Medicis*, cannot always govern their States with their Beads in their Hand ^a. We must suppose, says *Wicquefort* *, that he almost every where describes what Princes do, not what they ought to do. It is therefore condemning the Conduct of Princes, to condemn what *Machiavel* says, if it be true that he describes what they do, or, to speak more properly, what they are sometimes forced to do. For the Man, says he, Chap. XV. of his Prince, that makes a Conscience of being strictly honest on all Occasions, must needs be undone among the many who act upon different Principles. A Prince therefore must learn, for his own Security, to be virtuous or vicious according to

^a *Che gli statì non si tenevano con pater-nostri.* *Machiavel*, Book 7. of his History. Francis, who was afterwards Great-Duke of Tuscany, being at the Court of Spain, and a Gentleman blaming some Command of his as unjust, answered in the following Words of *Ezekiel*, Is not my way equal,

and are not your ways unequal? (*Ezek.* Chap. xviii.) giving him to understand, that there are things which seem unjust to private Persons, because they do not know the Reasons which oblige a Prince to order them.

* Book I. of his Embassador, Section 7.

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to the Exigence of his Affairs ^b. And in his 18th Chapter, after having said that a Prince ought not to fulfil his Engagements, when they are contrary to his Interest, he fairly owns, that *if Men were all good, this Maxim would be false; but that as they are bad, and would not observe their Promises to us, we ought as little to think ourselves bound by our Engagements to them* * : For otherwise the Prince would lose his Power, and consequently his Reputation; it being impossible, that a Prince who has lost the one, should preserve the other. Since I have happened to touch upon his 18th Chapter, which is undoubtedly the most exceptionous as well as the most dangerous of all his Writings, I think it not unnecessary to point out here, by-the-bye, in what Sense we ought to understand the Instruction which he there gives to his Prince. *It is not necessary*, says he, *that a Prince should have all the above-mentioned Qualities; but it is extremely requisite that he should appear to have them. Let him seem, and let him*

^b *Plutarch* says, that if all the Duties of Morality must needs be discharged, and all the Rules of Justice observed, in order to reign well,

Jupiter himself would not be equal to the Task.

* See the Notes upon the 15th and 18th Chapters of his Prince.

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him actually be merciful, true to his Word, humane, religious and sincere.--To judge of him by his Looks and Discourse, he should seem to be all Goodness, Sincerity, Humanity, and Religion. There is nothing of which it is more necessary to have the Appearance than of this last Quality. Upon this Passage is grounded the prevailing Notion among the Vulgar, that *Machiavel* was an Infidel, and even an Atheist: And indeed, his Words might deceive weak Minds. But if we examine the Meaning of them, we shall find that he no-where asserts what is laid to his Charge, viz. That a Prince should have no Religion: He only says, that if he has none, as may sometimes happen, he should beware of shewing it, Religion being the strongest Bond between him and his Subjects; and the want of Religion, the most just Motive, or at least the most specious Pretence, they can have for withdrawing their Allegiance^c. It is infinitely better for a Prince to be an Hypocrite than a declared Infidel; an

^c *Nec toleraturos profani Principis imperium*, says *Tacitus*, Ann. 14. "People would never bear the Government of an irreligious Prince." The Chancellor de l'Hôpital said, That Religion had a greater

Influence upon the Minds of Men, than all their Passions; and that the Knot with which it tied them together, was infinitely stronger than all the other Bonds of civil Society.

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an Evil that is concealed, being much less than one that is universally known. All the World perceive the Infidel, but few discern the Hypocrite. I take this to be *Machiavel's* Meaning, when he adds, that *all Men have the Faculty of seeing, few that of Perception; and that every one sees what you appear to be, few know what you really are.* "We see very
 " clearly what is before our Eyes, *said a*
 " *Roman Knight to Tiberius*; but it would
 " be in vain for us to pry into what lies con-
 " cealed in a Prince's Heart d." Besides, we ought to consider that *Machiavel* reasons every-where like a Politician, that is, according to the Interest of State, which has as absolute Power over Princes, as Princes have over their Subjects e. This is so true, that Princes, as an able Minister of the present Age expressed it *, chuse rather to hurt their Conscience than their Kingdom. And this is all that could be objected against *Machiavel's* Doctrines by *Justus Lipsius*, a Man

as

d *Spectamus, quæ coram habentur, abditos Principis sensus exquirere illicitum, anceps, nec ideo adsequare.* Tacit. Ann. 6.

Prince, says *Cicero*, and the Prince to the Times. *Nos Principi servimus, ipse temporibus.* Ep. Lib. 9.

* *Mr. de Villeroi*, Secretary of State to *Henry IV.*

e We are subject to the

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as eminent for his Piety and Religion; as for his Learning and Politicks. *Lipsius* frankly owns, that he values *Machiavel* more than all the other modern Politicians^f; which he would never have said, had he suspected *Machiavel*, in the least; either of Infidelity or Atheism. To this we may add, that *Machiavel*, who needed the Protection of the Family of *Medicis*, would never have presumed to dedicate his Prince to *Laurence of Medicis* in the Life-time of his Uncle Pope *Leo X.* if it had been an impious Book: Neither would he have presumed, some Years after, to inscribe his History of *Florence* to Pope *Clement VII.* with an Epistle, wherein he says, that *he hopes his Holiness will cover him with the Buckler of his Pontifical*

Qui nuper aut heri id tentarunt non me tenent aut terrent, in quos, si verè loquendum est, Cleobuli illud conveniat: Inscitia in plebisque, & sermonum multitudo. Nisi quòd unius tamen Machiavelli ingenium non contemno, acere, subtile, igneum. Sed nimis sæpe deflexit, & dum commodi illas semitas intente sequitur, aberravit à regià viâ. Preface to his Doctrina Civilis. " Those who very lately " have made any Attempts

" this way, neither raise my
" Attention nor my Fear.
" To them we may truly
" apply that Saying of Cleobulus: Most of them are
" grossly ignorant, and yet
" abound in a Multitude of
" Words. Machiavel is the
" only political Writer
" whom I esteem, for the
" Sharpness, Subtlety, and
" Fire of his Genius. But
" while he closely follows
" the Paths of Interest, he
" too often deviates from the
" great Highway of Truth."

P R E F A C E. xvii

fical Approbation s, had he passed for a Man of no Religion. Let me observe, by-the-by, that those who will take the Trouble to read the 12th Chapter of the first Book of his Discourses, where he shews how highly necessary it is to keep up Divine Worship; and the first Chapter of the third Book, where he commends the *Franciscans* and *Dominicans*, as the Restorers of *Christianity*, which the bad Lives of the Prelates had intirely disfigured; will find, that however much he deserved the Name of a worldly wise Man, he had very good Sentiments in point of Religion, and that consequently we ought to put a more favourable Construction, than is usually done, upon certain State-Maxims, the Practice of which is become in a Manner absolutely necessary, on account of the Wickedness and Perfidy of Mankind. Princes, besides, are now grown so refined and subtle, that it is impossible to deal with them in a plain and open Manner, without being their Dupe.

I could say a great deal more in favour of *Machiavel*; but as I am writing a Preface, not an Apology, I leave him to be defended by those who are more interested in Politicks than I, or who are better able to defend him. I shall only

a

add

* *Sperando che sarà dalle tiffimo giudicio aiutato & disarmate legioni del suo san- feso.*

add what it is fit the Reader should know with regard to this Translation of his Prince †.

Besides several Notes, taken from the other Works of *Machiavel*, and from the Histories of *Nardi* and *Guicciardin*, I have placed under the Text several Quotations from *Tacitus*, which serve to prove, confirm, or exemplify what *Machiavel* says. This makes a sort of Concordance between the Politicks of these two Authors; from which it will appear, that it is impossible to approve or condemn the one without the other: So that if *Tacitus* is proper to be read by those who ought to learn the Art of Government, *Machiavel* is not less so; the former shewing how the *Roman* Emperors governed of old, and the latter how Princes ought to govern in our Times.

Some perhaps will ask, Whether I think that *Cesar Borgia*, whom *Machiavel* proposes for the Imitation of Princes, is a good Model? I answer, that he is an excellent Model for new Princes, that is, for private Men who usurp a Principality, but a very bad one for Princes by Inheritance. It plainly appears from two Passages in the 7th Chapter of this Book, that *Machiavel* only proposes

† As the two next Paragraphs of this Preface relate only to some Peculiarities in the *French* Translation, it has been thought proper to leave them out, as foreign to the *English* Reader.

P R E F A C E. xix

proposes *Cæsar Borgia* as an Example for Usurpers, who indeed cannot maintain their Usurpation, without being cruel, at least in the Beginning; because all those who do not find their Account in such a Change, are of Course their Enemies; and even those who had the chief Hand in bringing it about, are not long their Friends, for want of being gratified in all their Pretensions: Whereas hereditary Princes, if they govern but tolerably well, have no Occasion to support themselves by Severity and Violence, their Subjects having been long accustomed to the Sovereignty of their Family. As to Duke *Valentine* (*Cæsar Borgia's* Title) I confess he was a very bad Man, and deserved a thousand Deaths^h; but at the same time it must be acknowledged, that he was both a great General and a great Politician, and one to whom we may justly apply what *Paterculus* said of *Cinna*; viz. that his Attempts were such as no good Man dared to make; but that he succeeded in several Enterprizes which none but a Man of superior Courage would have been able to effectⁱ.

a 2

I

A Cæsarem Borgiam vel ausum eum, quæ nemo aude-
mille neces meritum, says ret bonus; perfecisse quæ à
Onufrio Panvini in his Life nullo, nisi fortissimo, perfici
of Pope Julius II. possent. Hist. 2.
De quo verè dici potest,

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I shall conclude with observing, that *Machiavel*, who is every-where represented as an Advocate for Tyranny, detested it more than any Man of his Time. This appears from the 10th Chapter of the first Book of his Discourses, where he greatly inveighs against Tyrants. *Nardi**, his Cotemporary, says that he was one of those who made Panegyricks upon Liberty, and upon Cardinal *Julius* of *Medicis*, who after the Death of *Leo X.* feigned that he would make his Country free. *Nardi* adds that *Machiavel* was suspected to be an Accomplice in the Conspiracy of *Jacopo de Diacetto*, *Zanobi Buondelmonti*, *Luigi Alamanni*, and *Cosimo Rucellai*, against that Cardinal, on account of his intimate Connexion with them and the rest of the *Libertines*; a Name which the Partisans of the Family of *Medicis* gave to those who stood up for Liberty in *Florence*. It was probably on account of this Suspicion that he was not rewarded for his History of *Florence*, which he had compiled by Order of the said Cardinal, as he himself takes Notice in the Beginning of his Dedication. This is all I think necessary to say concerning the Person and Writings of *Machiavel*, of which I leave every Man to judge as he pleases.

* Book 3. of his History of *Florence*.



Nicholas Machiavel

To the Most Illustrious

LAURENCE de MEDICIS,

Duke of Urbin, &c.*

IT is^o usual with those who court the Favour of a Prince, to present him either with such Things as they value most, or with those in which they see him take a peculiar Pleasure: For this Reason, he is often presented with Horses, Arms, Gold-Stuffs, precious Stones, and the like Ornaments, suitable to the Greatness of his Rank. Being therefore ambitious to appear before you with some Testimony of my humble Attachment, I could think of nothing more dear and precious to myself, than the Knowledge of the Actions of great Men, acquired by my long Experience in modern Affairs, and my continual Study of what passed in former Times. Having long and carefully examined,

* This Prince was Father to Catharine de Medicis; Queen of France: He died in the Year 1519.

examined this Subject, and now brought my Reflections upon it within the Compass of a small Book, I make bold to lay them at your Feet; not that I think it a Gift worthy of your Acceptance, but because from the Opinion I have of your Goodness, I flatter myself with the Hopes of your deigning to receive it: especially since the richest Present I can make is, to give you an Opportunity of knowing in a very short Time what I have learned in a Course of many Years, and at the Expence of infinite Hardships and Dangers. I have not studied to recommend this Work by a Number of lofty Periods, and high-sounding Expressions, nor by any other of those outward Embellishments and Charms with which many chuse to set off their Productions; because I had rather mine should have no Merit at all, than that this should consist in any thing but the Truth of my Reflections, and the Solidity of the Subject.

LET no Man think it Presumption, that a Person of low Rank should thus venture to prescribe Rules of Government to Princes;
for

for in the same Manner as those who draw Landships, place themselves upon a Plain when they would observe the Nature of the Mountains, and high Grounds; but ascend to the Tops of the Mountains, in order to observe the Face of the Valleys; so, to know the Nature of the People well, it is necessary to be a Prince; and one must be a private Subject, in order to be well acquainted with the Nature of Princes.

MAT you therefore accept this small Present with the same Good-will as I beg Leave to offer it! If you read and consider it carefully, you will there see how ardently I wish for your attaining to that Grandeur which Fortune and your great Qualities pre-sage to you: And if, from that high Station in which you are placed, you should sometimes vouchsafe to look down, you will find how unjustly I stand exposed to the severe and continual Persecutions of Fortune.

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EXA-





EXAMINATION OF *Machiavel's* PRINCE.

CHAP. I.

*The several Sorts of Principalities,
and after what Manner they are
acquired.*



ALL States and Sovereignities that
ever had, or now have, Authority
over Men, have been and
are either Republicks or Principa-
lities^a. Principalities are either
hereditary, where the Family of the Prince
has

^a This Division is founded
upon the Doctrine of *Taci-*
fus, That a Principality and

a Republick are two Oppo-
sites. *Res diffociabiles, Prin-*
cipatum & Libertatem. In
Agricola.

2 EXAMINATION of

has been long in Possession^b; or new. The new are either wholly so, as the Dutchy of *Milan* was to *Francis Sforza*; or they are annexed, as Members, to the hereditary States of the Prince who acquires them, as the Kingdom of *Naples* is to the King of *Spain*. Dominions thus acquired, are accustomed either to be subject to a Prince, or to be free; and are acquired either by foreign Arms, or one's own, either by Fortune or Valour.

OBSERVATIONS.

If a Man would reason well upon any Subject, he must begin with examining thoroughly the Nature of it; he must go back to the very Source and Rise of Things, in order to lay down the first Principles of them, with as much Certainty as possible; it will then be an easy matter to trace out their Progress, and all the Consequences that may follow. Instead of beginning with an Account of the different Sorts of Dominion, *Machiavel* ought, methinks,

Agricola. Romam a principio Reges habuere: Libertatem L. Brutus instituit. Ann. 1. C. Marius & L. Sulla Libertatem in dominationem vertunt. Hist. 2. Haud facile Libertas & Dominum miscetur. Hist. 4. Indeed every Principality is not a Republick; but every Republick is a Principality: Il serenissimo Principe sa saper, says the

Republick of *Venice* in its Edicts.

^b 'Tis in this Sense that *Galba* said to *Piso*, *In gentibus, quæ regnantur, certa dominorum domus. Tacit. Hist. 1. And Mucianus to Vespasian: Non contra Caii aut Claudii, vel Neronis, fundatam longo imperio domum exsurgimus. Hist. 2.*



MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 3

methinks, to have inquired into the Rise of supreme Power, and enlarged upon the Reasons that induced Men, who were free, to subject themselves to a Master.

But in a Book designed to inculcate Tyranny and Crime, it would perhaps have been improper to mention what tends to destroy both: It would have ill become *Machiavel* to declare, that the People found it necessary for their own Preservation and Quiet to have Judges, who might decide their Differences; Protectors, to defend them against their Enemies, and secure them in their Possessions; and Sovereigns, to unite all their various Interests in one common Interest, and that at first they chose out of their own Number such Men to govern them as had the greatest Reputation for Wisdom, Equity, Disinterestedness, Humanity, or Valour.

A Sovereign, he should have said, was originally designed for the Good of the People; this is therefore what a Prince ought to prefer to every other Consideration; and Justice alone ought to be the Guide of all his Actions. What becomes then of all those Notions of Self-Interest, Grandeur, Ambition and Despotism; when it appears that the Sovereign, far from being the absolute Master of his People, is nothing more than their chief Servant?

As I propose to refute the pernicious Principles of this Book, one by one, I shall only speak of them as the Subject of each Chapter gives Occasion. Here I must observe in general, from what I have said concerning the Rise of supreme Power, that an Act of Usurpation or Tyranny appears to be far more criminal than an Act of Violence; since the Prince, who sacrifices his People, and their Properties, to his Avarice and Caprice, is not only

4 E X A M I N A T I O N o f

guilty of Violence, but of a Breach of the Trust reposed in him ; the People having vested him with Power for no other End but that he might protect them. There are but three lawful ways of acquiring Sovereignty ; either by Inheritance, or Election, or Conquest, as when some Provinces are gained from the Enemy in a War undertaken upon just Motives.

I would intreat those for whom I design this Work, not to forget my Remarks upon this Chapter, since upon these all the following Remarks will depend.

C H A P. II.

Of Hereditary Principalities.

I Shall omit speaking of Republicks, having discoursed of them elsewhere at large*: Here I shall only treat of Principalities, and shew, according to the foregoing Division, how they may be governed and maintained. I say then, that hereditary States, and such as
are

O B S E R V A T I O N S.

Men have a sort of superstitious Veneration for every thing that is ancient ; and when the Right of Inheritance is joined with Antiquity, the Yoke it imposes is easily borne, however grievous : So I would be far from denying *Machiavel* what
every

* In his Discourses on *Livy*.

MACHIABEL'S PRINCE. 5

are accustomed to the Family of the Prince, are preserved with less Difficulty than the new^a; because it is sufficient for the Sovereign not to depart from the Order established by his Predecessors^b, and withal to fit himself to such Accidents as occur. So that if a Prince

every Man will grant him, that hereditary Kingdoms are most easy to govern.

I shall only observe, that hereditary Princes are secured in their Possessions by an intimate Connection which generally subsists between them and the principal Families in their Dominions; most of these Families owing their Elevation and Estates to the Predecessors of the Sovereign, and having their Fortunes so entirely dependent upon his, that they can never forsake him, without forsaking themselves.

In

^a Tacitus observes, that a Sovereignty got by Violence, cannot be preserved by Lenity and Moderation. *Non posse Principatum scelere quietum, subita modestia, et prisca gravitate teneri.* Hist.

I. Now the Rigour that is commonly necessary for preserving a State, newly conquer'd, often causes the Loss of it; the Subjects growing at length impatient, and rebelling. *Atque illi,* says Tacitus, *quamvis servitio sueti,*

patientiam abrumpunt. Ann. 12.

^b Much the same thing was said to Nero; that being no longer a Child, but of Age to govern, he needed no Master, nor any other Instruction, but the Example of his Ancestors. *Finitam Neronis pueritiam, et robur juventutis adesse; exueret magistrum, satis amplis doctoribus instructus Majoribus suis.* Ann. 14. Tacitus observes, that Tiberius, in the Beginning of

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Prince is but tolerably industrious, he will always keep Possession of his Dominions, unless there be some extraordinary Power that deprives him of them; and even in that Case, no sooner does the least Misfortune befall the Usurper, but the other recovers them. *Italy* affords an Example of this, in the Duke of *Ferrara*, who was able to withstand the *Venetians*,

In our Days, numerous and formidable Armies, which Princes keep up in Times of Peace, as well as of War, contribute likewise to the Security of their States, and like naked Swords overawe their Enemies, and refrain the Ambition of neighbouring Princes.

But it is not sufficient for a Prince to be, as *Machiavel* calls it, *di ordinaria industria*, tolerably industrious;

of his Reign, made it his Rule to imitate the Conduct of *Augustus* in every thing. *Neque fas Tiberio infringere dicta ejus.* Ann. 1. *qui omnia facta, dictaque ejus, vice legis observem.* Ann. 1. and that he durst not yet treat with Rigour, a People whom *Augustus* had used with so great Mildness. *Populum per tot annos molliter habitum non audebat ad duriora vertere.* Ann. 1. That *Vonones* was despised and banished by the *Parthians*, because his Conduct had been entirely

opposite to that of their former Kings. *Accendebat de- dignantes et ipse, diversus a Majorum institutis.* Ann. 2. And on the contrary, that *Italus* pleased the *Germans* so much the more, because, tho' he had been brought up at *Rome*, yet he fell in with them in their Debauches, just as if he had always lived with them. *Latus Germanis adventus, atque eo magis, quod saepius violentiam ac libidines, grata barbaris usurparet.* Ann. 11.

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 7

netians, in the Year 1484, and Pope *Julius* II. in 1510, purely because his Family had long possessed that Dutchy^c. For as a natural Prince has not so much Occasion or Necessity to oppress his Subjects, so he must needs be more beloved by them; and unless some extraordinary Vices concur to make him odious, his Subjects have a natural and just Affection

dustrious; he must use all Endeavours to make his People happy. Indeed, if they are not discontented, they will never think of revolting; but when a Prince makes his People happy, they will always be more afraid of losing him, than he can be of losing any Part of his Power. The *Dutch* would never have revolted from *Spain*, had not the *Spaniards* carried Oppression and Tyranny to such a Height, that the *Dutch* could not be more miserable than they were already.

Naples, and *Sicily* too, have passed more than once from the *Spaniards* to the *Germans*, and from these again to the *Spaniards*. Why was it always so easy a matter to conquer them? The Government of both these Nations was equally rigorous and oppressive, and the People always expected a Deliverance in a Change of Masters.

What

^c We rebel not against the House of *Augustus*, which hath so long possessed the Empire, said *Mucianus* to *Vespasian* (*Tacit. Hist.* 2.);

intimating, that it was needless to fear the Empire would ever return to *Vitellius*, when once he was dispossessed of it.

B 4

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Affection for him: Besides, an old and uninterrupted Possession of Sovereignty takes away the Memory and Causes of Innovation; for one Change always leaves, as in Buildings, a Toothing and Facility for establishing another.

CHAP.

What a Difference there is between the *Neapolitans*, and the People of *Lorrain*! When these were obliged to change their Sovereign, all *Lorrain* was in Tears, and lamented the Departure of a Family, whose Predecessors had for so many Ages possessed that flourishing Country: Some of them had the most amiable Qualities, and were Patterns for Kings. The Memory of Duke *Leopold* was still so dear to the *Lorrainers*, that when his Widow was obliged to quit *Lunneville*, the whole People fell upon their Knees before her Coach, the Horses were often stopp'd, and nothing was heard or seen but Cries and Tears.

For, according to *Tacitus*, it is always less dangerous to put up with the Prince who is in Possession, than look out for another. *Minori discrimine sumi principes, quam queri.* Hist. 1.

According to *Paterculus*, People always improve upon the first Examples. *Non enim ibi consistunt exempla unde cœperunt; sed quamlibet in tenuem recepta tramitem*

latissime evagandi sibi viam faciunt. Hist. 2. And that one Change never fails to draw on another, we have several beautiful Instances in *Tacitus*. *Libertatem & Consulatum L. Brutus instituit. Dictaturæ ad tempus sumebantur: neque Decemviralis potestas ultra biennium, neque tribunorum militum Consulatus jus diu valuit. non Cinna, non Sulla longa domi-*
natio;

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CHAP. III.

Of Mixt Principalities.

BUT the Difficulty lies in maintaining a Principality newly acquired. First, if it is not entirely new, but has only a new Member incorporated with it, so that

natio; et Pompeii Grassique potentia cito in Casarem: Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere. Ann. 1.
 " Lucius Brutus founded Liberty and the Consulship.
 " Dictators were chosen only in pressing Exigencies.
 " The supreme Power of the Decemvirate prevail'd little more than two Years; and the Consular Jurisdiction of the Military Tribunes not very many. The Domination of Cinna was but short; that of Sylla not long. The Authority of Pompey and Crassus was quickly swallow'd up in Caesar; that of Lepidus and Antony in Augustus."
 You see there a whole Series of Changes: Here follows another. *Sulla dictator abolitis vel conversis prioribus: cum plura addidisset, otium ei rei haud in longum paravit. Statim turbidis Lepidi rogationibus, neque multo post*

Tribunis reddita licentia quoquo vellent populum agitandi. Jamque non modo in commune, sed in singulos homines latae quaestiones-----Exin continua per viginti annos discordia, non mos, non jus. Ann. 3.
 " Sylla the Dictator, changing or abolishing the past, added many Regulations of his own, and procured some Respite in this Matter, but not long; for presently follow'd the turbulent Suits and Proposals of Lepidus, and soon after were the Tribunes restored to their licentious Authority of throwing the People into Combinations at Pleasure. And now Laws were not made for the Publick only, but for particular Men particular Laws.-----Henceforward for twenty Years civil Discord raged, and there was neither Law nor Settlement."

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that the whole may be called a Mixt Principality, it is exposed to Changes and Revolutions from a natural Inconveniency that arises in all new Sovereignties; which is, that Men easily part with their Prince, in Hopes of bettering their Condition^a; and these Hopes prompt them to rebel and take Arms against their Governor; but they are generally deceived; for they soon find by Experience, that their Condition is much worse^b. This again proceeds from a natural and usual Necessity

OBSERVATIONS.

The fifteenth Century, wherein *Machiavel* lived, was still rude and barbarous: the fatal Glory of making Conquests, and of performing great Actions, that dazzle the World, and impose a sort of Respect, was still preferred to Moderation, Justice, Clemency, and the other Virtues. In our Days

^a *Parthos presentibus mobiles, absentium æquos.* Ann. 6. All Nations are of this Disposition, *servitii ingenio*, from a Capriciousness that accompanies Slavery, says *Tacitus*, Ann. 12.

^b Do you believe, said a Roman Senator, that the Tyranny died with *Nero*? It was thought extinguished by the Death of *Tiberius*, and of

Caligula, and yet we have seen a new Tyrant more cruel than those. *An Neronem extremum dominum putatis? Idem crediderant, qui Tiberio, qui Caio, superstites fuerunt: cum interim intestabilior et sævior exortus est.* Hist. 4. *Claudius* therefore had Reason to tell the *Parthian* Embassadors, who came to ask a better King than

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cessity which Princes are under to disgust their new Subjects, by oppressing them with Troops, Taxes, and a thousand other Inconveniences, which are the natural Effects of Conquest^c. Infomuch that you render all those your Enemies, whom you have wrong'd by seizing the Principality, and cannot preserve the Friendship of those who aided you, because

Days we see Humanity valued above all the Qualities of a Conqueror; the Folly of praising and encouraging those cruel Passions, that turn the World up-side down, is now at an End.

I would ask, what Reasons a Man can have for aggrandizing himself? What Right to form the Design

than the Prince who then govern'd, that frequent Changes were of no Use, and that they ought to bear with the Humours of their Kings as much as possible. *Ferenda Regum ingenia, neque usui crebras mutationes.* Ann. 12. All Subjects ought to adopt the Sentiments of that Roman Senator, who said, that he admired the Times past, without condemning the present; and that though he wished for good Princes, yet he patiently submitted to such as were bad, always remembering how necessary it is to live according to the Times.

Se meminisse temporum, quibus natus sit; ulteriora mirari, presentia sequi, bonos Imperatores voto expetere, qualescunque tolerare. Hist. 4. This is what Machiavel justly calls a Golden Sentence. *Discorsi*, lib. 3. chap. 6.

^c *Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt Moliri, et late fines custode tueri,* says Dido in *Virgil*. *Æneid*. 1. *Arma,* says *Tacitus*, Ann. 1. *quæ neque parari possunt, neque haberi per bonas artes.* That is, It is impossible to take Arms, and at the same time to keep within the Bounds of Moderation.

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because you are neither able to satisfy their Expectations, nor to treat them with Rigour, as being obliged to them: For let a Prince have ever so powerful an Army, he must likewise have the Favour of the Natives, if he would conquer a Province. Thus it was that *Lewis XII.* of *France* quickly subdued *Milan*, and as quickly lost it: For the same People that had open'd their Gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their Hopes, and disappointed of those future Advantages which they expected, were not able to bear with the Haughtiness of their new Sovereign.
It

Design of raising his Power upon the Ruin and Destruction of others? Or how he can expect to make himself illustrious, by rendering others miserable? The new Conquests of a Sovereign do not enrich or improve his old Dominions; his Subjects are not the better for them; and he deceives himself, if he thinks they add to his Happiness. How many Princes have, by means of their Generals, conquer'd Provinces they never saw? These Conquests are in some respect imaginary; imaginary

^a *Tacitus* says, that the *Parthians* received *Tiridates* with open Arms, hoping he would use them better than *Artabanus* had done; and that in a little time, they hated *Tiridates* as much as they had loved him, and recalled *Artabanus* whom before they had so much hated. *Qui Artabanum ob sevitiam execrati come Tiridatis ingenium sperabant—ad Artabanum vertere, &c.* Ann. 6.

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It is very true, that a Country which has once rebelled, and is conquered a second time, is not so easily lost; because the Prince, after a Rebellion, is more at Liberty to secure himself, by punishing Offenders, exposing the Suspected, and strengthening himself where he finds he is weak. So that if Duke *Lodwick** was able to recover *Milan*, the first Time, out of the Hands of the *French*, merely by making a Bustle upon its Borders; he was not able to recover it a second time,

ginary with regard to the Prince who acquires them: and yet many People must be reduced to Misery, in order to satisfy the Caprice of a single Man, who seldom deserves so much as to be known.

But suppose this Conqueror brings all the World under his Subjection; can he govern all the World, when subdued? Let him be ever so mighty a Prince, he is but a very limited Being; he can scarce remember the Names of all his Provinces; and his imaginary Grandeur will but the more expose his real Littleness.

'Tis

* *Tacitus* observes, that *Rhadamistus* having recovered *Armenia*, from whence he had been expell'd by his Subjects, he treated them with excessive Rigour, looking upon them as Rebels, who only waited for a new Op-

portunity of revolting. *Vacuam rursus Armeniam invasit, truculentior quam antea, tanquam adversus defectores, et in tempore rebellaturos.* Ann. 12.

* *Lodwick Sforza*, surnamed the *Moor*.

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time, till he had confederated all the World against them, and till their Armies were wasted, and driven out of *Italy*. And this proceeded from the Causes above-mentioned.

Nevertheless the *French* were twice dispossessed of *Milan*: The general Reasons of their losing it the first time, we have already discoursed of. It now remains, that we consider how they came to be dispossessed again, and shew what Remedies the King of *France* had, or any other Prince in his Situation may have, for securing his Conquest. I say then, that Provinces newly acquired, and join'd to the ancient Territory of the Prince who conquers them, are either of the same Country, or Language, or otherwise. In the first Case, they are easily kept, especially if the People have not been accustomed to Liberty: And to secure the Possession of them, it is only necessary to extirpate the Family of the Prince who govern'd before; for if in every thing else they are allow'd to enjoy their old Customs, and provided their Manners are not intirely different from those of the other Subjects, they will acquiesce, and live quietly; as has been seen in the Case of

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of *Burgundy, Bretagne, Gascoigne, and Normandy*, which have so long been subject to the Crown of *France*: For though their Language be something different, yet their Customs are alike; and therefore they are easily united into one People. Whoever therefore would preserve a Country which he has newly conquer'd, must be very careful of two things; the one, that the whole Race of the former Prince be extinguished, the other, that no new Law or Taxes be imposed: By this means it will in a very short time be incorporated with his hereditary Dominions. But here lies the great Difficulty, when a Conquest is made of a Country differing in Language, Customs and Laws; and in this Case, it can only be preserved by great Fortune, and great Industry ^f. One of the surest

'Tis not upon the Extent of a Country, that the Glory of its Sovereign depends: a few Leagues more of Land, will never make him more illustrious: for if it was otherwise, they would be the most valuable Men who had the largest Possessions.

Machiavel's Error, in this Point, may have been general in his Time; but certainly his wicked Max-

^f *Ex diversitate morum crebra bella, says Tacitus, Hist. 5.*

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surest and most effectual Expedients to keep it, would be for the Conqueror to live there himself, which would render his Possession more secure and durable; as the Great *Turk* has done in *Greece*, who, notwithstanding all his Policies to preserve that Country, would never have succeeded, had he not fixed his Residence there. For when a Prince is upon the Spot, he sees Disorders in their very Rise, and can presently crush them; whereas if he is at some Distance, he can only be inform'd

Maxims were not. Can any thing be more horrible than some of the Means which he proposes for preserving a Conquest? And indeed, there is not one of them, when well examined, but appears either unreasonable or unjust. *You must exterminate*, says he, *the whole Race of the Prince who governed before*. Is it possible to read such Precepts without Horror and Indignation? This is trampling under Foot every thing that is sacred and venerable, taking off all Restraint upon Self-interest, and paving a way for all manner of Crimes. If an ambitious Man has robbed a Prince of

* Slight Remedies have calmed the first Commotions, *modicis remediis primos motus sedidisse*. Tacit. Ann. 14. In this Sense it was said to *Tiberius*, that he needed but shew himself to

the Mutinous, and they would immediately return to their Duty. *Ire ipsum, & opponere majestatem Imperatoriam debuisse, cessuris ubi Principem vidissent*. Ann. 1,

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form'd of them when they are got to a head, and can no longer be prevented: Besides, the Province is not liable to be pillaged by his Officers; and the Subjects having the Convenience of applying to him immediately, and without Loss of Time, rest contented, and are thus disposed to love him, if they are good; and if wicked, to fear him: If any neighbouring Power has a mind to attack his Province, it must be done with more Care and Circumspection; since a Prince can never be dispossessed of a Country where he resides, without the greatest Difficulty.

There is another Remedy, still better than the former, which is to plant Colonies in one or two Places, that may be, as it were, the Keys of such a State; either this must needs be done, or an Army of Horse and Foot be maintained in those Parts. Now Colonies are of no great Expence; the Prince sends
and

of his Dominions, has he a Right to assassinate him likewise, or to poison him? But the same Conqueror, by such a Conduct, sets the World a Precedent for his own Destruction. Another more ambitious and expert than himself, will punish him by the Law of Retaliation, seize upon his Dominions, and destroy him with as much Cruelty

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and maintains them at very little Charge; and does Injury to none but those whom he is forced to dispossess of their Houses and Lands, for the Subsistence and Accommodation of the new Inhabitants: Besides, the Persons injured make but a small Part of the State, continue poor, and dispersed over the Province, and therefore can never hurt him; and all the rest, who are not injured, live peaceably and quiet, lest upon any Fault they should meet with the Fate of their Neighbours, who were dispossessed.

From whence I conclude, that those Colonies which are least chargeable, are most faithful and inoffensive; and the Persons offended, are too poor, and too much dispersed, to do any Hurt, as I said before. Here it must be observed, that Men are either to be
soothed

as he destroyed his Predecessor. Pope *Alexander VI.* had like to have been deposed for his Crimes; his Bastard, *Cæsar Borgia*, was stripp'd of all his unjust Possessions, and died in Misery. *Galeas Sforza* was murdered in one of the Churches of *Milan*; *Lodwick Sforza*, the Usurper, died in *France*, in an iron Cage; the Princes of *York* and *Lancaster* destroyed each other by turns; as did the Emperors of *Greece*, till at length the *Turks* took Advantage of their Crimes, and exterminated

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soothed and indulged, or utterly destroyed ^h; because slight Injuries leave them the Power of Revenge, but great ones do not: so that an Injury ought to be such as removes all Fear of Revenge. But if, instead of Colonies, an Army is kept on foot, it will be much more expensive, and the whole Revenue of the Province will be consumed in Garisons: So that the Acquisition will become a Loss, and rather prejudicial than useful, since the whole State must suffer by the frequent removing of the Camp into different Parts of the Country; an Inconvenience which every Man will resent, and be ready to revenge; and of all Enemies those are the most dangerous who are provoked by Insolences

nated their whole Power. If at present there are fewer Revolutions in *Christendom*, 'tis because the Principles of sound Morality are more universally known, Men are less savage and fierce, and their Understanding is better cultivated; and perhaps all this is owing to Men of Learning, who have polish'd *Europe*.

Ma-

^h *Gli uomini grandi*, says *Machiavel*, in the fourth Book of his History of *Florence*, *o non s'hanno à toccare, o tocchi à spegnere.* That is, Great Men must never be provoked; or if they are provoked, must be killed.

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lences offered them in their own Houses. In all respects therefore, this sort of Guard is prejudicial, whereas that of Colonies is useful.

Besides, a Prince who gains a Province, the Language, Customs and Laws of which are different from those of his old Dominions, should make himself Head and Protector of his inferior Neighbours, use all Endeavours to weaken such as are more powerful, and take particular Care that no Stranger as powerful as himself, ever come into that Province: for the Discontented will always be ready to call in some foreign Aid, either through Ambition, or Fear. Thus we see the *Romans* were brought into *Greece* by the *Etolians*, and never got footing in any Province but by means of the Natives.

What commonly happens in such Cases is this: No sooner does a foreign Potentate invade a Country, but all those who are weaker
and

Machiavel's second Maxim is, That the Conqueror ought to fix his Residence in his new Dominions. There is nothing cruel in this; nay, it seems in some respects to be a wise Maxim: But it must be consider'd, that the Dominions of a great Prince are generally so situated, that he can hardly remove from the Centre, without doing a Pre-

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 21

and discontented, join with him, out of the Hatred they bear to those who are above them: Infomuch that no Pains must be omitted to gain those inferior Lords, and when gained, they readily and unanimously fall into one Mass with the State that is conquer'd. Only the Conqueror must take special Care they grow not too strong, nor be trusted with too much Authority; and then with his own Forces, and their Assistance, he can easily weaken and depress the others, who are more powerful, and thus make himself sole Arbiter in that Province. He who cannot put this Method in Practice, must quickly lose what he has got; and, while he holds it, will find himself exposed to numberless Difficulties and Inconveniencies. The *Romans* in their new Conquests strictly observed these Maxims; they planted Colonies, encouraged and protected the inferior Lords, without

Prejudice to the Whole; for when the Sovereign, who is the first Principle of Activity in a State, leaves the Centre of it, the Extremities must needs languish.

The third political Maxim is, That Colonies must be planted in new Conquests, for securing the Fidelity of the Conquer'd.

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without increasing their Power, depressed and weakened the greater, and never suffered any foreign Prince to gain Interest among them. I shall confine myself to the Province of *Greece* for an Example. They protected the *Etolians* and *Achaians*, depressed the Kingdom of the *Macedonians*, and expelled *Antiochus* their King; and yet the Merit and Fidelity of the *Achaians* and *Etolians* could never procure them any Increase of Authority, nor the Solicitations of *Philip* induce the *Romans* to be his Friends, till they had weakened him; nor the Power of *Antiochus* prevail with them, to consent, that he should retain any Sovereignty in *Greece*. The *Romans* acted in this Case as all wise Princes ought to do, who should have an Eye to future, as well as to present Dangers and Inconveniencies, and use all Means to prevent

The Author supports this Doctrine by the Practice of the *Romans*; but does not consider, that if the *Romans* had not sent their Legions into those Countries, where their Colonies were settled, they would have quickly lost their Conquests; besides, they had the Art of making Alliances. The *Romans*, in the happy Times of the Commonwealth, were the wisest Robbers that ever infested and plunder'd the World; they preserved with Prudence,

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vent them ; which is easily done, if they are foreseen at a Distance ; whereas, if you wait till they draw nearer, the Remedy comes too late, and the Disease is incurable. The Physicians observe, that a Hætic Fever, in its Beginning, is easily cured, and hard to be known ; but when for want of being discovered and taken in Time, it grows to a head, it is then easily known, but very difficult to be cured. Thus it is in Affairs of State : Evils that are seen at a Distance (which can only be done by Men of Prudence and Penetration) are quickly redressed ; but when for want of being foreseen and prevented, they

dence, what they had acquired with Injustice : But this People at length met with the Fate of all Usurpers, and were oppressed in their turn.

Let us now examine whether those Colonies, for the Settlement of which *Machiavel* would have his Prince commit so great Violence and Injustice, are really so useful as he represents. The Colonies you send into a Country newly conquer'd, are either powerful or weak ; if powerful, you weaken yourself considerably by dispeopling your old Dominions, and dislodging a great Number of your new Subjects ; if they are weak, they will not be a sufficient Security ; and, without much Advantage to yourself, you render all those miserable, whom you have dispossessed.

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they come to such a Height, as to be generally known, they are past all Remedy. The *Romans* therefore saw their Dangers at a Distance, and always prevented them; they would never put up with any Inconvenience to avoid a War; for they knew the War was by this means not avoided, but only deferred, till the Enemy grew stronger: They chose therefore to make War upon *Philip* and *Antiochus* in *Greece*, that they might prevent having a War with them in *Italy*: They might, at that Time, have easily avoided a War with both these Princes; but the *Romans* never relished that Saying which is every Day in the Mouths of our new Politicians, *That we ought to enjoy the Advantages*

¹ *Fuit proprium populi Romani longe a domo bellare,* says *Cicero*. "It was the peculiar Policy of the Roman People to make War at a great Distance from their own Country." *Tiberius* always observed this Maxim: *Destinata reticens, consiliis & astu res externas moliri, arma procul habere.* *Tacit. Ann. 6.* "He concealed his Designs, contrived and managed foreign Affairs with Prudence and Artfulness, and

"kept War at a great Distance from home." The *Romans* took this Course, in order to preserve the Freedom and Riches of *Italy*; for if a foreign Prince had once got footing in it, he might have turned the Arms and Riches of the Country against them, and by that means have considerably weakened their State. And in this Sense it was *Hannibal* said to *Antiochus*, That the *Romans* could only be conquered in *Italy*.

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 25

vantages of the present Time: They trusted rather to their own Prudence and Valour than to Time, which may produce any thing, Evil as well as Good, and Good as well as Evil.

But let us return to *France*, and examine whether it has acted in this manner. I shall not speak of *Charles VIII.* but only of *Lewis XII.* as being a Prince who continued longer in Possession of *Italy*, whose Proceedings and Management are therefore more easily discerned: It will appear, that he acted the very Reverse of every thing that is necessary for preserving such a Province as we now speak of. *Lewis* was brought into *Italy* by the Ambition of the *Venetians*, who expected to gain half *Lombardy* by his coming. I will not blame that Expedition,
nor

'Tis therefore much better to send regular Troops into such a Country; for if good Order and Discipline are but observed, the Soldiers will neither oppress the Natives, nor be chargeable to the Towns where they are quarter'd. But in *Machiavel's* Time, this sort of Policy was unknown: Armies were only raised upon great Exigencies, and for the most part were nothing else but a Multitude of Vagrants and Free-booters: Standing Armies, Magazines, Caserns, and a thousand other
Re-

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nor the King's Councils; for as he wanted to get footing in *Italy*, and had no Allies in that Country, as the very Gates were shut against him on account of the Mismanagement of *Charles* his Predecessor, he was obliged to take up with such Friends as he could get; and his Enterprize would have succeeded, had he not committed several Errors. *Lewis* therefore had no sooner subdued *Lombardy*, but he recovered all the Reputation that was lost by King *Charles*; *Genoa* submitted; *Florence* courted his Friendship; the Marquis of *Mantua*, the Duke of *Ferrara*, the *Bentivoglio's**, the Coun-

Regulations, that secure a State in Times of Peace, both against its foreign and domestic Enemies, were not yet in Use.

Machiavel's fourth Maxim is, That a Prince ought to make himself Head and Protector of the inferior Princes his Neighbours, and by sowing Diffention among them, raise or humble them, as he thinks fit. This was the Practice of *Clovis*, the first King of *France* that embraced the Christian Religion: His Example has been followed by some other Princes, not less cruel than himself. How different is this from the Conduct of a good King, who, when the neighbouring Princes are at

Va-

* Lords of *Bologna*.

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 27

Countess of *Forli*, the Lords of *Faenza*, *Pesaro*, *Rimini*, *Camerini* and *Piombini*; the People of *Lucca*, *Pisa* and *Sienna*, all addressed themselves to him, for his Alliance and Friendship. Then it was the *Venetians* might have perceived their Folly; since to gain two Towns in *Lombardy*, they had made the King of *France* Master of two thirds of *Italy*. Now let any one consider with how little Difficulty the King might have kept up his Reputation in that Country, had he observed the Rules above-mentioned, and protected his Confederates, who being numerous, and yet weak, and fearing some the Pope, and some the *Venetians*, were always under a Necessity of adhering to him, and might have been the means of securing him

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Variance, becomes their Mediator, decides their Quarrels, and gains their Confidence by his Probity, Justice and Disinterestedness! Such a Prince is not only the Father of his People, but of his Neighbours.

Besides, it may be observed, that those Princes who raise others to a Throne by violent Means, generally undo themselves. We have two Instances of this in the present Century; one of *Charles XII.* King of *Sweden*, who raised *Stanislaus* to the Throne of *Poland*; and another, which

is

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effectually against any Competitor whatever. Yet no sooner had *Lewis* entered *Milan*, but he did the very reverse, and sent Supplies to Pope *Alexander*, to put him in Possession of *Romagna*; not considering, that he weakened himself by disgusting his Friends, who had thrown themselves into his Arms; and that he aggrandized the Church, by adding to its spiritual Authority, which was so formidable before, so great a Proportion of Temporal. Having committed this first Error, he was forced to go on in it; till at length, in order to put a Stop to the Ambition of Pope *Alexander*, and hinder his making himself Master of all *Tuscany*, he was obliged to come again into *Italy*. Nor was it enough for him to have advanced the Interest of the Church, and deserted his Friends; but out of an

is still later. I conclude therefore, that true Glory is not to be purchased by Usurpation; that Assassinations will always be abhorred; that a Prince who treats his new Subjects with Injustice and Violence, will forfeit the Esteem and Affection of all the rest; that it is impossible to justify Crime, and that all who apologize for it, will argue no better than *Machiavel*. To employ our Reason against Humanity, is wounding ourselves with a Weapon that was given us for our Defence.

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 29

an Ambition to possess himself of the Kingdom of *Naples*, he shared it with the King of *Spain*. Thus *Lewis*, who before was sole Umpire of *Italy*, introduced a Partner, to whom the Ambitious of that Province and his own Malecontents must have Recourse upon Occasion; turned out a King of *Naples*, whom he might have made a tributary Prince; and put in another, powerful enough to turn out himself.

Certainly there is nothing more common, or indeed more natural, than for a Prince to desire new Acquisitions^k; when he attempts nothing but what he is able to execute, he is always applauded^l, or at least not blamed: But when his Enterprizes are too great for his Power, and yet he pursues them, he is then deservedly censured. If the King of *France*, with his own Forces alone, was able to make himself Master of *Naples*, he ought to

^k *Vetus ac jampridem insita mortalibus potentiae cupido.* Hist. 2.

^l This was *Mucianus's* Sense of the Matter, when he said to *Vespasian*, I call you to the Empire; 'tis in your own Option; and you cannot without Indolence and Cowardice suffer another to

be raised to it, under whom besides you will neither be free nor safe. *Ego te ad imperium voco, in tua manu positum est.—Torpere ultra, & perdendam rempub. relinquere, sopor & ignavia videretur, etiamsi tibi, quam inhonesta, tam tuta servitus esset.* Hist. 2.

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to have done it; but if his own Forces were not sufficient, he ought not to have shared it with any other Power: And if his consenting to the Partition of *Lombardy* with the *Venetians*, is excusable, 'tis because he got Footing by that means in *Italy*. But his dividing *Naples* with the King of *Spain* is greatly to be blamed, because it was done without any such Necessity. *Lewis* therefore committed five Errors in this Expedition: He ruin'd the inferior Lords of that Country; augmented the Dominions of a neighbouring Prince; called in a Foreigner as powerful as himself; neglected to continue there in Person, and planted no Colonies. Nevertheless all these Errors might have been of no Prejudice, whilst this King lived, had he not committed a sixth, in depressing the Power of the *Venetians*. If indeed he had not aggrandized the Church, and brought the *Spaniards* into *Italy*, it would have been prudent and necessary to humble them; but after taking such Measures, he should never have suffer'd the *Venetians* to be ruin'd; because whilst their Strength was entire, they would have hindered others from making any Attempts upon *Lombardy*; for they would never have consented to it, but upon Condition

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 31

dition it should be delivered to them; and no Prince would ever have taken it from *France* to give it to the *Venetians*, or have had the Courage to attack them both together. If it is alledged, that King *Lewis* gave up *Romagna* to the Pope, and *Naples* to the King of *Spain*, that he might avoid a War; I answer, as before, that a present Mischief is never to be suffered, in order to prevent a War; for the War is by this means not prevented, but only put off, till the Enemy gathers more Strength, and will break out afterwards with greater Disadvantage. If it is further alledged, that *Lewis*, in order to obtain the Dissolution of his Marriage†, and a Cardinal's Cap for the Archbishop of *Rouen*, had given the Pope his Faith and Promise, that he would undertake this Enterprize for him; I refer to what I shall say hereafter concerning the Faith of Princes, and how far it is binding*.

Lewis therefore lost *Lombardy*, because he did not observe any of those Rules which
others

† With *Anne* Dutcheſs of *Bretagne*: Upon which *Nardi* pleasantly ſaid, that Pope *Alexander* and King *Lewis* XII. both made uſe of the Spiritual Authority to in-

large the Temporals, *Alexander* to get *Romagna* for his Son, and *Lewis* to unite *Bretagne* to his Kingdom. Book 4. of his *History of Florence*, * Chap. XVIII.

32 EXAMINATION of

others have follow'd who conquered Provinces, and kept them. Nor is it any thing extraordinary, but what commonly happens in such Cases, and ought to be expected. I remember I once talked upon this Subject with the Cardinal of *Rouen* at *Nantes*, just when *Romagna* was seized by *Valentino*; for this was the Name commonly given to *Cæsar Borgia*, Pope *Alexander's* Son. In the Heat of our Conference the Cardinal told me, *That the Italians were ignorant of the Art of War.* I replied, *That the French were not less ignorant in Affairs of State; otherwise they would never have made the Church so powerful.* And it has been found since by Experience, that the Grandeur of the Pope, and of the *Spaniards* in *Italy*, has been owing to *France*; and that in Return the Pope and the *Spaniards* have occasioned the Expulsion of the *French*.

From whence a general Conclusion may be drawn, and such as seldom or never fails; *That every Prince, by increasing the Power of another, lessens his own:* For that Increase proceeds either from his Conduct, or his Power, and both these make him at length suspected and odious to the Person he has raised.

CHAP.

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 33

CHAP. IV.

Why the Kingdom of Darius, subdued by Alexander, did not rebel against his Successors.

CONsidering the Difficulties in preserving a new Conquest, one may well admire how it happened, that *Asia*, which was subdued in a few Years by *Alexander* the Great, who died not long after, did not shake off the Yoke of his Successors, but was enjoyed by them without any other Disturbances, but such as arose from their own Ambition. I answer, that all Sovereignties whatever, of which we have any Account, were governed after one of these
two

OBSERVATIONS.

To make a right Judgment of the Genius of any Nation, we must necessarily compare it with others: *Machiavel* therefore in this Chapter draws a Parallel between the *Turks* and the *French*, whose Manners, Customs and Opinions are so very different; he gives the Reasons why the Conquest of the *Turkish* Empire would be difficult, and the keeping it, when conquered, easy; and shews, that on the contrary, the intestine Divisions of *France*,
D which

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two different Manners: Either by a Prince and his Servants, whom, out of his mere Favour and Choice, he constitutes his Ministers, and whose Assistance he takes in the Administration of his Kingdom; or by a Prince and his Barons, who hold that Rank, and share in the Government, not by the Favour or Concession of the Prince, but by virtue of their ancient and noble Extraction. These Barons have States and Subjects of their own, who acknowledge their Authority, and pay them a natural Respect. In those States that are governed by a Prince and his Servants, the Prince is more absolute,

which are the continual Disturbance and Danger of its Sovereign, would make it easy to be conquer'd, but hard to be kept.

Our Author views Things only in one single Light; and considers nothing but the different Constitutions of a Government; he seems to believe, that the Power of the *Turkish*, and likewise of the *Persian* Empire, is solely owing to the general Slavery of these Nations; and that an absolute and despotic Power, well established, is the surest means for a Prince to govern without Disturbance, and make a vigorous Resistance against his Enemies.

In *Machiavel's* Time *France* had still its Grandees and Nobles, those petty Sovereigns, who in some

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lute, because there is no other Sovereign in all his Dominions but himself; and if any other is obeyed, it is not out of any particular Affection to his Person, but only because he is the Minister and Substitute of the Prince. We have at this Time Examples of these two different Governments, in *Turkey* and *France*. The whole *Turkish* Monarchy is govern'd by a single Person; the rest are all his Slaves; he divides it into Provinces and Governments, sends thither what Officers he thinks fit, and changes them as often as he pleases. But the King of *France* is surrounded by a great Number of antient Lords, whose Sovereignities have been owned, and Families long beloved, by their Subjects, and who enjoy a Pre-eminence, which it is not in the King's Power to take from them, without inevitable Danger to himself.

some measure shared with their Prince in Authority and Power: This gave Occasion to continual Divisions, kept up and fomented Faction and Party, and was the Cause of frequent Rebellions. Nevertheless, it may be questioned whether the Grand Signior is not more exposed to be dethroned, than a King of *France* was in those Times: There seems to be this Difference between them, that the *Turkish* Emperor is commonly strangled by his Janissaries,

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himself. So that whoever compares the *Turkish* Empire with that of *France*, will find the former more difficult to be conquered, but when once conquered, more easy to be kept. The Reason of the Difficulty is, because the Invader cannot be called in by the Grandees of the Empire, nor expect any Assistance from the great Officers, to facilitate his Enterprize: And this proceeds from the Causes above-mentioned; for being all Slaves, and under Obligations to their Sovereign, they are not easily corrupted; and even if they could be corrupted, would be of very little Service, because, for the Reasons already given, they have no Interest with the People. Whence it appears, that whoever invades the *Turk*, must expect to find him intire and united, and must depend more upon his own

faries, whereas the Kings of *France*, who have been put to Death, were either assassinated by Monks, or by the Tools of Monks, and such Monsters as were of their forming.

But in this Chapter *Machiavel* treats rather of Revolutions in general, than of any particular Case; and indeed he has pointed out some secret Springs of a very complicated Machine; but does not seem to have examined others, that are not less considerable.

The

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 37

own Strength, than upon any Divisions among his Enemies: But when once they are conquered, and their Armies defeated beyond the Possibility of a Recruit, the Danger is at an End; for there is nobody remaining to be feared, but the Family of the Emperor, which being once exterminated, the rest having no Interest with the People, are as little to be apprehended after the Victory, as they were to be relied upon before. But in Kingdoms governed after the Model of *France*, it happens quite otherwise; for when you have gained some of the Barons, (and some of them will always be discontent, and disposed to Innovation) you may readily enter; they can give you easy Admission, and

The Diversity of Climates, Food and Education in Men, gives them a quite different Manner both of Thinking and Acting: This appears by comparing an *Italian* Monk with a *Chinese* Literato. But even in Nations that are not very remote from one another, this Difference of Manners and Genius is remarkable; as between a *German* and *Italian*; the one blunt and open, the other secret and artful: An *Englishman*, deep and solid, but melancholy, has but little Resemblance with the haughty, boasting *Spaniard*; and the Manners of a *Frenchman* are as different from those of a

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Dutchman,

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and contribute to your Victory: But in defending and preserving such a Conquest, you will meet with great and numberless Difficulties, occasioned both by those who have assisted you, and by those whom you have conquered. Nor will it suffice to exterminate the Race of the Prince, because other Princes will remain, who will always be disposed to head any Commotion; and as they can neither be contented, nor extinguished, you must of Necessity be expelled upon the first Insurrection.

Now if we consider the Nature of *Darius's* Government, we shall find it very much resembled that of the *Turks*. Wherefore *Alexander* was forced to attack the *Persian* Empire,

Dutchman, as the Vivacity of a Monkey from the Heaviness of a Tortoise.

It has often been observed, that there is in the Genius of the *Eastern* Nations a Spirit of Perseverance in their antient Customs and Usages. This, however, seems rather to secure the Throne than the Monarch; for their Monarchs have often been destroyed, or dethroned, but the Form of their Government is never altered. The Genius of the *French* Nation is intirely different from that of the *Oriental*s: Its Fickleness and Inconstancy has been if not the sole, at least the principal Cause of the many Revolutions in *France*. But the Cardinals
who

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 39

Empire, whole and entire, to give *Darius* a total Defeat, and drive him out of the Field: After this Victory, *Darius* dying, *Alexander* came of course to the peaceable Possession of that Empire, for the Reasons above-mentioned; and his Successors, had they continued united, might have enjoyed it without any Disturbance; for no other Tumults happened but such as were raised by themselves. But Kingdoms that are constituted like *France*, can never be enjoyed with so much Quiet. Hence arose the many Defections of *Spain, France* and *Greece* from the *Romans*: For those Countries abounding with Principalities, as long as the Memory of these

who successively governed that Kingdom, and were hated and esteemed by the *French*, made good Use of our Author's Maxims, to humble and depress the Grandees, and took Advantage of the Temper of the Nation, in order to avert those Storms with which the Sovereign was continually threatened.

The single Policy of Cardinal *de Richelieu* was to depress the Grandees, and raise the Prerogative of the Crown, that it might be the sole Basis of the Government: He succeeded so well, that at present there are hardly any Traces remaining in *France* of the Power of the great Lords, a Power

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these lasted, the Dominion of the *Romans* was always precarious and unsettled; but when, by the Power and Continuance of the Empire, the Memory of them was extinct, the *Romans* were secure and undisturbed in their Possessions. Afterwards, when they quarrelled among themselves, every Officer, according to the Extent of his Command in these Provinces, was able to bring a Party into the Field; and the Reason was, because the Race of their old Princes being extirpated, there was no other Sovereign left

which was always formidable, and often fatal to the Sovereign.

Cardinal *Mazarin* trod in the Steps of *Richelieu*; he met with great Opposition, but at length succeeded; he stripped the Parliament of its Privileges, and reduced it from a Substance to a Shadow; so that in our Days, if at any time a Parliament of *France* mistakes itself for a real Being, it is soon made to feel and to repent its Error.

The same Politics that taught the Ministers of *France* to establish an absolute Government in that Kingdom, taught them likewise to amuse and employ the Fickleness and Inconstancy of the Nation, that it might be no longer dangerous to the Prince. Trifles, Pleasures, and a thousand frivolous Occupations, put the *French* upon a new Scent: So that the same People, who had so long struggled with *Julius Caesar*, who often shook off the Yoke of

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 41

left for them to acknowledge, but the *Romans*. These Things being considered, 'tis not surprising, that *Alexander* so easily kept Possession of the Empire of *Asia*, whilst *Pyrrhus*, and many others, found it so very difficult to preserve their Conquests: It did not proceed from the good or ill Conduct of the Victor, but from the different Forms of the Governments^a.

CHAP.

of Emperors, who called in Foreigners to their Assistance during the Reigns of the Family of *Valois*, who leagued against *Henry IV.* and caballed under Minorities; are in our Days employed in nothing so much as changing Modes, Mistresses, Places, Amusements and Follies. Nor is this all the Security of a King of *France*: Numerous Garisons, and powerful Armies, kept up in Times of Peace, guard him as much against Insurrections at home, as against foreign Invasions.

^a *Machiavel* gives a beautiful Example of this in Chap. 12. Book III. of his Discourses: If we compare, says he, the Neighbourhood of the City of Florence, with that of Venice, we shall not wonder, as many do, that Florence, though it has spent more in the Wars, yet has got less by them, than the Venetians: For this proceeds from the Difference of their Neighbourhood. Florence is surrounded with Cities that are free, and therefore har-

der to be subdued: Whereas those which bordered upon the Territories of Venice, were for the most part subject to some Prince. Now a People that are accustomed to Servitude, have but little Aversion to change their Sovereign, and very often desire it. And therefore, though the Cities upon the Frontiers of Venice were stronger than those upon the Frontiers of Florence, yet they were more easily reduced.

CHAP. V.

How Cities and Principalities are to be governed, which enjoyed their own Laws, before they were subdued.

IF States that are newly conquered, were accustomed to Liberty, and their own Laws, there are three ways of preserving them: The first is, utterly to ruin them*; the second, to reside there in Person; the third, to permit them to enjoy their Laws, making them pay a Tribute, and putting them under the Government of a few Persons,

OBSERVATIONS.

According to our Author, there is no sure way of preserving a free State, newly conquered, but by destroying it. Certainly this is the most effectual way to prevent a Rebellion. Not many Years ago, a Lunatic killed himself in *London*; upon his Table he left a Paper, wherein he justified the Action, and pretended he had done it to prevent Sicknefs. The Lunatic is in the same Case with the

* This is the Maxim of the *Turks*.

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 43

sons, who may keep the People in Obedience and Allegiance^a; which they will always be careful to do, as being appointed by the Prince, and solely depending upon his Protection and Power. And certainly a Town that has been formerly free, cannot more easily be kept in Subjection, than by employing its own Citizens. We have Examples of this in the *Spartans* and *Romans*. The *Spartans*, having made themselves Masters of *Athens* and *Thebes*, settled an Oligarchy

the Prince, who destroys a Conquest in order to keep it. I will not reason with *Machiavel* upon the Principles of Humanity, which indeed are foreign to his Writings; but upon those of Interest, the sole Basis of his wicked Politics.

You say then, that a Prince ought to destroy a City or Country newly conquered, in order to secure the Possession of them. I ask, For what End he conquer'd them? You will answer, To augment his Power, and make himself more formidable. But by following these Maxims, he does the very reverse: For the Conquest must needs have

^a This is what *Artabanus*, King of the *Parthians*, did in *Seleucia*; he changed its popular Government into an Oligarchy, as more resembling the Government of a single Person: *Qui plebem primoribus tradidit, ex suo usu* (as his Interest required, says *Tacitus*). *Nam populi imperium juxta libertatem, paucorum dominatio regiae libidini propior est.* Ann. 6.

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garchy in both these Cities, and yet they lost them. The *Romans*, to keep Possession of *Capua*, *Carthage* and *Numantia*, ordered them to be destroyed, and by that means preserved their Conquests. Thinking afterwards to keep Possession of *Greece*, as the *Spartans* had done, by declaring it free, and suffering it to enjoy its own Laws, they did not succeed; so that they were forced to destroy many Cities in that Province, before they could keep it: For indeed there is no other sure way of preserving such Conquests, but by destroying them. And whoever conquers

have put him to great Expences; and he ruins the only Country that should have defrayed them, and compensated his Losses: For it must needs be granted, that the Possession of a Country laid waste and dispeopled, cannot add either to the Riches or Power of the Conqueror. The Desarts of *Libya* and *Barca* would never make a Prince more formidable than he was before; unless Panthers, Lions and Crocodiles, could be compared with Cities and Citizens, Harbours and Ships, Cattle, and all the Produce of a well-inhabited Country. There is no Folly greater, or more pernicious to Mankind, than that of making Conquests. 'Tis universally agreed, that the real Strength and Greatness of a State does not consist in the Extent of its Territories, but in the Number of its Inhabitants.

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 45

quers a free City, and does not demolish it, may expect it will demolish him; for the Name of Liberty, and the Laws of their Ancestors, which no Length of Time, nor Obligation whatever, will be able to root out of their Memory, will always furnish the Citizens with a Pretence for Rebellion, to which they will have recourse upon the very first and slightest Occasion, if they are not either dif-

bitants. This appears by comparing *Holland* with *Russia*. *Holland*, inhabited by an infinite Number of People, industrious, vigorous, powerful and rich, consists of a small marshy Territory, about 48 Leagues in Length, and 40 in Breadth, and of a few barren Islands rising in the neighbouring Sea; and yet it was able to shake off the Yoke of *Spain*, at a time when the *Spanish* Monarchy was the most formidable and powerful in *Europe*; its Commerce extends at present over the whole Earth; it ranks immediately after Kings; and in Times of War, besides its numerous and strong Fleets, can send into the Field and maintain an Army of Fifty thousand effective Men.

Russia, on the other hand, resembles the World newly brought out of Chaos; it is bounded on one Side by *Great Tartary* and *India*, and on the other by *Hungary* and the *Black-Sea*; and extends to *Poland*, *Lithuania*, *Courland* and *Sweden*; it is above 500 German Miles in Length, and 300 in Breadth; produces all sorts of Corn, and furnishes
all

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disunited ^b or dispersed. This was the Case of *Pisa*, after it had continued many Years in Subjection to the *Florentines*. But it happens quite otherwise in Cities or Provinces that have been used to a Prince whose Race is extinct: For, on the one hand, accustomed to obey, and on the other, having lost the antient Family, they can never agree among themselves about setting up another; and

all the Necessaries of Life, at least in the Neighbourhood of *Moscow*, and towards *Little Tartary*: But this immense Country hardly contains fifteen Millions of Inhabitants; and the *Russians*, who now begin to make so considerable a Figure in *Europe*, are but little stronger than the *Dutch* by Land,

^b *Quoties concordēs agunt, says Tacitus, Ann. 6. spernitur Parthus; ubi dissensere, dum sibi quisque contra æmulus subsidium vocant, accitus in partem, adversus omnes valet.* "When the Seleucians act with Unanimity, they despise the Parthians; but when Discord reigns, while each Side calls in a foreign Aid against their Competitors, the Person invited prevails against the whole." And in the eleventh Book of his Annals, *Deditur Seleucia, sep-*

timo post defectionem anno, non sine dedecore Parthorum, quos una civitas tamdiu eluserat. "Seleucia surrendered in the seventh Year of its Siege, so long had that single City maintained its Independency, and baffled the Power of Parthia, to the signal disgrace of the Parthian Monarchy." A single City held out seven Years against the whole Power of the Parthians, merely because its Inhabitants were united.

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 47

and as they know not what it is to be free, they are slow to take Arms, and the Prince may easily gain and secure them. But as to Republics, their Hatred is more inveterate, their Revenge more insatiable; and the Remembrance of their Liberty continually spurs them on to Rebellion, and can never suffer them to rest. So that the securest way is either to destroy them, or to reside among them.

Land, and much less formidable by Sea, have fewer Resources in Times of Danger, and cannot compare with them in Riches.

Since therefore it is not the Extent of Territory, but the Number and Wealth of the Inhabitants, that constitutes the real Strength and Greatness of a State, a Prince ought, for his own Interest, to people his Conquests, and render them flourishing, instead of destroying and laying them waste; and *Machiavel's* Reasoning in this Case is as bad, as his Politics are inhuman and barbarous.

His third Maxim is, That a Prince ought to fix his Residence in a free City or Country newly conquered. This Maxim is not so cruel as the other; but I have already shewn, Chapter III. that it cannot be followed, without many Inconveniencies.

A Prince who conquers a free Country, in a War undertaken upon just Grounds, might be content, methinks, with inflicting some Punishment upon it, and afterwards restore its Freedom
and

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and Laws. But if this should be thought insufficient, he might secure it, by placing strong Garrisons in the principal Towns, and suffer the People in all other respects to enjoy their Liberty.

CHAP. VI.

Of Principalities which a Prince acquires by his own Conduct and Arms.

LET no one be surprised, if in speaking of Principalities wholly new, and of Princes and States, I should here bring in the greatest Examples; for as Men commonly follow Ways that are beaten, and are guided in their Actions by Imitation, but cannot always hold on in the Foot-steps of others,

OBSERVATIONS.

If Men were not sufficiently supplied with Passions, it would be at least excusable in *Machiavel* to make up the Defect; this would be imitating *Prometheus*, who robbed Heaven of its Fire, to animate *Automata*. But Things are quite otherwise; and as the Passions, when moderate and subject to Reason, are the very Life and Soul of Society, so, when unbridled, they are the Destruction of it.

Of

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 49

others, and come up to the Perfection they imitate; so a wise Man ought to set out in the Steps of those who have most excelled, and copy after the best Models; that if he cannot equal them, he may at least resemble them: like a good Archer, who knowing the Strength and Reach of his Bow, takes his Aim a little higher than the Mark, when it is at great Distance, not with Design to hit above it, but only to reach it.

I say then, that Principalities wholly new, and subject to a new Prince, are more or less difficult to be kept, as the Prince has fewer or more great Qualities: And as the Happiness of rising from a private Man to be a Prince, presupposes either great Qualities or great Fortune, so, when both concur, they help

Of all the Passions that tyrannize over the Mind of Man, there is none more repugnant to Humanity, or more unhappy to those who feel its Impulses, than an unbridled Ambition, or an immoderate Desire of false Glory. A Man born with such a Disposition, has no Enjoyment of the present Time, and only exists in Futurity: Nothing can satisfy his Desires, and these imbitter all his Pleasures. If he is a Prince, his Misery is great in proportion to his Elevation: Honours and Preferments might possibly content the Passions of

E

private

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help to remove many Difficulties: Nevertheless the Prince maintains himself longest, who has been least indebted to Fortune: It likewise prevents much Trouble, if he is obliged, for want of other Dominions, to live personally among his new Subjects.

But to speak of those who have risen to supreme Power rather by their own Virtues than by Fortune, I say the most eminent are *Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, &c.* *Moses* indeed ought to be set aside, as having only executed the Orders which God had given him; nevertheless he deserves to be admired, was it only for that Grace which rendered him worthy of conversing with God. But if we consider *Cyrus* and others, who either conquered or founded Monarchies, we shall find

private Men, whereas Provinces and Kingdoms, which are still harder to be attained, can scarce sate the Ambition of Monarchs.

Machiavel sets before them the Examples of *Moses, Romulus, Theseus* and *Nero*: This Catalogue might be increased by several Authors of Sects, as of *Mohammed* in *Asia*, *Mango Kapac* in *America*, *Odin* in the North, and many others: I hope the *Jesuits* will give me leave to add their Sect to the rest; and it must needs do them great Honour to rank them with Legislators.

Ma-

find they were Persons of great and uncommon Abilities, and that their particular Actions and Institutions were but little different from those of *Moses*, notwithstanding *Moses* had so great an Instructor. Upon examining their Lives it will appear, that they were beholden to Fortune for nothing but Opportunity, which enabled them to establish such Forms of Government as they thought proper: Without Opportunity, their great Abilities would never have appeared; and without these, Opportunity would have been lost.

It was necessary therefore, *Moses* should find the People of *Israel* Captives in *Egypt*, and oppressed by the *Egyptians*, that to free themselves from Bondage, they might be disposed to follow him. It was necessary, that

Machiavel shews Ambition only in its best Light; he only speaks of such Lawgivers and Conquerors as have been successful and happy; but is quite silent about those who have been the Victims of their Passions. This is imposing upon the World, and handling his Subject with Artifice and Cunning. When he spoke of the Legislator of the *Jews*, of the *Albanian* Monarch, of the Conqueror of the *Medes*, and of the Founder of *Rome*, whose Successes were great and

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that *Romulus* should be driven out of *Alba*, and exposed to the wild Beasts, when he was young, that he might afterwards be King of *Rome*, and Founder of the *Roman* Empire. It was necessary, that *Cyrus* should find the *Persians* discontented under the Domination of the *Medes*, and the *Medes* degenerate, and enervated by a long Peace. Nor would the great Abilities of *Theseus* have ever appeared, unless the *Athenians* had been dispersed^a. These Opportunities therefore made those Men successful, and their excellent Qualities made the Opportunities known; and thus they aggrandised and ennobled their Country. Those

remarkable, why did he not add Examples of those who have been unsuccessful? Because it would have shewn, that if a few Men succeed in their Ambition, the greatest Number miscarry, and are undone by it. Was not *John* of *Leyden*, Chief of the *Anabaptists*, tortured, burnt, and hung in an iron Cage at *Munster*? If *Cromwell* was successful, was not his Son dethroned, and his own Body dug out of his Grave, and hung up in a Gibbet? Were not two or three *Jews*, who pre-

^a Military Discipline was corrupted, says the younger *Pliny* to *Trajan*, that you might have the Glory of re-

forming it. *Corrupta est disciplina castrorum, ut tu corrector emendatorque contineres.* In his Panegyric.

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 53

Those who rise to Sovereignty by the like Virtues, attain it with great Difficulty, but keep it with Ease: The Difficulty in attaining it arises, in some measure, from the new Laws and Customs which they are forced to introduce for establishing their Dominion, and securing their Persons: For it must be considered, that there is no Enterprize more difficult in itself, more dangerous in conducting, or more doubtful in the Success, than that of setting up for a Chief, and introducing new Laws; because the Person who introduces them will be hated by those to whom the old Laws are beneficial, and but ill supported by others, who find their Account in the new: And this last arises partly from their standing in Awe of their Adversaries, who have the old Laws on their

pretended each to be the *Messias*, put to Death; and was not another forced to turn *Mohammedan*, and spend the rest of his Days as a Scullion in the great *Turk's* Kitchen? If *Pepin* dethroned his Sovereign with the Pope's Approbation, was not *Guise* assassinated, who attempted to dethrone his King with the same Approbation? Are there not above thirty Chiefs of Sects, and about a thousand others, who lost their Lives by the Ambition that is here talked of?

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their Side, partly from a natural Incredulity in Man, which makes him averſe to all new Eſtabliſhments, unleſs they are recommended by Experience and Succeſs: From hence it proceeds, that as often as the Enemies of the new Prince have an Opportunity of attacking, they do it with great Briskneſs and Vigour, while his Friends make but a faint and weak Defence; ſo that he is in Danger on both Sides.

'Tis therefore neceſſary, for diſcuſſing this Point, to examine whether Legislators depend upon themſelves, or upon the Favour of others; that is, whether they are obliged to make uſe of Intreaties, for effecting their Deſigns, or have a Power to compel. In the firſt Caſe, they never ſucceed in any thing; but
in

Befides, it is methinks very inconfiderate in *Machiavel* to rank *Mofes* with *Romulus*, *Cyrus* and *Theſeus*. Either *Mofes* was inſpired, or he was not: If *Mofes* was not inſpired, he can only be looked upon as an Impoſtor, who made uſe of the Name of God much in the ſame manner as it is uſed in the Machinery of a Poem: And, in this Caſe, *Mofes* muſt have been a Man of very little Ability, ſince he took forty Years to carry the People of *Israel* through a Country which they might have eaſily paſſed in fix Weeks; he muſt
have

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 55

in the second, when they have the Power in their own Hands to make themselves obeyed, they very rarely miscarry, or run any Hazard. Thus it happened, that all the Prophets succeeded who were armed, and that all who were unarmed miscarried and were undone: For, besides the Reasons already given, the People are naturally changeable; 'tis an easy matter to persuade them, that a new Doctrine is true, but extremely difficult to settle them in that Persuasion: So that it is always necessary to have such a Power,

have made but little Improvement by his Studies in *Egypt*, and must have been much inferior to *Romulus*, *Theseus*, and the like Heroes. If *Moses* was inspired, as is evident he was, he can only be considered as the blind Instrument of the Wisdom and Power of God; and in this Case likewise the Conductor of the *Jews* was, setting aside his Inspiration, every way inferior to the Founder of the *Roman* Empire, to the *Persian* Monarch, and those other Heroes, who by their own Valour and Ability executed greater Enterprizes, than *Moses* did with the immediate Assistance of God.

It must be owned indeed, that great Genius, Courage, Address and Conduct, are necessary in order to equal those Lawgivers and Conquerors; but I know not whether the Epithet of Virtue properly belongs to *Machiavel's* Heroes. Valour and Address are common to Heroes, and Highway-

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Power, as, when their Faith begins to stagger, may compel them to believe. *Moses* ^b *Cyrus*, *Theseus* and *Romulus* could never have made their Laws to be long observed, had they been unarmed: This appears from what happened in our own Times to *Frier Jerom Savanarola*, who was ruined by his new Institutions, when the People of *Florence* deserted him; the Reason was, that he had not a Power either

men: The only Difference is that the Hero acts in a greater, the Highwayman in a lesser Sphere, and that the one is rewarded with a Laurel, the other with a Rope.

It must likewise be granted, that whoever introduces Innovations, must expect to meet with a thousand Obstacles; and that a Prophet at the Head

^b *Whoever reads the Bible with Coolness and Attention, says Machiavel, Chap. 30. Book III. of his Discourses, will find that Moses, for the promoting and establishing his Laws, was forced to put to Death an infinite Number of People, for no other Reason but because they opposed his Designs. We read in Exodus, Ch. 32. that he put to Death above Three thousand in one Day. Moses called the People to him, and spoke after the following manner,*

v. 25, &c. "Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, Put every Man his Sword by his Side, and go in and out from Gate to Gate, throughout the Camp, and slay every Man his Brother, and every Man his Companion, and every Man his Neighbour. And the Children of Levi did according to the Word of Moses, and there fell of the People that Day above Three thousand Men."

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 57

either to secure himself of his Profelytes, or to compel others, who had no Faith in him. Such Persons have many Difficulties to struggle with, in the Pursuit of their Designs, and are continually exposed to great Dangers, which they can only overcome by their own Abilities: But when that is done, when they begin to be held in Veneration, and have taken off those who envied and opposed them, then they are powerful, safe, honoured and happy.

To

Head of an Army, will make more Profelytes, than if he fought with no other Weapons but Syllogisms. It must be granted, that the *Christian* Religion, when only supported by Arguments and Disputation, was in a languishing Condition, and very much oppressed; and that it was not propagated in *Europe* without a great deal of Bloodshed.

Yet it cannot be denied, but that new Opinions have commonly some Run in the Beginning. How many Religions, how many Sects, have been introduced without the least Difficulty! For there is nothing more proper to bring them into Credit than Enthusiasm; and therefore *Machiavel* has spoken too positively on this Head.

I shall

^c *Machiavel* says, he had persuaded the People of *Florence*, that he held Conferences with God (Disc. Book I. Chap. II.). *Savonarola's* Party were called *Piagnoni*,

that is, the Mourners, or the Hypocrites; and his Enemies *Arrabiati*, or the Furious and Untractable. *Nardi's* History of *Florence*, Book II.

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To these great Examples I shall add one, which indeed is of an inferior Nature, but has nevertheless a great Resemblance with the former; and it shall satisfy me for all others of the same Kind. It is that of *Hiero*, who from a private Man rose to be King of *Syracuse*, without being indebted to Fortune for any thing but Opportunity. The *Syracusians*, being oppressed, chose *Hiero* their General; and in this Station he acted with so great Ability, that he was thought worthy to be their Sovereign: It is observed by those who have made mention of him, that he had, when a private Man, all the Qualities that could intitle him to a Crown: He disbanded the old Troops, and raised new ones; he forsook his old Friends, and betook himself to others; and thus, having secured him-
self

I shall now make some Remarks on the Example of *Hiero* King of *Syracuse*, which *Machiavel* proposes to those who would raise themselves by the Assistance of their Friends, and of an Army. *Hiero* turned off his old Friends and Soldiers who had assisted him in effecting his Designs; and afterwards raised new Troops, and made new Friends. Now I affirm, that *Hiero's* Policy was not only full of Ingratitude, but likewise very dangerous; and that it is always safest and
most

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 59

self by an Army and by Friends, who were devoted to his Interest, he must have found it an easy matter to build any Superstructure upon such a Foundation: So that he met with many Difficulties in acquiring, but with very few in preserving his new Kingdom.

most prudent to rely upon Troops and Friends whose Valour and Fidelity have been tried and experienced. This indeed is too evident, to need any Proof: No Man can be at a Loss to prove it to himself, who abhors Ingratitude, and is so happy as to have felt the Pleasures and Contentment of Friendship.

Without Opportunity, says *Machiavel*, the great Abilities of those Men would not have appeared. This must certainly be granted; and we may add, that without Opportunity, that is, without favourable Circumstances, Villains and Madmen could never have made use of their Talents.

To conclude, the only Opportunity when a private Man may raise himself to a Crown, without Guilt, is, either when he is born in an elective Kingdom, or when he delivers his Country. *Sobieski* in *Poland*, *Gustavus Vasa* in *Sweden*, the *Antoninus's* at *Rome*, are Examples of both these Kinds. Let *Cæsar Borgia* be the Pattern of *Machiavel's* Hero, that of all virtuous Princes will be *Marcus Aurelius*.

CHAP. VII.

Of new Principalities acquired by the Arms of other Princes, and by Fortune.

THOSE who rise from a private Condition to that of a Prince merely by the Indulgence of Fortune, attain their Dignity without much Trouble, but find great Trouble in preserving it; they meet with no Obstruction in their Advancement, and seem, as it were, to fly to the Throne; but when they are seated there, it is then that all the Difficulties break upon them. Princes who rise after this manner, are those to whom a Principality is granted either for Money,

OBSERVATIONS.

Compare the Archbishop of Cambray's Prince with that of *Machiavel*: In the Character of the one you will find Goodness, Justice, Equity, and in short every Virtue, carried to its greatest Height: He seems to be one of those pure, ethereal Beings, who for the Good of Mankind preside and watch over the Government of the World. The Character of the other is a Complication of Villainy,

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 61

Money, or by the Favour of the Donor; as happened to many Persons in *Greece*, in the Cities of *Ionia*, and upon the *Hellespont*, where they were created Princes by *Darius*, for his greater Security and Glory; and to those Emperors of *Rome* who obtained the Empire by corrupting the Army.

As such Persons have their sole Dependence upon the Fortune and Pleasure of those who have advanced them, which are two Things very changeable and unsettled, so they have neither Ability nor Power enough to hold their Dignity; not Ability, because

it

lâiny, Craftiness, Perfidy, Treachery, and of all manner of Crimes: He seems to be such a Monster as Hell itself could hardly produce, to scourge and destroy the World. And if in reading *Telema- chus* we imagine that our Nature comes up to that of the Angels; it seems to resemble that of infernal Beings, when we read *Macbiavel's Prince*.

Cæsar Borgia is the Model by which our Author would form his Prince; and which he has the Boldness to propose for the Imitation of those who rise to Principalities by the Assistance or Arms of their Friends. It is therefore necessary to examine the Character of this Hero, in order to form an Idea of our Author's Maxims and Politics.

There is scarce any Crime of which *Cæsar Borgia* was not guilty: His Brother, who was his Rival
both

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it is not to be expected, that a Man who has always lived in a private Station, unless he has uncommon Parts, can know how to command; not Power, because they have no Forces, upon whose Allegiance and Fidelity they can depend.

Besides, it is with Principalities suddenly acquired, as with all other Things in Nature whose Rise and Progress are sudden; they can have no Root or Foundation, but what will be torn up by the very first Blast of Adversity. This must always happen, unless those who are so suddenly advanced have Skill enough to prepare in Time for preserving what Fortune has so luckily thrown into their Lap, and to lay such Foundations after their Advancement,

as
both in Glory and Love, he caused to be assassinated almost in the Sight of his own Sister: Some of the Pope's Guards having offended his Mother, he ordered them to be murdered: He plundered several Cardinals, and rich Men, to satiate his Avarice; the Duke of *Urbino* he deprived of *Romagna*, put *d'Orco* his Minister to Death, not for his Cruelties, but merely to content the Populace; he was guilty of the most horrible Treachery at *Sinigaglia*, where he ordered some Princes to be murdered, because he thought their Lives inconsistent

MACHIABEL'S PRINCE. 63

as others have done before they were advanced.

I will give two Examples, within my own Memory, of the two Ways of attaining a Principality, either by Ability, or by Fortune; the one *Francis Sforza*, the other *Cæsar Borgia*. *Sforza* by just Means, and his own great Abilities, rose from a private Man to be Duke of *Milan*, and enjoyed in great Peace what he had gained with much Trouble. *Borgia*, commonly called Duke *Valentine*, attained a Principality by the Fortune of his Father Pope *Alexander*, and lost it upon his Father's Death, notwithstanding he used all the Industry, and all the Arts, which a wise Man ought to do, in order to fasten and to root himself in a Principality which he owes to the Fortune and Arms of another.

For,

sistent with his Interest: He deflowered a *Venetian* Lady, and then drowned her. But it would be needless to number up his Crimes and Barbarities. And such is the Man, whom *Machiavel* prefers to all the great Genius's of his Time, and to all the Heroes of Antiquity, and whose Life and Actions he thinks a fit Pattern for those Princes who owe their Advancement merely to Fortune! But to be more particular,

Cæsar

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For, as was hinted already, he who does not lay the Foundations of his Security before his Advancement, may by his great Abilities do it afterwards, though with much Trouble to the Architect, and Danger to the Building. If we consider all the Steps and Measures taken by Duke *Valentine*, it will appear, that he laid the strongest Foundation for his future Security and Power: And therefore I think it may not be superfluous to enlarge a little upon this Example, as I know nothing that can be more properly set before a new Prince for his Imitation, than the Conduct of this Duke; for if his Measures were at last unsuccessful, it cannot be imputed to himself, but to a strange and uncommon Malignity of Fortune.

Pope

Cesar Borgia formed the Design of raising himself by embroiling the Princes and States of *Italy*. Wherefore he that would raise himself, must usurp the Possessions of his Neighbours; for this End he must weaken them, and in order to weaken them, he must embroil them: Such was the Practice of *Borgia*, and such is the Doctrine of *Machiavel*!

Borgia wanted foreign Assistance: It was therefore necessary, that Pope *Alexander* his Father should dissolve the Marriage of *Lewis XII.* in order to procure him that Assistance. Thus has the World been

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 65

Pope *Alexander VI.* had a mind to aggrandize his Son Duke *Valentine*, but found several immediate Difficulties, and foresaw others that would follow. First, he could see no Way of giving him any Territory, which did not belong to the Church; and he knew, that if he dismembered any of the Ecclesiastical Dominions, it would be opposed by the Duke of *Milan* and the *Venetians*; for *Faenza* and *Rimini* had already put themselves under the Protection of the latter: He was likewise sensible, that the Forces of *Italy*, especially such as were capable of assisting him, were in the Hands of those who ought to apprehend the Greatness of the Pope; as the *Ursini*, *Colonnese*, and their Followers; and therefore he could

been often deluded by many Politicians, who whilst they were seemingly zealous for the Interest of Heaven, meant nothing at bottom but their own. If *Lewis's* Marriage ought in Justice to have been dissolved, the Pope should have done it without any Equivalent: If it could not be with Justice dissolved, nothing should have prevailed with the Head of the Church to sacrifice Religion to his Interest.

It was necessary that *Borgia* should gain Dependents and Adherents, and therefore that he should

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bribe

66 EXAMINATION of

could put no Trust in them. For these Reasons it was necessary to embroil the States of *Italy*, before he could make himself Master of any Part of it: And this was no hard Matter to accomplish, because the *Venetians* had, for Reasons of their own, called back the *French* into *Italy*. The Pope therefore was so far from hindering this new Expedition of the *French*, that he promoted it by dissolving King *Lewis's* former Marriage. *Lewis* therefore passed the *Alps*, by the Assistance of the *Venetians*, and with Pope *Alexander's* Consent; and was no sooner in *Milan*, but he sent Forces to assist him in his Enterprize against *Romagna*, which, because of the King's Reputation, was presently surrendered.

The
bribe over the Duke of *Urbino's* Party: But Bribery was the least of *Borgia's* Crimes, and had some Resemblance of Generosity, and therefore we shall pass it over. He had a mind to rid himself of some Princes of the *Ursini* Family, of *Vittellozzo Vitelli*, *Olivoretto da Fermo*, and others; wherefore *Machiavel* affirms, that he had the Prudence to make them come to *Sinigaglia*, where he cut them all off by Treachery. Dissimulation, Trick, Treachery, Perjury, Murder, are the infamous Arts which *Borgia* employed, and *Machiavel* here recommends. But even granting these

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 67

The Duke having thus reduced *Romagna*, and defeated the *Colonneſi*, was willing not only to keep what he had got, but to enlarge his Territories. In this he met with two Obſtructions; one from his own Army, whoſe Fidelity he ſuſpected, the other from the *French*: He was afraid, that the *Urſini*, whoſe Forces he had employed, would ſupplant him, and not only hinder him from gaining more Territories, but deprive him of thoſe he had already acquired: And the ſame Fears he had of the *French*. As for the *Urſini*, he had obſerved that when he led them on to the Attack of *Bologna*, after making himſelf Maſter of *Faenza*, they had advanced with Coldneſs and Reluctance: And the Inclination of King *Lewis* he diſcovered, when having poſſeſſed

theſe horrible Expedients were lawful, I aſk whether it is Prudence in a Prince to make uſe of them? I aſk whether he can deceive, betray, and aſſaſſinate others, without ſetting others an Example, nay giving them a Right, by the Law of Retaliation, to deceive, betray and aſſaſſinate himſelf?

Nevertheless, in others *Borgia* puniſhed with Barbarity, Crimes which were much inferior to his own. He who himſelf was guilty of Uſurpation, Perjury, Cruelty, Poiſoning and Murder, condemned to the moſt inhuman Punishments Rogues,

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possessed himself of the Dutchy of *Urbini*, he invaded *Tuscany*, and was by him requested to desist.

Whereupon the Duke resolved to depend no longer upon Fortune, and foreign Arms. The first Course he took was to weaken the Party of the *Urfini* and *Colonnese* at *Rome*, which he did by gaining such of their Adherents as were Gentlemen, taking them into his own Service, giving them large Pensions, and honouring them with Governments and

Commands, Sharpers and Rioters, who copied his Character, and were so many *Borgia's* in Miniature.

That King of *Poland*, whose Death of late embroiled *Europe*, acted more consistently and with more Generosity towards his *Saxon* Subjects. By one of the Laws of *Saxony* all Adulterers were condemned to be beheaded. I shall not inquire into the Rise of so barbarous a Law, which seems more suitable to the Jealousy of the *Italians*, than the Patience of the *Germans*. An unhappy Transgressor was accordingly condemned to Death, and *Augustus* was to sign the Sentence. But being susceptible of Love, and moved by Humanity, he pardoned the Criminal, and abrogated a Law which tacitly condemned himself.

Such a Conduct was both prudent and humane. *Cæsar Borgia*, on the contrary, having made the cruel *d'Orco* Governor of *Romagna*, with Design to suppress some Disturbances, and punish those
who

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 69

Commands, according to their respective Qualities; so that in a few Months their Zeal for that Faction evaporated, and they came all over to the Duke: Having thus dispersed the *Colonneſi*, he waited for an Opportunity to ruin the *Urſini*; the Opportunity ſoon offered, and he made good Uſe of it.

The *Urſini* perceiving too late that the Greatneſs of the Duke and the Church tended to their Ruin, held a Council at a Place called *Magione* in the Territory of *Perugia*. This Council occaſioned the Revolt of *Urbino*, and the Tumults of *Romagna*, and expoſed the Duke to infinite Dangers: Though he overcame them all, by the Aſſiſtance of the *French*, and recovered his Reputation, yet he would no longer truſt to *France* or any other foreign Allies, as having no Opportunity to ſecure them in his Intereſt:

He who had raiſed them, afterwards ordered him to be cut in Pieces merely for accompliſhing his own Deſigns; and thus ſacrificed the Inſtrument of his Barbarity, to ingratiate himſelf with the People. The Load of Tyranny is never ſo grievouſly felt, as when the Tyrant puts on the Appearance of Innocence.

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He betook himself therefore to fraudulent Means; and so well dissembled his Intentions, that the *Ursini* were reconciled with him, by the Mediation of Signor *Paulo*, whom the Duke had lulled into Security, by shewing him all manner of Civilities, and presenting him with Money, Horses, and rich Cloaths; insomuch that the *Ursini* were simple enough to come to *Sinigaglia*, and put themselves in the Duke's Power. Having thus cut off the Chiefs of his Adversaries*, and reduced their Friends, the Duke had laid a secure Foundation for his Greatness; he was now in Possession of all *Romagna*, with the Dutchy of *Urbini*; and the People, who already began to taste their future Peace and Happiness, were wholly in his Interest. As this Part of the Duke's Story

Borgia, carrying his Foresight even beyond the Death of the Pope his Father, exterminated the whole Race of those Lords whom he had stripped of their Possessions. Thus you see how one Crime draws on another. In order to be powerful, a Man

**Vitellozzo Vitelli*, *Olivetto da Fermo*, the Duke de *Gravina*, and Signor *Paulo*, were all strangled in the Castle

of *Piense* by Duke *Valentine's* Order. See *Machiavel's* Account of this Murder. *Descriptione del modo, &c.*

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 71

Story well deserves to be known and to be imitated by others, I will not pass it over in Silence.

When Duke *Valentine* had possessed himself of *Romagna*, finding it had been governed by poor and inferior Lords, who had rather plundered than corrected their Subjects, and been the Occasion of Discord rather than of Union, insomuch that the whole Country was over-run with Robberies, Murders, and all manner of Riots; to reduce them to Order and Subjection to Monarchy, he thought it necessary to provide them with a good Governor. This Post he conferred on *Remiro d'Orco*, a Man of great Dispatch and Cruelty, and to him he gave an unlimited Power. It was not long before *d'Orco* settled the whole Country in Peace and Concord, and gained great Reputation. Afterwards the Duke suspecting that his delegating such an absolute Authority would make him odious to the People^a, he erected in

Man must have large Possessions; for this Purpose, he must turn out the lawful Possessors: And to enjoy with Safety what he has got with Injustice, these

F 4 Pos.

^a *Nec unquam, satis fida potentia, ubi nimia est, says Tacitus, Hist. 2.*

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in the Middle of the Province a Court of Justice, in which each City had its Advocate; and a Man of great Worth was appointed to preside. But knowing that his past Severity had created him several Enemies, in order to disculpate himself, and to recover the Affections of the People, he one Morning caused the Governor to be apprehended, his Head to be struck off in the Market-place at *Cesena*, and his Members exposed upon a Stake, with a bloody Dagger by them; having a mind to shew the People, that if any Cruelties had been committed, they had not proceeded from himself, but from the Arrogance of his Minister^b: And in effect this cruel Spectacle pacified and stunned the People for some time.

But to resume our Discourse; I say the Duke now found himself very powerful, and Possessors, and their whole Race, must needs be exterminated. This is *Machiavel's* Doctrine, and the Practice of Highwaymen and Banditti.

Borgia

^b Nothing is more common than for Princes to sacrifice sooner or later the Instruments of their Cruelty. *Scelerum ministros*, says *Tacitus* of *Tiberius*, *ut perverti*

ab aliis nolebat, ita plerumque satiat, veteres et prae-graves afflixit. Ann. 4. *Levi post admissum scelus gratia, dein graviore odio.* Ann. 14.

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 73

and in some measure secure against present Danger; he was now armed in the manner he had chosen; and had reduced most of his Neighbours to an Incapacity of hurting him; insomuch that he had nothing to fear from any Power but *France*. But he knew that *Lewis*, who had at length perceived his Error, would not suffer him to enlarge his Dominions: He began therefore to look abroad for new Allies, and to hesitate and waver with regard to *France*; as appeared when the *French* Army advanced into the Kingdom of *Naples* against the *Spaniards*, who besieged *Caieta*: His main Design was to secure himself against the *French*, which he would have quickly done, had the Pope his Father lived.

These were the Measures he took, with regard to present Affairs; as to the future, the chief thing he feared was that the next Pope would be his Enemy, and seek to resume all that *Alexander* had given him. To prevent this, he proposed four Expedients: The first was to exterminate the whole Race of those Lords whom he had dispossessed,

that

Mucianus Vespasian's Minister put to Death the Son

 of *Vitellius*, because, as he pretended, civil Discord would

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that the Pope might have no Opportunity of restoring them: The second, to ingratiate himself with all the Nobility at *Rome*, that by their means he might keep the Pope in Awe: The third, to gain, if possible, the College of Cardinals to his Interest, and the fourth, to enlarge his Territories, and thus make himself so powerful before the Death of his Father, that he might be able with his own Forces to repel the first Attacks of his Enemies.

Three of these four Designs he effected before his Father's Death, and had very near ac-

Borgia invited some of the Cardinals to sup with his Father, in order to poison them: The Pope and he having drank, by Mistake, of the Liquor that was poisoned, the former died of it, and the other recovered, to linger out in Misery and Pain. Such is the due Reward of Poisoners and Assassins.

These

would never cease, unless the Seeds of War were crushed and destroyed. *Mucianus Vitellii filium interfici jubet, mansuram discordiam obtendens, ni semina bella restinxisset.* Hist. 4. It is dangerous for a Prince not to put those to Death whom

he has robbed of their Possessions. *Periculum ex misericordia—Ubi Vespasianus imperium invaserit, non ipsi, non amicis ejus, non exercitibus securitatem, nisi extincto æmulatu, reddituram.* Hist. 3.

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 75

accomplished the fourth. Of the dispossessed Lords, he had cut off as many as he could come at, and very few had escaped: The Nobility of *Rome* he had brought over to his Interest, and had made a strong Party in the College of Cardinals. As for enlarging his Territories, he designed to make himself Master of *Tuscany*: He had already got Possession of *Perugia* and *Piombino*, and taken *Pisa* into his Protection; so that by this Time he had no need of keeping Measures with the *French*, especially as the *Spaniards* had just dispossessed them of the Kingdom of *Naples*, and both *French* and *Spaniards* were under a Necessity of courting his Alliance:

These are the Arts of Policy which *Machiavel* recommends and extols. The Bishop of *Meaux*, the Bishop of *Nimes*, the eloquent Panegyrist of *Trajan*, could not have celebrated their Heroes more than our Author celebrates *Borgia*. Had he done this in a Poem, or in some rhetorical Piece, his Subtlety might have been applauded and his Choice abhorred. But in a grave and serious Work, in a political Treatise, designed for the Instruction of Posterity, it is impossible for an Author to recommend the Example of the most abandoned Ruffian that ever infested the World, without coolly and deliberately exposing himself to the Contempt and Hatred of Mankind.

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ance: He proposed therefore to fall suddenly upon *Pisa*; after which *Lucca* and *Siena* must have quickly surrendered, partly out of Hatred to the *Florentines*, partly through Fear; and the *Florentines* could have expected no Relief.

Had the Duke succeeded in these Views, as doubtless he would have done in the very same Year the Pope died, he must have gained so much Reputation and Strength, as to have stood afterwards upon his own Bottom, without depending upon Fortune, or foreign Supplies, or any thing except his own Power and good Conduct. But five Years after he took Arms, Pope *Alexander* died, leaving him secure in none of his Possessions except *Romagna*; the rest were all in a hovering Condition, whilst the Duke himself was hemmed in between two formidable Armies, and mortally sick. Nevertheless he was a Man of so great Abilities, had such a Ferocity of Spirit, knew so perfectly how his Enemies were to be gained, or duped, or destroyed, and in a few Years had laid so sure a Foundation for his Greatness, that if two powerful Armies had not been upon his Borders, and himself at the same time afflicted with a dangerous
Dis-

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 77

Distemper, he would have triumphed over all Opposition, and perfected his Designs.

That the Foundations he had laid were strong, appears from the Patience of his Subjects in *Romagna*, who held out for him a whole Month; from the ill Success of the *Baglioni*, *Vitelli* and *Ursini*, who though they came to *Rome* when the Duke lay there at the Point of Death, yet could make no Party against him; and from the Influence he kept in the College of Cardinals; for though possibly he could not get any Man whom he pleased elected Pope, yet he was able to exclude all those whom he thought his Enemies. But had he been well when his Father died, every thing would have gone according to his Wishes. He told me himself, about the Time that *Julius II.* was elected, *That he had well considered all the Accidents which might befall him upon his Father's Death, and provided against them; but had not imagined that he should be in so great Danger of dying himself, at the time his Father died.*

Upon considering the whole of Duke *Valentine's* Conduct, I find nothing in it that deserves to be blamed. On the contrary,

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methinks, it ought to be proposed as an Example for all Princes to imitate, who suddenly rise to supreme Power by Fortune, and foreign Arms: For as the Duke had a high Spirit, and vast Designs, he could not act otherwise than he did; nor can his ill Success be ascribed to any thing, but his Sickness, and the short Reign of Pope *Alexander*. So that whoever attains a new Principality, and thinks fit to secure himself against his Enemies, to gain Friends, to conquer either by Force or Fraud, to make himself loved and feared by his Subjects, and obeyed and honoured by his Army; to destroy and exterminate such as either may or should do him Injury, to repeal and suppress old Laws, and introduce new, to be severe, and yet agreeable, magnanimous and liberal; to cut off such of his Guards as are unfaithful, and supply their Place with others; to preserve the Friendship of Kings and Princes, so as to make them either ready to oblige, or afraid to offend him: Such a Person, I say, cannot find a fresher or better Model, than the Actions of this Duke.

If in any thing he is to be blamed, it is in suffering the Election of *Julius II*, which was much to his Prejudice; for though, as was
said

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said before, he could not make a Pope to his mind, yet he was able to exclude any one from being chosen; and therefore he should never have consented to the Election of any of those Cardinals whom he had formerly offended, or who after their Promotion were likely to be jealous of him: for Men are as mischievous through Fear as through Hatred^d. Those Cardinals whom he had disoblged were, among others, the Cardinals *St. Peter ad vincula*^e, *Colonna*^f, *Saint George*^g, and *Ascanius*^h. The rest, if any of them were advanced to the Popedom, might well be afraid of him, except the *Spanish* Cardinals, and the Cardinal of *Rouen*; the *Spaniards*, be-
cause

^d Nero displaced four Tribunes, only because he was afraid of them. *Exuti tribunatu, quasi Principem non quidem odissent, sed tamen extimerentur.* Ann. 15. He put to Death *Ostorius*, because he feared the great Strength of his Body, and his Reputation. *Causa festinandi (cædem) ex eo oriebatur, quod Ostorius ingenti corporis robore, armorumque scientia, metum Neroni fecerat, ut invaderet pavidum semper.* Ann. 16. For *Satis clarus est apud timentem, quisquis timetur.*

^e *Alexandro Pontifice, qui cum veteres & privatas similitates habebat, perpetuis decem annis urbe absuit.* Onuphr. in Vita Julii II. "The Cardinal of *St. Peter ad vincula* had been ten Years absent from the City, in the Pontificate of *Alexander VI.* with whom he had several old and private Quarrels.

^f *John.*

^g *Raphael Riari*, the Pope's Great Chamberlain.

^h *Ascanius Sforza*, Son of *Galeas*, Duke of *Milan*.

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cause of their Connexion with him, arising either from Alliance or Obligations; the other, by reason of the Interest he had in the Kingdom of *France*. The Duke therefore ought, above all things, to have made a *Spanish* Cardinal Pope: If this could not have been done, he should rather have consented to the Election of *Rouen*, than of *St. Peter ad vincula*: For it is Folly to believe that new Obligations make great Men forget old Injuriesⁱ. The Duke therefore, in this Election of Pope *Julius II.* committed an Error, that was the Cause of his utter Ruin.

ⁱ *Quarum apud præpo-*
zentes in longum memoria est.
Tacit. Ann. 5. For Favours
never penetrate so deep into
the Heart as Injuries: Be-
sides, Gratitude is expensive
to ourselves, Revenge to

those who are the Objects of
it. *Tanto proclivis est in-*
juria, quam beneficio vicem
exsolvere, quia gratia oneri,
ultio in quaestu habetur.
Hist. 4.

CHAP. VIII.

Of those who have acquired Principalities by wicked and unjustifiable Means.

AS there are two other Ways of rising from a private Condition to a Sovereignty, which are not intirely the same either with good Fortune or good Conduct, methinks I ought not to pass them over. One of these Ways is, when a Sovereignty is attained by wicked and infamous Means: The other, when a private Citizen, by the
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OBSERVATIONS.

In the preceding Chapter, *Machiavel* had recommended to new Princes the Example of *Cæsar Borgia*, who was raised to Sovereignty by means of his Father Pope *Alexander*, and maintained it by deceiving, poisoning and destroying all those who either did or might oppose his Ambition. In this Chapter, he seems to go a Step farther, and to shew how sovereign Power may not only be maintained, but acquired, by Disimulation, Perfidy, Murder, and the other Arts of Policy, which he had celebrated in *Cæsar Borgia*.

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Favour of his Fellow-citizens, is made Prince of his Country. Of this last I shall treat more fully when I come to speak of Commonwealths: What I design to say here of the other, I shall illustrate by two Examples, one antient, the other modern; without entering into the Merits of the Cause, which, I think, are sufficient, when there is a Necessity of following such Examples.

Agathacles, the *Sicilian*, rose not only from a private, but from a mean and abject Condition, to be King of *Syracuse*. This Man, the Son of a Potter, led a criminal and profligate Life throughout all the Degrees of his Fortune. Nevertheless, his Vices were accompanied with such Courage and Activity, that having betaken himself to the Army, he came, by the several Steps, to be Prator

Such Doctrines are so absurd in themselves, so glaringly inconsistent with the Peace and Good of Society, so repugnant to all the Sentiments of Humanity, as well as of Justice; that the bare mentioning them seems to be a sufficient Confutation. Nor do I see how any Man, as a Writer, can be more obnoxious to Society, or make himself more infamous and abhorred, than he who recommends and inculcates Diffimulation, Breach of Faith, Cruelty, and Murder; recommends them in a
serious

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Prætor of *Syracuse*. He was no sooner settled in that Post, but he resolved to make himself Sovereign of the City, and to hold by Violence, without Obligation to any Man, what had been conferred upon him by Consent. For this Purpose he entered into a Correspondence with *Hamilcar*, who then headed the *Carthaginian* Army in *Sicily*. Having one Morning assembled the People and Senate of *Syracuse*, as if it had been to consult them about public and important Affairs, he gave his Soldiers a Signal which he had before appointed; whereupon they immediately slew all the Senators, and the richest of the Citizens. After their Death, he usurped the Sovereignty of *Syracuse*, and possessed it without any Molestation from his Subjects. And though he lost two great Battles to the *Carthaginians*, and was afterwards besieged; yet he not only defended the City,

serious Performance designed for the Perusal and Instruction of Posterity, and of those in particular upon whom the Good of Mankind so eminently depends. And it were to be wished, that such Examples of superior Villany, as our Author singles out, for illustrating his Precepts, were for ever buried in Oblivion.

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City, but leaving part of his Forces to maintain it, he invaded *Africa* with the rest, and by that means quickly raised the Siege, and brought the *Carthaginians* so low, that they were fain to make Peace with him, and content themselves with *Africa*, leaving *Sicily* to *Agathocles*.

If therefore we examine the Conduct and Exploits of *Agathocles*, we shall scarce find that Fortune was at all concerned in them: For, as we said before, he did not attain the Sovereignty by the Favour of any Man, but rose to it by Degrees, through all the Steps of the Army, with great Difficulty and Danger; and preserved it afterwards by executing the boldest Enterprizes. Indeed it cannot be called Virtue * in *Agathocles* to murder his
Fellow-

The Life of an *Agathocles*, or of an *Oliverotto da Fermo*, can only tend to quicken and to feed every thing in our Instinct that is vicious, and to call up all those Seeds of Vice that may lie hid in the Mind, and would otherwise be neglected and die away. How many young People have been
spoiled

* In this Passage, *Macchiavel* seems to put a new Sense upon the Word *Virtù*, which he commonly makes use of to signify any Quality whatever, good or bad, that gains Esteem and Applause. He had just said, a few Lines before, *le attione e virtù di Agatocle*.

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Fellow-citizens, betray his Friends, and act without any Regard to Faith, Pity or Religion: This may be the means of attaining supreme Power, but can never purchase true Glory. Nevertheless, when I consider his Courage and Conduct in facing and overcoming Dangers, and his Greatness of Mind in supporting and mastering his Misfortunes; though he cannot be ranked with the most excellent Men, on account of his horrible Cruelties and numberless other Crimes; yet I see no Reason why he may not be deemed equal to the greatest Commanders: Wherefore we cannot ascribe to Fortune or Virtue, what *Agathocles* effected without the help of either.

In our own Times, under the Popedom of *Alexander VI. Oliverotto da Fermo*, having been left an Orphan, was brought up by his Uncle on the Mother's side, whose Name was *John Fogliani* †, and in his Youth was

listd spoiled by reading Romances; insomuch that *Gandalin* or *Medor*, or some other Hero in Romance, has been the sole Pattern of their Thoughts and Actions? Certainly there is something epidemical and infectious in our manner of Thinking,

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† *Guicciardin* calls him *Frangiani*.

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listet a Soldier under *Paul Vitelli*, to learn the Art of War, and thereby attain some considerable Command in the Army. *Vitelli* dying, he served afterwards under that General's Brother *Vitellozzo*; and being a Man of Parts, Courage, and good Appearance, he quickly rose to be one of *Vitellozzo*'s principal Officers. But thinking it beneath him, and servile, to be longer under any Superior, he resolved, with the Assistance of the *Vitelli*, to make himself Master of *Fermo*; and for this purpose entered into a Conspiracy with some of the Inhabitants of that City, who preferred Slavery to Liberty. Whereupon he wrote to *Fogliani* his Uncle, that after so many Years Absence, he intended to come and visit him and his native Country, and take a View of his Inheritance: And that, as he had long served in the Wars merely to pur-

something that communicates itself from Mind to Mind with Ease and Rapidity.

Charles XII. that wandering Hero, that King-Errant, worthy of old Chivalry, whose Virtues were pushed to such an Excess, that they degenerated into Vices, always carried about him from his Youth the Life of *Alexander* the Great, and copied after it: so that many who particularly knew him, affirm that it was *Quintus Curtius* who

ra-

purchase Reputation and Honour, he proposed to make such a Figure at his Entry, as might shew his Fellow-citizens that his Time had not been ill spent: He therefore desired Admittance for a hundred Horse of his Friends and Equipage, and begged he would be pleased to procure them an honourable Reception, both for his own Reputation, and for his Uncle's, who had brought him up. *Fogliani* was wanting in no good Office on behalf of his Nephew; so that he was received in *Fermo* with great Distinction, and lodged in *Fogliani's* House. A few Days after, when he had made the necessary Dispositions for perpetrating his Design, he prepared a magnificent Entertainment, to which he invited his Uncle, and all the principal Ci-

ravaged *Poland* and *Saxony*, that *Stanislaus* owed his Crown to the Promotion of *Abdolonimus* *, and that the Battle of *Arbela* occasioned the Defeat at *Pultowa*.

As I am now speaking only of the Mind of Man in general, and of the Impressions and Modifications that may be produced in it by external Causes, without considering the Difference of

* *Abdolonimus*, a Gardener, was made King of *Sydon* by *Alexander*.

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Citizens. The Feast was over, with the other Diversions which are usual upon such Occasions, when *Oliverotto* purposely brought in some serious Discourse concerning the Pope and his Son *Cesar Borgia*, their Grandeur and their Enterprizes. His Uncle and the other Guests partaking of the Discourse, he started up on a sudden, and said these were Affairs of too great Moment not to be discoursed of in a more private Place. Accordingly he retired into a Chamber, whither he was followed by the whole Company. No sooner were they sat down, but some Soldiers, who were concealed about the Chamber, rushed in and murdered them all. *Fogliani* and the principal Citizens being thus dispatched, *Oliverotto* mounted on Horseback, rode up and down the City, cleared it of all his suspected Enemies, and

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Rank or Fortune, methinks I may be allowed to pass from this great Example to another of a meaner sort.—Not many Years ago, a mock Opera was acted in *London*, and met with uncommon Applause, insomuch that it has been often represented since: The Subject of it was the Feats, Adventures and Intrigues of Highwaymen, Pickpockets, &c. What was the Consequence? The Heroes of the Piece were admired and imitated, and

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besieged the chief Magistrate in his Palace. Whereupon the rest of the Citizens, through Fear, submitted, and settled a Government of which *Oliverotto* assumed the Sovereignty. After dispatching all the Malecontents, who had any Power to hurt him, he so well secured himself by several new Laws, both Civil and Military, that in the Space of one Year, he was not only fixed in the Sovereignty of *Fermo*, but grown formidable to all his Neighbours: Infomuch that he might have enjoyed his Principality as long as *Agathocles* did that of *Syracuse*, had he not suffered himself to be circumvented by *Cesar Borgia*, who, as we said before,

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and the Roads and Streets more infested with Robbers than they were before: So dangerous it is to proclaim and dwell upon Examples of Vice!

Machiavel here produces two Examples of successful Villains, takes in just as much of their Story as would serve his Purpose, and passes over every thing that might tend to shew their Misery. But it is not true, that *Agathocles* enjoyed his Usurpation in Peace. *Agathocles* was almost continually at War with the *Carthaginians*; he was forced, in *Africa*, to fly from his own Army, who afterwards murdered his Children; and he was at length poisoned by his own Grandson.

Oli-

surprised the *Unfani* and *Vitelli* at *Sinigalia*; where *Oliverotto*, being likewise taken a Year after the Parricide he had committed, was strangled with his Master *Vitellozzo*, from whom he had learned his Skill both in War and Villany.

Considering how many Sovereigns, because of the Cruelties they had acted, were unable to defend their Government even in Times of Peace, much less when they were intangled in War; one may wonder how it happened that *Agathocles*, and a few more, after numberless Acts of Treachery and Inhumanity, reigned so long and so peaceably over those who had formerly been their Fellow-citizens, and were not destroyed either by Conspiracies at home, or Invasions from abroad. The Success or Miscarriage of such Princes

Oliverotto, the other Example, soon met with the Reward due to his Crimes; he was destroyed by the Treachery of *Cæsar Borgia*, in less than a Year after his Usurpation, and thus seems to have been snatched from the Vengeance of his injured Fellow-citizens: So that this Example proves nothing; and the other can only shew that Misery is inseparable from Greatness, when Greatness is attained by Perfidy and Inhumanity.

Our

MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE. 91

Princes does, I believe, depend upon their Cruelty being well or ill applied. Cruelty may be said to be well applied, (if it is allowable to give any Commendation to ill Actions) when it is committed but once, out of Necessity, and for Self-preservation; and never repeated afterwards, but converted as much as possible to the Benefit of the Subject. Cruelty is ill applied, when it is but little at first, and is afterwards rather increased than abated. Those who are cruel in the first manner, sometimes receive Assistance afterwards both from God and Man, as *Agathocles* did. But those whose Cruelty lingers, and comes on by degrees, cannot possibly subsist long.

Whence

Our Author's Remark upon these Examples is That *Agathocles* and *Oliverotto* maintained their Usurpations by committing all their Cruelties at once, without being reduced to the Necessity of repeating them: From whence he infers, that an Usurper, to maintain his Government, must suddenly assassinate all those whom he suspects and distrusts, as well as his Enemies, and beware of using a slow Revenge, which would always disturb his Subjects, and endanger himself. *Machiavel* seems to feel no Horror at the naming of these Crimes; but talks of them coolly, as stanch political Maxims: He must therefore have approved
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Whence it may be concluded, that he who usurps the Government of a State, ought to make great Dispatch in his Cruelties, and commit them all at once; that there may be no Need of renewing them from time to time, and that by their Discontinuance, his Subjects may trust in him, and be disposed to adhere to him, upon his obliging them.

Whoever acts otherwise either through Fear or Imprudence, is always forced to be ready with his Knife in his Hand, and can never rely

of the Massacre on St. *Bartholomew's* Day, of the *Sicilian* Vespers, and such-like Barbarities, as being necessary for the Security and Interest of the Sovereign.

But granting Usurpers and Tyrants sometimes escape with Impunity, that is, are not disturbed or destroyed by those whom they oppress; yet still their Conscience is their Tormentor, they can never extinguish the Testimony it bears against them, they can never be free from the most pungent

* This was the Conduct of *Augustus*, *Qui posito triumviri nomine, militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit.* Ann. 1. "He laid aside the Name of
"Triumvir, gained the Army by Liberality and Donations, and the People

"by Store of Provisions,
"and charmed all by the
"Blessings and Sweetness of
"public Peace." And Ann.
3. *Quæ tribunatu gesserat, abolevit.* "He abolished
"the Laws he had enacted
"in his Tribuneship."

rely upon his Subjects, because the fresh and repeated Injuries they receive will always make them dread and distrust him. Injuries therefore must be done all at once, that those who suffer may have the less Time to feel, and therefore be the less disposed to revenge them. Whereas Favours ought to be bestowed by little and little, that there may be the more Time to relish them. And above all things, a Prince ought so to behave himself to his Subjects, that no Accident, good or bad, may be able to make any Alteration in his Conduct. For when Misfortunes bring him to a Necessity either of hurting or obliging them, his Injuries will be unseasonable, and dangerous to himself, and his Favours will be looked upon as forced, and consequently have no Effect ^b.

gent Remorses, and their Minds are always overwhelmed and blackened with Melancholy. If we read the Lives of *Dionysius*, *Tiberius*, *Nero*, *Lewis XI.* *Basilowitz*, or other Tyrants, we shall find these Monsters had no true Contentment and Peace, and generally ended their Days in the utmost

^b In this Sense it was that *Otho* said to his Nephew, That *Vitellius* would not be so implacable, as either to murder or dispossess the Nephew of an Emperor who had preserved all his Family, and surrendered the Empire to him, when he was able to keep it, and when his whole Army

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most Wretchedness. So that if there were no Justice either in this World or the next, Virtue would still be the Interest of Mankind; because it unites, cements and preserves them; whereas Vice is the true Cause of their Discord, Misery and Destruction.

Army were extremely desirous to engage with that of Vitellius. *An Vitellium tam immitis animi fore, ut pro incolumi tota domo, ne hanc quidem sibi gratiam redderet? Non enim ultima desperatibne, sed poscente praelium exercitu remisisse Reip. novissimum casum.* He had just before said to the Army, *Quanto plus spei ostenditis, si vivere placeret, tanto pulchrior mors erit.* "The more Zeal you shew to fight for me, if I cared to live, and the more confident you are of Success, the more honourable will be my Death." Tacit. Hist. i.

CHAP. IX.

Of Civil Principalities.

I SHALL now speak of the other Way by which a Principality is attained, to wit, when a chief Citizen is made Sovereign of his Country, not by wicked Means, or intolerable Violence, but by the Favour of his Fellow-citizens; this may be called a Civil Principality: To attain it, there is no need of extraordinary Merit or Fortune, but only of a lucky Sort of Cunning, which may gain the Favour and Interest either of the

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the People, or the Nobility: For there is no City but is divided into these two Factions; because the Nobles always seek to command and oppress the People; and the People to save themselves from Obedience and Oppression: This Strife never fails to produce one of these three Effects, either a Principality, or Liberty, or Licentiousness^b.

A Prin-

OBSERVATIONS.

There is no Sentiment more inseparable from our Being, than that of Liberty; nor is there any that is more equally, or more universally felt. As we are born without Fetters, so we desire and we claim to live without them. 'Tis this noble Spirit of Independence that has produced so many illustrious Men, so many free Governments, and so many Republicks wherein a Sort of Equality is settled that brings us back, as it were, to the State of Nature.

In this Chapter *Machiavel* gives some excellent Political Rules for those who rise to the Sovereignty of a Republick by the Suffrages of their Fellow-citizens. And indeed this is almost the only Case wherein

^a *Naturalem nobilitatis superbiam*, says *Paterculus*, Hist.

2. "That Pride and Arrogance which is natural to the Nobility." *Avaritiam et arrogantiam præcipua*

validiorum vitia. Tacit. Hist.

2. "Avarice and Insolence are the common Vices of the Great."

^b *Postquam exigi equalitatis, et pro modestia ac pudore*

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A Principality is introduced either by the Nobility, or the People, according as either of the two Parties has need of it: For when the Grandees find themselves in no Condition to resist the People, they cast their Eyes upon some one of their Number, and make him Sovereign, that under his Name they may vent

wherein he would suffer a Prince to be virtuous: But unfortunately, 'tis a Case that very rarely happens. The Republican Spirit is so excessively jealous of its Liberty, that it startles at the very Name

dore ambitio et vis incedebat, provenere dominationes. Tacit. Ann. 3. "As soon as
"Equality was destroyed,
"and instead of Modesty
"and Moderation, Pride,
"Ambition and Violence
"prevailed, a Principality
"was settled."-----*Postquam Regum pertasum, leges maluerunt. Ibid.* "When they
"were surfeited with the
"Kingly Government, they
"preferred and assumed their
"Liberty."-----*Tribunis red- dita licentia, quoquo vel- lent populum agitandi--Exin continua per viginti annos discordia, non mos, non jus, de- terrima queque impune. Ibid.* "The Tribunes were re-
"stored to their licentious
"Authority of throwing the
"People into Combuſtions

"at Pleasure.---Hencefor-
"ward for twenty Years
"civil Discord raged; and
"there was neither Law,
"nor Settlement; the most
"Wicked found Impunity
"in the Excess of their
"Crimes."-----*Inter Patres plebemq; certamina exarsere; modo turbulenti Tribuni, modo Consules prevalidi. Hist. 2.*
"Contentions were raised,
"and fomented between the
"Senate and the People,
"sometimes by the Turbu-
"lence of the Tribunes, and
"at other times by the too
"great Power of the Con-
"suls." These are the Ac-
counts which Tacitus gives
of Principality, Liberty, Li-
centiousness, and Contention
between the Nobles and the
People.

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vent their Animosity c. In the same manner the People, when they are not able to resist their Adversaries, transfer their Power to a single Person, and create him their Prince, to be protected by his Authority d.

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Name of a Master. We know some Nations in *Europe* that have shook off the Yoke of their Tyrants, and established a Sort of natural Independence; but we know of none, who from being free have subjected themselves to a voluntary Servitude: For the *Danes* in surrendering their Liberties did no more than prefer one Master to many; they made their Sovereign absolute with no other View but to deliver themselves from the Tyranny and Oppression of the Nobles.

Many Republicks have with Length of Time fallen back into despotick Governments. This seems to be a Calamity that inevitably happens to every free Government, sooner or later. And indeed how can it perpetually resist every thing that

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saps

^c Thus the Grandees of *Heraclea*, to be revenged on the People, who over-matched them, recalled *Clearchus* from Exile, and made him their Sovereign, notwithstanding the Opposition of the People. See *Machiavel*, Chap. 16. Book I. of his Discourses.

^d Thus the Constitution of *Denmark* was changed, not many Years ago, from a li-

mitted to an absolute Monarchy: For in the Reign of *Frederick III.* the Commons and Clergy of that Kingdom, to free themselves from the Oppression of the Nobles, made a formal and voluntary Surrender of their Liberties and Privileges to the King and his Heirs for ever; and compelled the Nobles to join with them, in putting on the Yoke.

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The Prince who is raised to his Sovereignty by the Nobles, finds greater Difficulty in maintaining it, than he who rises by the Favour of the People: For the former is surrounded by many who look upon themselves as his Equals, and whom therefore he cannot govern and command as he would^e; whereas the latter has no Rival in Power, and is surrounded

saps and supplants it? How can it always check the Ambition of those great Men whom it produces, and harbours in its Bosom? How can it always watch against the dark and secret Practicēs and Machinations of its Neighbours, or against the Corruption of its own Members; while Interest prevails in the World, over every other Motive? How should it expect always to come off with Success in the Wars it must needs undertake and support for its Security? or prevent those dangerous Conjunctions, those critical and decisive Moments, when its Liberty is at stake, or those unforeseen Accidents that animate and favour the Wicked and Audacious?

* Accordingly *Clearchus* was forced to exterminate all the Grandees of *Heraclea*, in order to deliver himself from their Insolence, and to content the People, by avenging them upon those who had deprived them of their Liberty. From whence *Machiavel* infers, Chap. 16. Book I. of

his Discourses, that whichever way a Prince attains his Sovereignty, the Good-will of the People must always be gained, sooner or later; because 'tis otherwise impossible he should be safe: Besides, the more a Prince destroys the People, the more he weakens himself.

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rounded by few or none who are not disposed and ready to obey. Besides, the Grantees cannot, with Honour, be contented, or without doing Injury to others; but it is not so with the People, who are more reasonable in their Expectations; and would only be secure against Oppression; whereas the Grantees want to oppress. Add to this, that a Prince can never be safe, when the People are his Enemies, because of their Number; on the contrary the Nobles are but few, and therefore easily secured. The worst a Prince may expect from an injured People, is to be forsaken; but when the Grantees are his Enemies, he ought to fear that they will not only

ious? If any Armies are commanded by timid and unskilful Generals, it falls a Prey to any Enemies; if they are headed by bold and successful Commanders, these will be as dangerous in Times of Peace, as they were useful and beneficial during the War.

There are few, if any Republicks, but have risen from the very Abyfs of Tytanny to Freedom, and from thence have sunk again into the Dregs of Servitude.

H 2

¶ *Cosmo* of *Medicis* prevailed over the Nobles of *Florence*, because, (says *Nardi*, Book I. of his History) the Nobles being all equal, did not so well agree among

themselves, as *Cosmo's* Adherents, who dazzled with the Splendor and Reputation of his Family, thought it no Dishonour to depend upon, or obey him.

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only forsake, but attack him; for having more Penetration and Cunning, they anticipate their Dangers, and court the Favour of the Person who is like to overcome. Besides, the Prince is obliged to live always with one and the same People, but not always with the same Set of Grandees; for these he may make and unmake, advance and remove as he pleases.

But for the better explaining of this Subject, we must consider the Conduct of the Nobles with regard to their Prince. They are either wholly attached to his Fortune and Interest; and in this Case, they ought to be valued and preferred, unless they are rapacious: Or they are not. This again proceeds either from Fear, and a natural Want of Courage; or from Design and Ambition. In the first Case, they may be employed, especially if they are Men of Prudence, and fit for giving Counsel; because they will do

Honour

virtude. The same *Athenians*, who in the Times of *Demosthenes* provoked and insulted *Philip* of *Macedon*, crouched to *Alexander*. The *Romans*, who abhorred Royalty, and expelled their Kings, suffered, some Ages after, the most horrible Oppression and Cruelties from their Emperors. And the same *Englishmen* who rebelled against, imprisoned,

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Honour to the Prince in his Prosperity, and are not to be feared in his Misfortunes. But when the Nobles are acted by Ambition and Self-designs, which shew that their Thoughts are more intent upon their own Advantage than the Prince's, he ought to be as much upon his Guard against them, as against his open Enemies; for in his Misfortunes, they will always help to bring on his Ruin.

The Prince who owes his Advancement to the People, ought always to keep them his

soned, and beheaded *Charles I.* submissively bore the galling Yoke of a Protector.

In the same manner as Men are born, grow up, live for some Years, and if not cut off by some Disease or Accident, die of old Age; Republicks are formed and settled, flourish for some Ages, and if not destroyed either by foreign Arms, or by some of their own Citizens, perish by the Length

H 3

of

“ We have an Instance of this in *Valerius Festus*.—*Legatus studia provincialium cum fide juvit, mox nutabat, palam epistolis edictisque Vitellium, occultis nunciis Vespasianum fovens, & hæc illave defensurus, prout invavisissent. Tacit. Hist. 2.* “ *Valerius Festus*, Governor of the Province, promoted the Zeal and Inclinations

“ of the People, with exemplary Fidelity, in the Beginning: In a short time he began to halt, and whilst in Letters and Edicts he asserted the Cause of *Vitellius*, he gave secret Intelligence and Encouragement to *Vespasian*, being resolved, whichever Party prevailed, to maintain the Justice of it.”

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his Friends; and this is easily done, the People only desiring to be saved from Oppression. But he who is advanced by the Grandees, against the Inclinations of the People, should make it his chief Endeavour to ingratiate himself with the latter; which may be easily done, by granting them his Protection. For when Men receive good Offices where they expected Injuries, the Obligation is doubled; and therefore the People grow better affected to such a Prince, when he is their Benefactor, than they would have been, had he owed his Principality to them. Now the Affections of a People are to be gained many ways, for which no certain Rules can be given,

of their Duration. As every thing in Nature has its Period, so all Governments, and the greatest Monarchies, have but their limited Time. Republicks are sensible of this; and therefore look upon every Family that is grown too powerful, as the Beginning and Root of a Distemper by which they must perish. But tho' many Revolutions in States and Kingdoms must needs happen, yet Governments that are truly free will never be persuaded to put themselves under a Master; at least a better Master: For they will always alledge that it is safer to be subject to the Laws, than to the Caprice of any single Man.

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given, because they vary according to the Times; and therefore I shall pass them over. I will only conclude, that it is always necessary a Prince should be well with his People; for otherwise he has no Resources in Times of Danger and Distress. *Nabis* Prince of *Sparta*, attacked and besieged by all *Greece*, and by a victorious Army of *Romans*, was able to defend his Government and his Country against their united Strength, by securing a few of the Nobles. But had the People been his Enemies, this would not have been sufficient.

Let no Man here object the trite Proverb, *That he who builds upon the People, builds upon Sand*. This indeed may be true, when a private Citizen rests upon the People, and persuades himself, that they will protect or deliver him from the Oppression of his Enemies or of the Magistrates: Such a Man will often find himself deceived; as happened to the *Gracchi* in *Rome*^h, and to *George Scali* in *Florence*ⁱ. But if the Prince, who relies upon

H 4

them,

^h *Tiberius Gracchus* was attacked and killed by the People, upon *Scipio Nasica's* calling out, *Qui salvam velint Remp. me sequantur*.
 " Let all those who would maintain the Liberty of

" the Commonwealth, follow me." *Patere. Hist. 2.* His Brother *Caius* was killed afterwards.

ⁱ *Machiavel* relates, Book III. of his History of *Florence*,

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them, knows how to command, is courageous, and neither dejected in his Distress, nor wanting in the necessary Preparations; if by his own Valour and Conduct he keeps alive the Courage of a whole People, he will never be deserted by them, nor find that he rests upon a tottering Foundation.

Principalities that are suddenly raised from a limited to an absolute Government, are for the most part in a dangerous and unsettled Condition: For either the Sovereign governs by himself, or delegates his Power to the Magistrates: In this last Case, the Danger is greatest; for he solely depends upon the Affection of his Delegates; who may with great Ease deprive him of his Authority, especially in Times of Danger, either by acting against him, or by withdrawing their Obedience: Nor can such a Prince, when his Affairs are perplexed, resume and exert his whole Authority; because his Subjects, accustomed to receive their Orders from their Magistrates and Fellow-citizens, will refuse Obe-

rence, that *George Scali* was *Florente, Fondarsi come Mes-*
beheaded in Presence of a *ser Giorgio Scala.* The Af-
People, who but a little be- ffection of the People, he
fore had adored him. Whence adds, is as easily lost as it is
proceeded the Proverb at gained.

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Obedience to those of their Prince; besides, it always happens in such pressing Exigencies, that there are but few upon whose Fidelity he can rely. Wherefore a Prince, in such a Situation, ought not to take his Measures according to what he sees in Times of Peace; for then the Citizens have need of the State, and his Subjects of his Protection; and every one runs, and promises, and dies to serve him, when Death is at a Distance: But in Times of Distress, when the State and the Prince have need of their Service, most of them fly off. And this Trial is the more dangerous, as it can be made but once.

Upon the Whole, a wise Prince ought to find some Means of making his People, at all Times and upon all Occasions, have need of his Government; and in this Case they will ever be faithful and true to him.

CHAP.

* *Prosperis Vitellii rebus certaturi ad obsequium, adversam ejus fortunam ex æquo detrectabant*, says Tacitus, Hist. 2. "Those who during the Prosperity of Vitellius, would contend with one another in Acts of Submission and Duty, equally concurred to de-

"sert his falling Fortune."

— *Languentibus omnium studiis, qui primo alacres fidem atque animum ostentaverant.*

Hist. 1. "The Zeal of all those Men decaying, who had at first appeared confident, faithful and courageous."

CHAP. X.

How the Strength of all Principalities ought to be computed.

IN examining the Nature of these Principalities, it must further be considered, whether the Prince has Power and Territory enough to subsist by himself, or whether he has need of foreign Assistance: To clear this Point, I say that as I think those Princes capable of subsisting by themselves, who

OBSERVATIONS.

Since the Time that *Machiavel* wrote his political Prince, the Face of *Europe* is so much altered, that it would be no longer known to be the same. If some great General in the Age of *Lewis XII.* was to come back into the World, he would find himself much at a Loss; he would see War now carried on by such numberless Bodies of Men, as can hardly be subsisted in the Field, and yet are kept up in Times of Peace, as well as of War; whereas in his Age, to execute great Enterprizes, and strike decisive Blows, a Handful of Men was sufficient; and these were disbanded as soon as the War was over. Instead of Coats of Mail, Lances, and Harquebusses with Matches, he would find the Army furnished with common Cloathing, with

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who either by the Numbers of their Men, or the Greatness of their Wealth, can raise a complete Army, and give Battle to those who attack them; so those I think depend upon others, who not being strong enough to meet the Enemy in the Field, are forced to keep within the Walls of their Towns. Of the first Case we have spoken already, and shall say more as Occasion offers. As to the other, we can only advise such Princes to strengthen and fortify the Capital Towns in their Dominions, and to have no Dependence upon the Country: For if the Prince has fortified his Capital, and behaved himself

with Firelocks and Bayonets; he would see new Methods of Encamping, Besieging, and giving Battle; and find the Art of subsisting the Troops as necessary now, as that of Conquering was before.

But what would *Machiavel* say himself, upon seeing this new political Face of *Europe*, and so many Princes scarce known in his Days, who are now ranked with the greatest Monarchs? upon seeing the Power and Authority of Sovereigns firmly established; the present Manner of Negotiating; and that Balance which is settled in *Europe* by the Alliance of many Princes and States against the Over-powerful and Ambitious, a Balance which is solely designed for securing the Peace and Tranquillity of Mankind?

All

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self to his Subjects so as I have described, and shall describe hereafter, he will never be wantonly attacked^a; for Men are always afraid of embarking in difficult Enterprizes^b; and there

All these Things have produced such an universal Change, as renders our Author's Maxims inapplicable in Modern Politicks: As appears chiefly from this Chapter. I shall here give a few Examples.

Machiavel supposes that a Prince who has a large Territory, a numerous Army, and full Coffers, may defend himself against his Enemies by his own Strength without foreign Supplies. As I will venture to contradict; nay I affirm, that let a Sovereign be ever so formidable, he cannot defend himself against powerful Enemies without the Assistance

* Upon this Account *Tacitus* censures *Bardanes* for laying Siege to *Seleucia*.----
Solis Seleucensibus dominationem ejus abnuentibus; & quos, ut patris sui quoque defectores, ira magis, quam ex usu praesenti, accensus, implicabatur obsidione urbis valide, & munitionibus objecti annis, muroq; & commeatibus firmata. Ann.

11. " *Seleucia* was the only
" City that disowned his
" Sway: So that, more
" transported with Wrath
" against the *Seleucians*, as
" a People who had likewise

" revolted from his Father,
" than consulting his present
" Interest, *Bardanes* entan-
" gled himself in the Siege
" of a Town, strongly forti-
" fied, fenced by a River,
" and replenished with
" Stores."

^b *Omnes qui magnarum rerum consilia suscipiunt, aestimare debent, an quod inchoarunt promptum effectu, aut certe non arduum sit.* Hist.

2. " Those who undertake
" some great Enterprize, says
" *Tacitus*, ought to examine
" well, whether the effect-
" ing it is easy or difficult."

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there is always great Difficulty in attacking a Prince who keeps his Capital in a good State of Defence, and is not hated by his People.

The Towns in *Germany* are many of them free, have but little Territory, obey the Emperor only when they please, and are in no Awe either of him, or of any other Prince of the Empire: The Reason is, they are all so well fortified, that the taking any one of them is looked upon as a Work of great Difficulty and Time; their Walls are strong, their Ditches deep, their Fortifications sufficiently provided with Cannon; and their Stores and Magazines furnished for a Twelve-month: Besides, that the lower People may be no Burden to them, but maintain themselves by their own Labour, they have Work-houses,

Assistance of some Allies. If the most formidable Prince in *Europe*, *Lewis XIV.* was reduced to the greatest Distress, and had like to have been ruined by the War about the *Spanish* Monarchy; if for want of foreign Assistance, he was unable to defend himself against the Alliance of so many Kings and Princes; how should a Sovereign, less powerful, be able without Allies to resist the joint Attacks of his Neighbours, to which he may often be exposed?

*Tis

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houses, where, for a whole Year, the Poor may be employed in such Manufactures as are the Nerves and Subsistence of those Towns: Military Discipline and Exercises are likewise much in Request among them, for supporting which they have many good Laws and Customs.

A Prince therefore who possesses a City well fortified, and has the Affections of his People, cannot be attacked; or if he is attacked, his Enemies will come off with Dishonour: For Affairs of this World are so changeable, that it is scarce possible for an Army to lie a whole Year before a Town. Some may object, that if the People have Houses

'Tis often said, and often repeated without much Reflection, that Treaties are useless, because they are never observed in all Points; and that the present Age is not more scrupulous in keeping them than any other. I answer, that though many Examples may be produced, both ancient and modern, and some very late, of Princes who have not fulfilled all their Engagements, yet it is always prudent and necessary to make Alliances. For your Allies will otherwise be so many Enemies; and if they refuse to send you Supplies, when you have need of them, you may at least expect they will observe an exact Neutrality.

Machiavel

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Houses and Possessions in the Country, they will not have Patience to see them plundered and destroyed, and that Charity to themselves will make them forget their Prince. I answer, that a Prince who is not wanting in Courage or Authority, will always overcome these Difficulties, either by giving his People Hopes that their Troubles will soon be over, or by prepossessing them with the Cruelty of the Enemy, or by using his Address in correcting those who are turbulent and audacious. Besides, it is the common Practice of the Enemy to burn and destroy the Country at their first coming, when

Machiavel speaks afterwards of the *Principini*, those diminutive Sovereigns, who having but small Dominions, cannot send an Army to the Field. He advises them chiefly to fortify their Capitals, in order to secure themselves and their Troops in time of War. Those *Italian* Princes, whom *Machiavel* treats of, are properly a sort of Mongrels, half Sovereigns, half Subjects: They only appear as Sovereigns by the Number of their Domesticks. The best Advice that can be given them, would be, methinks, to lessen a little the Opinion they entertain of their own Grandeur, the extreme Veneration they have for their antient and illustrious Pedigree, and their inviolable Zeal for the Scutchi-
ons. Men of Sense pretend, that they had better
assume

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when every Man's Spirit is high, and bent upon Defence; so that the Prince need be in no Fear at first; and in a few Days, when the People begin to cool, and to consider that the Mischief is already done, and that there is no longer any Remedy; they join the more chearfully with their Prince, as they think they have done him an Obligation, by sacrificing their Houses and Possessions in his Defence. And such is the Nature of Man, that he is just as much pleased with conferring Obligations as receiving them. If all these things are fairly considered, it will not appear difficult for a Prince not only to gain, but

assume no other Rank in the World than is due to Noblemen of easy Fortunes; that they ought to descend from the Scaffold of their Pride, to maintain at most no more Troops than would be necessary to guard their Palaces against Robbers, if any Robbers could be reduced to the starving Condition of seeking a Subsistence in those Palaces; that they ought to raze and demolish their Ramparts and Walls, and every thing that gives the Place of their Residence the Appearance of Strength. The Reasons are these: Most of those petty Princes, and especially in *Germany*, ruin themselves by the excessive Sums they expend in maintaining that Grandeur with which they are intoxicated; and to support the Honour of their Family,

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but to retain the Affections of his People, and to make them endure a long Siege; if he is wise and provident, and has supplied them with every thing necessary for their Sustainance and Defence.

family, they reduce themselves to Beggary and Want: There is scarce a second Son of a second Son of a younger Brother, who does not believe himself to be something like *Lewis XIV.* he builds his *Versailles*, keeps his Mistresses, and maintains his Armies.

There is, at this Day, a certain Prince, descended from the younger Son of a great Family, who maintains all that Variety of Guards which compose the Household of a great King; but so much in Miniature, that each Corps can scarce be seen without the Help of a Microscope. His Army would perhaps be numerous enough to represent a Battle in the Play-house of *Verona*.

The Reason why these diminutive Monarchs have no need of fortifying their Capitals, is very plain: They can hardly be besieged at any time by their Equals; for their superior Neighbours would presently interpose, and offer a Mediation, which they are not at Liberty to refuse: Thus, instead of Bloodshed, two or three Dashes of a Pen are sufficient to terminate their Quarrels.

^c *Tacitus*, in his Life of *Agricola*, observes, that he annually renewed the Garrisons of his Towns, and sent them fresh Supplies of Ammunition and Provisions, that they might be able to hold out a long Siege.

I

What

What can be the Use of their fortified Towns? Were they strong enough to endure a Siege as long as that of *Troy*, against their Equals, they would not be able to hold out as long as *Jericbo* against a powerful Prince. Besides, if they lie between two mighty Neighbours, who are at War, it is not in their Option to observe a Neutrality; unless they would be totally ruined: And if they join with either of them, their Capitals become the Frontier-Towns of that Prince's Dominions.

The Description which *Machiavel* gives of the Imperial Towns in *Germany*, is quite different from what they are at present. A Petard or two, nay the Emperor's bare Mandate, would be sufficient to put him in Possession of any of them. They are all ill fortified, most of them have old Walls, flanked here and there with huge Towers, and surrounded with Ditches filled up almost to the Top, with the Earth that has tumbled down from time to time: They have very few Troops, and these ill-disciplined; their Officers are either the Refuse of the *German* Army, or superannuated and unfit for Service. Some of the Imperial Towns, indeed, are pretty well supplied with Artillery; but this would by no means be sufficient for withstanding the Emperor, who often uses to make them feel their Weakness. In short, to make War, give Battle, attack and defend fortified Places, is only the Business of powerful Sovereigns; and those who affect to imitate them, are no wiser than the Man who counterfeited the Noise of Thunder, and believed himself to be *Jupiter*.

CHAP. XI.

Of Ecclesiastical Principalities.

IT only now remains that we should treat of Ecclesiastical Principalities; which indeed it is hard to acquire, but herein the whole Difficulty lies; for though they are acquired by Merit or Fortune, they are maintained without the Help of either; being founded on old religious Customs, which have such Weight and Influence, that in whatever manner such Princes govern and live, they are sure of preserving their Dignity. These alone have Dominions which they defend not, and Subjects whom they do not govern; and neither for this Cause are their Dom-
nions

OBSERVATIONS.

Antiquity scarce furnishes us with any Examples of Sovereign Priests. Among the Nations of which we have the least Knowledge, the Jews only, methinks, had a Succession of priestly Monarchs. It is not surprising, that in the most superstitious as well as the most ignorant of all barbarous Nations, those who were at the Head of Religion did at length usurp the Management of

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nions taken from them, nor have their Subjects any Inclination, Design or Power to withdraw their Allegiance; so that only such Principalities are safe and happy. But as these are governed by supernatural Causes, which the Mind of Man comprehends not, I shall forbear to speak of them: For since they are raised and maintained by God alone, it would be Rashness and Presumption in any Man to account for them. Nevertheless, if it should be asked, whence it proceeds that the Temporal Power of the Church is now arrived at such a Height, as to become formidable to the King of *France*, to drive him out of *Italy*, and to ruin the *Venetians*; whereas before the Time of Pope *Alexander* it was but little regarded by the *Italian* Princes, I mean, not only by such as are properly

Affairs; but every-where else, I am of Opinion the Priests meddled only with the Duties of their own Function. They offered Sacrifices, received a certain Allowance, and had some Privileges; but neither Instruction nor Government was any part of their Business: And if there were no religious Wars among them, I believe it was owing to this; they had no Tenets calculated to sow Division in the Minds of Men, nor any Power to oppress.

When

perly so styled, but likewise by every Baron and petty Lord: Though this be well enough known, yet I think it will not be superfluous to make some Mention of it here.

Before the Expedition of *Charles VIII.* King of *France*, into *Italy*, that Country was subject to the Pope, the *Venetians*, the King of *Naples*, the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines*. These Powers had two things chiefly to mind: One was, to prevent a foreign Invasion; and the other, to take care that not any one of themselves should enlarge his Dominions. Those over whom they kept the strictest Eye, were the Pope and the *Venetians*. To restrain the latter, it was necessary that all the rest should join in a Confederacy; as it happened in the Defence of

When *Europe*, in the Decline of the *Roman* Empire, was under an Anarchy of Barbarians, it was parcelled out into a thousand petty Principalities. Many Bishops became Sovereign Princes, and the Bishop of *Rome* set an Example to the rest. One would think that under these Ecclesiastical Governments, the Subjects should have been in a tolerable Situation; since elective Princes, Princes raised to the Supreme Power at an advanced Age, such, in short,

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of *Ferrara*: And in order to check the Pope, they made use of the *Roman* Barons, who being divided into two Factions, the *Ursini* and the *Colonneſi*, were eternally quarrelling with one another; and as they were constantly in Arms under the very Eye of the Pope, his Power was thereby kept in a low Condition: Though now and then there aroſe a Pope of Spirit, ſuch as *Sixtus IV.* yet either his Fortune or Wiſdom was not ſufficient to extricate him from theſe Difficulties. The Shortneſs of their Lives was the Occaſion of this; becauſe ten Years, more than which few Popes lived, could hardly give them an Opportunity ſo much as to humble one of the Factions: And if, for Example, one Pope had in a manner quite deſtroyed

whoſe Dominions, like thoſe of Churchmen, are of a very ſmall Extent, ought to keep Meaſures with their Subjects, if not from a Principle of Religion, at leaſt from a Principle of Policy.

It is nevertheleſs certain, that no Country ſwarms ſo much with Beggars, as that of Priests. 'Tis there one may ſee a moving Picture of all the Miſeries of human Nature; not in thoſe Wretches whom the Liberality and Alms of Sovereign Princes draw thither, in thoſe Inſects which faſten upon the Rich, and crawl in the Train

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stroyed the *Colonnese*, presently up sprung another, an Enemy to the *Ursini*, who made it his Business to set them up again, so that there was never Time enough to destroy them utterly. Hence it proceeded, that the Temporal Power of the Pope was but little regarded in *Italy*. Afterwards arose *Alexander VI.* who more than all his Predecessors, shewed what a Pope could do by the Force of Money and Arms: Taking Advantage of the *French* Expedition, he performed, by the means of Duke *Valentine*, all those things which I have touched upon elsewhere, in speaking of the said Duke's Actions. Although his Design was not to aggrandize the Church, but the Duke; the Church, after their

Train of Wealth; but in those Starvelings, whom the Charity of their Prince deprives of the Necessaries of Life, in order to prevent Corruption, and the wrong Use which People commonly make of too great Abundance.

It is no Doubt upon the Laws of *Sparta*, where the Use of Money was forbidden, that the Principles of the greatest Part of these Ecclesiastical Governments are founded; with this only Difference, that the Prelates reserve to themselves the Enjoyment of those Goods of which they deprive their Subjects. Happy, say they, are the Poor;

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their Death, reaped the Benefit of all that he had done.

Pope *Julius* II. who succeeded *Alexander*, found the Church in a flourishing Condition, all *Romagna* being in Subjection to it, and the Factions of the Barons having been intirely rooted out by the Severities of his Predecessor. Having likewise found a way opened for filling his Coffers, (a way not practised before the Time of Pope *Alexander*) he not only pursued the same Track, but also extended his Views farther, and formed Schemes for making himself Master of *Bologna*, for humbling the *Venetians*, and driving the *French* out of *Italy*: All which he atchieved with the more Honour to him-

for they shall inherit the Kingdom of Heaven; and as they are willing that all should be saved, they take particular Care that all shall be indigent.

Nothing ought to be more edifying than the History of the Heads of the Church, those Vicars of *Jesus Christ*. One would expect to find there Examples of a blameless and holy Life; but it is quite the reverse: We meet with nothing but Obscenities, Abominations, and scandalous Proceedings. In short, it is impossible to read the Lives of the Popes, without being frequently shocked at their cruel and perfidious Actions.

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himself, as he did every thing for the Service of the Church, and not for that of any particular Person. He kept, besides, the Factions of the *Ursini* and *Colonnaesi* in the same Situation wherein he found them; and though there were some Seeds of Discord remaining, nevertheless two things obliged them to be quiet; the Grandeur of the Church, which keeps them in Awe, and their having no Cardinals *, who, in general, have been the Authors of their Broils: Nor will these two Factions ever be at Rest, should they
at

In general, we find their Ambition bent to increase their Temporal and Spiritual Power, their Avarice busied in conveying the Substance of the People to their own Families, to enrich their Nephews, their Mistresses, or their Bastards.

Those who make but little Use of Reflection, are surpris'd to find that People should bear with so much Tractability and Patience the Oppression of such Sovereigns; that they do not open their Eyes to behold the Vices and Excesses of their Ecclesiastical Governors; and that they should endure from a shaved Crown, a Treatment which they would not bear from a Head girt with Laurels,

* The *Ursini* and *Colonnaesi* and thus raised up so many Rivals and Enemies to both these Families.
were still more depressed by Pope *Sixtus V.* who created several Dukes and Princes,

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at any time have Cardinals belonging to them; because these, both within and without the City, promote Quarrels, which the Barons are obliged to espouse; and thus to the Ambition of Prelates are owing the Dissentions and Broils of the Barons.

His present Holiness Pope *Leo X.* having, for these Reasons, found the Church in a very powerful Condition, there is room to hope, that as his two immediate Predecessors aggrandized it by the Force of Arms, he, by his Goodness, and a thousand other Virtues, will make it still greater and more venerable.

Laurels. This *Phænomenon* seems less strange to those who know what Influence Superstition has upon weak Minds, and Bigotry upon the Mind of Man in general. They know that Religion is an old State Engine, which will never wear out, and has always been employed to secure the Allegiance of the Subject, and to curb the Intractability of human Reason: They know that Error may blind the most Discerning; and that nothing is more successful than the Policy of those who set Heaven and Hell, God and the Devil, at work, in order to compass their Ends. So true it is that Religion itself, the Source of all our Happiness, is often rendered, by the fatal Abuse of it, the true Cause of our Misery and Destruction!

The

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The Author judiciously points out what contributed most to the aggrandizing of the Holy See: The principal Cause, he thinks, was the skilful Conduct of *Alexander VI.* a Pope who carried his Cruelty and Ambition to the utmost Excess, and who knew no Principle but that of Interest. Now if it is true that *Alexander* was one of the most wicked and profligate Men that ever wore the triple Crown, what must we think of our Author's Heroes?

This Chapter concludes with an Encomium on *Leo X.* whose Ambition, Debauches, and Impiety, are sufficiently known. These, indeed, are not the Qualities which *Machiavel* celebrates; but he makes his Court to Pope *Leo*: Such Princes deserve such Courtiers. If *Machiavel* praised him only as a magnificent Prince, as the Restorer of Arts and Sciences, he could not be blamed; but he commends him for his wise and political Management.

CHAP. XII.

Of the several Sorts of Military Discipline, and of mercenary Troops.

HAVING spoken particularly of the several Sorts of Principalities, as I proposed in the Beginning, considered most of the Causes of their good or ill Constitution, and shewn the Ways which many have taken to acquire and preserve them, it
now

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now remains that I discourse in general of such things as conduce to the Defence or Offence of either of them.

We have already mentioned how necessary it is for a Prince to take care his Foundations be good; otherwise his whole Fabrick will be sure to fall. The principal Foundations of all States, new, old, or mixt, are good

OBSERVATIONS.

There is nothing in the Universe but Variety: Nature seems to have made the same Diversity in the Constitution of States, as in that of particular Men. By the Constitution of a State, I mean its Situation and Extent, the Number and Genius of its People, its Commerce, Customs, Laws, Strength, Weakness, Riches and Resources. This Diversity in Governments is very perceptible, and if, nicely examined, will be found infinite. As in Physick there is no universal Remedy, no Catholicon for all Distempers and all Complexions; so in Politicks there is no general Rule that can be alike applied to all Forms of Government. This leads me to examine our Author's Opinion concerning foreign and mercenary Troops, to wit, that they are not to be relied upon, and therefore are of no Use. He brings some Examples to shew that they are not only useless, but prejudicial, to the Prince or State by whom they are employed.

It must be owned, Experience has shewn that the national Troops of a State are always the most serviceable;

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good Laws, and good Arms^a; and because there cannot be good Laws where there are not good Arms, and where there are good Arms, the Laws must needs be good, I shall pass by the latter, and only speak of the former.

I say then, That the Arms with which a Prince defends his Dominions, are either his own, or mercenary, or auxiliary, or mixt: Those that are mercenary and auxiliary are unprofitable and dangerous; and the Prince who rests upon them will never be secure nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, undisciplined, treacherous, insolent to their
Friends,

serviceable; as appears from several Examples, particularly from the Valour of *Leonidas* at *Thermopylae*, and from the amazing Progress of the Arms of the *Romans* and *Arabians*. Our Author's Maxim therefore may justly be applied to all Countries, that are enriched with such a Number of Inhabitants as to be able to send out a complete Army for their Defence. I agree with *Machiavel*, that a State is generally

^a*Imperatorum majestatem, says Justinian in his Preface to his Institutes, non solum armis decoratam, sed etiam legibus oportet esse armatam, ut utrumque tempus, et bellorum & pacis, recte possit*

gubernari. "The Majesty
" of an Emperor must not
" only be adorned with
" Arms, but armed with
" Laws, that he may be able
" to govern well in Times
" both of Peace and War."

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Friends, abject to their Enemies, without Fear of God, or Faith to Man; and the Ruin of such a Prince is no longer deferred than till he is attacked: He is plundered, as by his Enemies in Time of War, so by his Mercenaries in Time of Peace. The Reason is, because it is not Affection for him that keeps them in the Field; they have no Attachment but to their Pay; and this is not a Motive strong enough to make them willing to die for him. They are glad to serve him when there is no need of their Service; but when
War

generally but ill served by mercenary Troops, because they can never act with so much Fidelity and Courage as Men who fight for their Possessions and Families. It is particularly dangerous for a Prince to suffer the People to languish in a State of Inaction, and grow soft and effeminate, at a Time when the Fatigues of War harden and discipline their Neighbours.

It has often been observed, that a Nation newly come out of a Civil War, is far superior in Valour to its Neighbours: For in a Civil War all the People are Soldiers; there is more room for Merit, and less for Favour; and every Man has more frequent Opportunities of discovering and improving his military Talents.

There are some particular Cases, however, that must be excepted from our Author's general Rule. If a Country does not produce a sufficient Number
of

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War comes on, they either disband before, or run away in the Battle b.

To prove this would require no great Pains: The Ruin of *Italy* at this Time proceeds from nothing but its having depended for many Years together upon mercenary Troops: These indeed may have formerly been of Service to some particular Person, and behaved well enough among themselves; but as soon as a foreign Enemy appeared, they quickly shewed what they were. Hence it was that *Charles*

VIII.

of Men for raising a complete Army, and recruiting it from time to time, according to the Consumption of the War, mercenary Troops are absolutely necessary for supplying the Wants of the State. In this Case several Expedients are found for removing the Difficulties and Dangers to which a State is exposed by employing Mercenaries; these are mixt with the national Troops, that the former may not make a separate and independent Body; both are used to the same Discipline, that both may be equally

^b He makes the same Remark, Chap. 43. Book I. of his Discourses; and then adds, That Troops which have no Affection for the Prince or State who employs them, will never have Courage enough to resist their Enemies, if these have

but the least Affection for their Masters. And as there can be no Affection or Emulation but among a Prince's own Subjects, it is necessary he should employ none but them, if he would preserve his Dominions.

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VIII. King of *France* was suffered to chalk out his Way into *Italy*^c. The Man who affirmed that our own Errors were the Cause of our Distress, spoke the Truth; though they were not the Errors he meant, but those I have mentioned^d, the Ambition and Avarice of our Princes; and these have likewise shared in the Punishment^e.

But to shew more fully the Infelicities which mercenary Troops occasion; I say, their

equally faithful; and particular Care is taken that the Number of foreign Troops do not exceed that of the National.

There is a *Northern* Prince whose Army is composed after this Manner, and who nevertheless is very powerful and formidable. Most of the *European* Armies consist of National and mercenary Troops;

^cThis alludes to a Saying of Pope *Alexander VI.* who compared King *Charles* to a Quarter-master; to denote that *Charles* had over-run *Italy* with as much Ease and Expedition, as a Man who had no more to do but measure out the Ground, and assign Quarters to his Army.

^dChap. 3.

^e*Guichardin*, Book 3d of his *History of Italy*, relates,

That *Peter of Medicis* said to *Lewis Sforza* Duke of *Milan*, That *Lewis* had been before-hand with him, but to no purpose, because he had missed the right way. The Duke answered, 'Tis true, one of us two has missed it; but possibly 'tis yourself; reproaching him indirectly with having entered into wrong Engagements with *France*. But Time has shewn, con-

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their Commanders are either Men of Courage and Ability, or not: If they are, you can never rely upon them, because they will always aspire at aggrandizing themselves, either by supplanting you their Master, or oppressing those whom you would protect: And if they are not Men of Capacity and Courage, you must expect to be undone.

Should it be objected, that every Man at the Head of an Army, whether a Foreigner or a Native, will act in the same manner; I answer,

Troops; those who inhabit Cities, or who till the Ground, are exempted from the War, upon paying a certain Tax for maintaining the Soldiers who defend them: So that our Armies, for the most part,

continues *Guichardin*, that they had both missed their way, and the Duke especially, who prided himself in being the Guide and Director of others; whereupon his Flatterers were not ashamed to tell him, nor he to hear, *That there were none in Heaven, except Jesus Christ, nor upon Earth, except Lewis the Moor, who knew what would be the Issue of the War with France: Nardi, Book 3d of his History of Florence;*

where he adds, That the Duke one Day rallying a Gentleman of *Florence*, and shewing him a large Map of *Italy*, where a *Moor* was represented with a Broom in his Hand, driving away a great many Cocks and Chickens of all Sorts; he asked his Opinion of the Design. *Your Moor*, said the *Florentine*, *in cleansing and sweeping Italy, seems to cover himself with Dust and Filth.* Thus he foretold the Duke what happened to him soon after.

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answer, That War is undertaken either by a Prince, or a Republick: The Prince should go to the War in Person, and take upon him the Office of General: The Republick ought to confer it upon one of its own Citizens; to change him, if he is not an able Commander; and if he is, to limit him by the Laws, and keep him in a State of Dependence. And indeed it appears by Experience, that Princes and Republicks, with their own Forces alone, execute great Enterprises, and that Mercenaries are always prejudicial. Besides, a martial Commonwealth, that rests upon its own Valour, is not so easily inthrall'd by any of its Citizens, as one that depends upon foreign Troops. *Rome* and *Sparta* maintained their Freedom for many Ages by their own Forces and Arms. The *Swiss* are more martial than their Neighbours, and consequently more free.

As
part, are compos'd of the Dregs of the People, of Sluggards, Rakes, Debauchees, Rioters, undutiful Sons, and the like, who have as little Attachment to their Masters, or Concern about them, as Foreigners. How different are these Armies from those of the *Romans*, who conquered the World? Desertions, which are now so frequent in
all

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As to the Danger of mercenary Arms, we have an old Example in *Carthage*, which, after the Conclusion of the first War with the *Romans*, had like to have been oppressed by its Mercenaries, though these were under the Command of *Carthaginians*. After the Death of *Epaminondas*, the *Thebans* chose *Philip* of *Macedon* their General; who, after defeating their Enemies, enslaved the *Thebans*. Upon the Death of Duke *Philip*, the People of *Milan* employed *Francis Sforza* in their War with the *Venetians*: *Francis* defeated the Enemy at *Caravaggio*, and then joined with them, to oppress the People of

all Armies, were unknown among the *Romans*; those who fought for their Families, their Household Gods, their Fellow-citizens, and every thing that was dear to them, never betrayed so many Interests by their Cowardice and Desertion. 'Tis the Security of the Sovereign Princes of *Europe* at present, that their Troops are much alike, so that in this respect they have no Advantage over one another. There are none but the *Swedes*, who are Citizens, Peasants and Soldiers at the same time; but on the other hand, when they go to War, there are too few Inhabitants left at home to till the Ground: So that their Power is by no means formidable; they can execute nothing without ruining themselves at length, as well as their Enemies.

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of *Milan*, his Masters. *Sforza* his Father, being employed by *Joan* Queen of *Naples*, suddenly withdrew his Army, and left her disarmed and defenceless; infomuch that to save her Kingdom she was forced to throw herself under the Protection of the King of *Arragon*^f. If lately the *Venetians* and *Florentines* enlarged their Dominions by employing mercenary Troops, and if their Generals have always been their Defenders, without aspiring to be their Sovereigns; the *Florentines* have been in this Case the particular Favourites of Fortune: For of those Commanders, whom they might have justly feared, some gained no Victories, some met with

As for the Manner in which a Prince ought to make War, I entirely agree with *Machiavel*. Indeed a great King ought always to take upon him the Command of his Troops, and to look upon the Camp as the Place of his Residence. This is what his Interest, his Duty and Glory require: As he is the chief Magistrate in distributing Justice to his People, in Times of Peace, so he ought to be their chief Protector and Defender in War. When a Prince is his own General, and present

^f *Alphonso*, whom she wards rejected, to adopt adopted her Son, and after- *Lewis* Duke of *Anjou*.

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with Opposition, and others turned their Ambition another way. The General who did not conquer was *John Acute*^g, whose Fidelity could not be known, because he had no Temptation to depart from it: But had he been victorious, every one must own, that the *Florentines* had lain at his Mercy. *Sforza*, the Father, was continually opposed by the *Bracceschi*; insomuch that they were a mutual Check upon one another. *Francis* his Son turned his Ambition towards *Lombardy*^h; and *Braccio* against the Churchⁱ, and the Kingdom of *Naples*. But let us come to later Occurrences.

The *Florentines* made *Paul Vitelli* their General; this was a Man of great Prudence,
and

present in the Field, his Orders are more easily suited to all sudden Emergencies, and are executed with more Dispatch; his Presence prevents that Misunderstanding among the Generals, which is so often prejudicial to the Interests of the Sovereign, and fatal to the Army; more Care is taken of the Magazines, Ammunitions and Provisions, without

^g An *English* General, who commanded 4000 *English*, in the Service of the *Gibelines* in *Tuscany*. *Mach. B. I.* of his History of *Florence*.

^h He became Duke of *Milan*.

ⁱ He made himself Master of *Perouse* and *Mantua*.

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and had raised himself from a private Fortune to the highest Reputation: Had *Vitelli* taken *Pisa*, it cannot be doubted but that the *Florentines* would not have been at Liberty to break with him; for if he had quitted their Service, and engaged with their Enemy, they must have been lost without Remedy; and to continue him in so much Power, would in time have made him their Master. If we consider the Progress of the *Venetians*, it will appear that they acted with great Security, Success and Reputation, whilst they made War with their own Forces; that is, whilst they fought only by Sea; where they employed their own Gentlemen and common People, and performed great Actions: But as soon as they made a Land War, they degenerated

which *Cæsar* himself at the Head of 100,000 Men would never be able to effect any thing. As it is the Prince himself who gives Orders for the Battle, it seems to be his Province to direct the Execution of them, and by his Presence and Example to inspire his Troops with Valour and Confidence.

But it may be objected, that every Man is not born to be a Soldier, and that many Princes have not the Talents, Experience, or Courage, that are necessary for commanding an Army. This Objection may be easily removed: A Prince will always find Generals skilful enough to advise him, and

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degenerated from their former Valour, and adopted the Manners and Customs of *Italy*. When they first began to conquer upon the Continent, as they had but a small Territory, and were in great Reputation, they had little Occasion to fear their Général: But as soon as they had enlarged their Dominions, and defeated the Duke of *Milan*, under the Conduct of *Carmignola*, they quickly perceived their Error. For on the one hand, the *Venetians* knew that *Carmignola* was an able and successful General: On the other, they observed that he grew cool and remiss in their Service, and protracted the War; infomuch that no great Success was to be further expected under his Command. Wherefore, as they were neither willing nor able to lay him aside, for fear of losing what they had got, they were obliged, for their own Security, to put him to Death. After him, they employed

Bar-

and it is sufficient for him, in this Case, to be directed by their Advice. Besides, no War can be carried on with great Success, if the General is under the Direction of a Ministry who are not present in the Camp, and consequently not able to judge of sudden Occurrences, and give

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Bartholomew of Bergamo, Robert of St. Severin, Count Pitigliano^k, and others, whose Losses they had more Occasion to fear, than their Victories; as happened not long after at *Vaila*, where in one Battle the *Venetians* were stripped of all they had been acquiring, with incredible Labour and Difficulty, for Eight hundred Years: Nor is this surprising; for the Conquests that are made by mercenary Troops are slow, tedious and weak, but their Losses are rapid and amazing.

These Examples having led me to discourse of *Italy*, where for these many Years every thing has been managed by mercenary Troops, I will begin a little higher, and point out their Rise and Progress, that it may the better appear how they are reformed.

give Orders accordingly; this often reduces the General to an Incapacity of improving great Advantages.

I shall conclude this Chapter with animadverting upon that Passage of *Machiavel*, where he says, That the *Venetians* distrusting the Duke of *Carmignola*, who commanded their Troops, were obliged for their own Security to put him to Death. For my own part, I don't conceive what he means; unless

* Of the *Ursini* Family.

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formed. When the *Roman* Empire began to decline in *Italy*, and the Pope to take upon him Authority in Temporal Affairs, *Italy* was divided into several States: Many of the great Cities took Arms against their Nobility, who having been formerly favoured by the Emperors, kept them under Oppression; and the Church assisted these Cities, in order to gain a Temporal Power. Other Cities were subdued by some of their own Inhabitants, who became their Princes. Thus *Italy* fell into the Hands of the Pope, and a few Commonwealths: These Priests and Citizens, having no Skill themselves in the Art of War, began to take Foreigners into their Pay. The first Man who gave any Reputation to this Sort of Troops was *Alberigo da Como*¹, a Native of *Romagna*. Under his Discipline were brought up, among

unless it be that the *Venetians* either betrayed, or poisoned, or assassinated a General who had served them long and successfully. Thus *Machiavel* endeavours to varnish over the basest Actions, by repre-

¹ Another *Da Como*, whom *Machiavel* calls *Lewis*, brought the Troops of *Italy* into Credit, by introducing a Body of *Italian* Soldiers, which he called *St. George's League*. History, Book I.

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among others, *Braccio* and *Sforza*, who in their Times were the Arbiters of *Italy*. These were succeeded by all the rest who commanded the Armies of *Italy* down to the present Times. Their Valour and Conduct has ended in this: *Italy* has been overrun by *Charles*, ravaged by *Lewis*, violated by *Ferdinand*, and insulted by the *Swiss*. The Method they took was first to depreciate the Infantry, and transfer their Reputation to themselves. This they did, because having no Dominions, and subsisting only by their own Industry, a few Foot could give them no Reputation, and a great Body they were not able to maintain: Whereupon the Foot were changed into Horse, a small Number of which was sufficient to make them live with Ease and Honour: And by Degrees this Sort of Cavalry grew so much in Fashion, that in an Army of Twenty thousand Men, there were scarce Two thousand Foot. Besides, they used all Endeavours to exempt themselves

representing them as necessary for Self-preservation and Interest. The *Greeks* commonly made use of Periphrases when they spoke of Death, because they could not think of it without Horror: In the

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selves and their Men from Fatigues and Dangers. They brought in the Custom of not killing one another in Skirmishes, but of taking Prisoners on both Sides, and afterwards dismissing them without Prejudice or Ransom: In the Night, they never disturbed the Besieged in their Towns, nor did these ever disturb the Besiegers in their Tents: They made no Palisado or Trench about their Camp; and never encamped in the Winter. All this was permitted as Part of their Discipline, and invented, as I said before, to free the Soldiers from Labour and Danger; by which Practices they have brought *Italy* into Slavery and Contempt.

the same manner our Author uses Periphrases, when he mentions Crimes; not perhaps for the same Reason, but that his Doctrines might go down the better with his Readers.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Auxiliary, Mixt, and National Forces.

Auxiliaries, another Sort of unserviceable Arms, are the Forces of some powerful Neighbour, which a Prince calls in for his own Defence and Assistance. Thus not many Years ago, Pope *Julius*, having made an unhappy Trial of his mercenary Troops, in the Enterprize upon *Ferrara*, had recourse to Auxiliaries, and made an Agreement with *Ferdinand* King of *Spain*, to be assisted by his Arms. This Sort of Forces

OBSERVATIONS.

Machiavel uses a very strange Hyperbole, when he affirms, that a prudent Prince would chuse rather to perish with his own Troops, than to conquer with foreign Assistance. A Man in Danger of Drowning would, methinks, give but little Ear to those who should tell him, That it ought to be beneath him to owe his Life to any but himself, and therefore that he should rather perish than lay hold of the Rope or the Stick that is offered him. We know by Experience, that the first Care of Man is his own Preservation, and the next his Hap-

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Forces may be useful enough in themselves, but are always prejudicial to the Prince who employs them^a: For if they are defeated, he is left at the Mercy of his Enemies; and if they conquer, he must expect to be the Prisoner of his Auxiliaries^b. Though ancient Histories are full of Examples of this Kind; yet I shall keep to that of Pope *Julius II.* as being still fresh in every one's Memory: Nor indeed could that Pope have acted more inconsiderately, in his Design upon *Ferrara*, than he did by putting himself wholly in the Power of a Foreigner. But his good Fortune saved him from feeling the Effects of his

Happiness: And this entirely destroys our Author's sophistical Hyperbole.

Upon examining this Maxim, we shall find, perhaps, that it is only meant to inspire Sovereigns with an extreme Jealousy of one another. It is nevertheless this Jealousy of Princes, either with regard

^a *Ambiguus auxiliorum animus*, says *Tacitus*, Hist. 4.
 " The Attachment of Auxiliaries is always divided
 " between two Masters." A little below he calls them *Militia sine affectu*. " A Sort
 " of Forces that are void of
 " all Affection for those
 " whom they serve."

^b *Et acciti auxilio Germani*, says *Tacit. ibid. sociis pariter atque hostibus servitum imposuerunt*. " The
 " Germans, being called in
 " as Auxiliaries, oppressed
 " and enslaved their Friends
 " and their Allies, as well as
 " their Enemies."

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his Imprudence; for his Auxiliaries being broken at *Ravenna*, and the *Swiss* coming in, and beating off the Victors, beyond his own Expectation, or that of any other Man; he escaped being a Prisoner to his Enemies, because they were defeated, and to his Auxiliaries, because he had not conquered with their Arms. The *Florentines*, being quite destitute of Soldiers, hired Ten thousand *French* in order to reduce the City of *Pisa*; and thus brought themselves into greater Danger than they had ever been exposed to in all their Troubles. The Emperor of *Constantinople*, to withstand his Neighbours, sent Ten thousand *Turks* into *Greece*, who when the War was ended, refused to depart: And this

was regard to their Generals, or to their Auxiliaries, whom they would not suffer to share in their Success and Glory, which has at all times been prejudicial to their Interests. This has occasioned the Loss of a great many Battles; and such petty Jealousies have often been more hurtful than either the superior Number, or any other Advantage, of the Enemy.

It

^c *Andronicus Paleologus* lost all *Thrace*, was forced to give up *Thresibund* to the *Turks*, whom he had called in for the Defence of *Constantinople*; and *John Servians*.

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was the Beginning of the Servitude into which that Country was brought by the Infidels.

Let every Prince therefore, who would reduce himself to an Incapacity of conquering, employ auxiliary Arms; for they are far more dangerous than Mercenaries; the Ruin they bring on is sudden, they are all united, and at all times obedient to the Commands of another Master: Whereas mercenary Troops, when they have gained a Victory, require longer Time and more Opportunities, before they can do Mischief: They are not all the same Body, but made up of different Nations, assembled and maintained by the Prince or State who employs them; and if they are put under the Command of a Native, he cannot suddenly gain so much Power and Authority, as to do any Injury by their Means.

It must be owned, that a King ought not to make War solely with foreign Troops, and to depend, if possible, upon none but his own; and rather to send than receive Auxiliaries. Prudence will teach him, that he must put himself in a Condition of fearing neither his Enemies nor his Friends; and that when he has made a Treaty, he ought to observe it inviolably. Whilst *Germany, England and Holland* acted in Concert against *Lewis XIV.* under the Conduct of Prince *Eugene* and the Duke
of

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Means. In short, it is Cowardice and Sloth that are to be feared in Mercenaries, but in Auxiliaries Courage and Activity.

Wise Princes therefore have always rejected this Sort of Forces, and depended upon their own; chusing rather to be defeated with these, than to conquer with the others, and looking upon that as no Victory which is obtained by borrowed Arms. I shall never make any Difficulty to produce *Cesar Borgia* for an Example. This Duke invaded *Romagna* with an Army of Auxiliaries consisting wholly of *French*, and with them he took *Imola* and *Furli*: But afterwards finding these Forces were not to be relied upon, he betook himself to Mercenaries, as the less dangerous of the two, and hired the *Ursini* and *Vitelli*: Finding them also irresolute, unfaithful and dangerous, he discharged

of *Marlborough*, they were always victorious; but as soon as *England* abandoned its Allies, *Lewis* recovered his Courage and Strength. Such Powers as have no need of mixt or auxiliary Troops, ought certainly not to employ them; but as few Princes of *Europe* are in such a Situation, I believe they are in no Danger from their Auxiliaries, as long as the Number of these is not superior to that of their own Troops.

Machiavel

discharged them, and employed none for the future but his own Forces. How great a Difference there is between these two Sorts of Arms will appear, if we consider the Difference between the Duke's Reputation, when the *Ursini* and *Vitelli* were in his Service, and when he depended upon none but his own Soldiers; for when he stood upon his own Bottom, his Reputation was always growing; nor indeed was it considerable, till every one knew that he was absolute Master of his own Army.

I thought to have confined myself to late Examples in *Italy*: But I cannot pass by *Hiero* of *Syracuse*, whom I have mentioned before. *Hiero*, being made General of the *Syracusan* Army, quickly perceived that his mercenary Forces were not to be relied upon; for

Machiavel wrote only for the petty Sovereigns of *Italy*, and indeed his Rules are scarce applicable to any others: Every Prince that makes War only for another, must indeed be weak himself; but if he makes War in Conjunction with other Powers, he must always be formidable, if not successful. To say nothing of the War of 1701, carried on by the Allies against *France*; that Enterprize against *Charles XII.* whereby he was stripped of Part of his Dominions in *Germany*, was

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executed

for their Officers were much the same with ours of late in *Italy*: And as he found he could neither retain nor dismiss them, he caused them all to be cut to pieces; and afterwards prosecuted the War with his own Forces only, without any foreign Assistance. The Old Testament affords us a Figure that may be applied to the present Subject. *David* having presented himself to *Saul*, and offered his Service against *Goliath* the Champion of the *Philistines*, *Saul*, to encourage him, clad him with his own Armour: But when *David* had tried them on, he declined to make use of them, alledging that with them he should not be able to exert his own Strength;

executed by an Army subject to three different Masters, the Czar, the King of *Denmark*, and the King of *Prussia*; and the late War begun by *France*, under Pretence of supporting the Rights of a Prince so often elected, and so often dethroned, was carried on by the united Forces of *France*, *Spain* and *Sardinia*.

As for the Allegory concerning *Saul's* Armour, which *David* refused when he went to fight with *Goliath*, 'tis mere Ornament, and proves nothing. It must be granted, that Auxiliaries are often cumbersome to those who employ them; but who would not put up with this Inconvenience in order to conquer Cities and Provinces? As for the *Swiss* Troops

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Strength; and therefore he chose to meet the Enemy with his Sling and his Sword^d. Upon the Whole, borrowed Arms are commonly unfit; they are either too wide, or too strait, or too cumbersome.

Charles

Troops in the Service of *France*, whom *Machiavel* endeavours to vilify, 'tis certain the *French* have owed many Victories to their Valour and Conduct, and reaped signal Advantages from their Service; insomuch that if the *Swiss* and *Germans* employed in the *French* Infantry were to be dismissed, their Army would be much less formidable than it is at present.

This

d "And *Saul* armed *David* " with his Armour, and he " put an Helmet of Brass " upon his Head; also he " armed him with a Coat of " Mail: And *David* girded " his Sword upon his Ar- " mour, and he essayed to " go; for he had not proved " it: And *David* said unto " *Saul*, *I cannot go with " these; for I have not " proved them; and David " put them off him. And " he took his Staff in his " Hand, and chose him five " smooth Stones out of the " Brook, and put them in a " Shepherd's Bag which he " had; and his Sling was in* " his Hand. 1 *Sam.* 17. *Ma-* " *chiavel* calls it *la sua fromba,* " *et il suo coltello.* But *Da-* " *vid* carried no Sword with " him, and made use of *Go-* " *liab's* to cut off his Head; as " is expressly said, Verse 50, &c. " So *David* prevailed over " the *Philistine* with a Sling " and with a Stone, and " smote the *Philistine* and " slew him; but there was " no Sword in the Hand of " *David.* Therefore *David* " ran and stood upon the " *Philistine*, and took his " Sword, and drew it out " of the Sheath thereof, and " cut off his Head there- " with."

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Charles VII. Father of *Lewis XI.* having by his own Fortune and Valour delivered his Country from the Power of the *English*, quickly perceived the Necessity of having Soldiers of his own; and therefore raised several Regiments of Horse and Foot, consisting of none but Natives. Afterwards his Son *Lewis* disbanded the Foot, and took the *Swiss* into his Pay. This Error, pursued by his Successors, is the Source of the many Dangers to which *France* is exposed, as appears at this Day by Experience. For those Kings having advanced the Reputation of the *Swiss*, by depreciating all their own Troops, and disbanding the Foot, so much accustomed the Horse to fight in Conjunction with the *Swiss*, that at length they believed they could do

This may suffice, as to our Author's Errors in Reasoning. As for those in Morality, he produces the very worst Examples, those of *Cæsar Borgia*, and *Hiero of Syracuse*. The latter, finding he could neither retain nor discharge his Auxiliaries, without equal Danger to himself, ordered them all to be cut in pieces. It would be shocking to read such a Fact in History; but an Author is unpardonable, who singles out such Examples, to illustrate and enforce his Doctrines, and recommends them to the Imitation of Sovereigns.

do nothing without them. Hence it proceeds, that the *French* Troops are not able to cope with the *Swiss*, and without them will venture upon nothing. The *French* Army therefore is mixt, consisting of Mercenaries and Natives, and is much preferable to an Army either of Mercenaries, or Auxiliaries only, but much inferior to an Army of national Troops, as sufficiently appears from the Example I have already given. *France* would have been unconquerable, had the Establishment begun by *Charles*, been preserved and improved by his Successors. But for want of Prudence, many Innovations are made, which at first appear beneficial, and conceal the Calamities they produce: Wherefore, as I said before of
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reigns. Cruelty and Barbarity are often fatal to private Men, who therefore feel a sufficient Horror at the bare naming them. But those whom Providence has raised above common Disasters, have less Pity, as they think they have less Need of it. Wherefore an honest Writer ought to take all Opportunities of inspiring Princes with an Aversion to every thing that has the least Appearance of Inhumanity, or any other Abuse of Power.

That of *Cæsar Borgia*.

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hætick Fevers, a Prince who cannot discover Evils, till they begin to grow up, is not truly wise; and to discover them in time, is the Talent but of few. If we consider the Decline of the *Roman* Empire, we shall find it first proceeded from employing the *Goths* as Mercenaries; by which means the Forces of the Empire were enervated, and all their Valour transferred, as it were, to those *Gothick* Troops.

I conclude, therefore, that a Prince is so far from being safe, who rests upon foreign Arms, that he lies intirely at the Mercy of Fortune, because he has neither Valour nor Strength enough to defend himself in Adversity. And it has been the declared Opinion of wise Men in all Ages, that nothing is so unsettled and transitory as a Reputation of Power, when it stands not upon its own native Vigour and Basis. National Troops consist of Citizens, or Subjects, or Servants; all others are either Mercenary or Auxiliary. The Manner of disciplining those national Troops will be easily discovered, if the Observations

* *Nihil rerum mortalium quam fama potentie, non suam instabile ac fluxum est, vi nixæ.* Tacit. Ann. 13.

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servations I have already made, and the Methods taken by *Philip*, the Father of *Alexander*, and by several Republicks and Princes, are sufficiently attended to: And to these I refer.

CHAP. XIV.

The Duty of a Prince, with regard to Military Discipline.

FROM what has been said it follows, that every Prince ought to devote all his Care and Attention to War and Military Discipline, and to make nothing his Profession but Arms, as there is no other Art or Knowledge which it concerns him to pos-

OBSERVATIONS.

There is a sort of Pedantry common to all Professions, which proceeds from the Avarice and Intemperance of those who practise them. A Soldier is a Pedant, if he is too careful about Trifles, if he is a Bully, or infected with *Quixotism*. *Machiavel's* Enthusiasm makes his Prince ridiculous: He carries things to such a strange Extravagance, that he would have him be nothing but a mere Soldier; he makes him a complete *Don Quixote*, who has his Imagination

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possess^a. The Art of War is of so great Importance, that it is alone sufficient, not only to maintain a Prince in the Dominions he inherits^b, but often to raise Men of private Fortunes to Regal Authority: On the other hand,

filled with nothing but Engagements, Retrenchments, Sieges, Fortifications, and Attacks.

A Prince who applies only to Arms, discharges but one Half of his Duty. It is evidently false, that he ought to be a mere Soldier; and

^a It was the Saying of a King of *Thrace*, That he was nothing better than his Groom, but when he made War. *Nero*, giving a Plan of his future Government, affirmed that he would concern himself in nothing so much as commanding his Armies. *Tacit. Ann. 13: Domitian* hated *Agricola*, because *Agricola* was the better General; being enraged that a Subject should exceed him in what he looked upon as the peculiar and distinguishing Talent of a Sovereign. *Id sibi maxime formidolosum, si militarem gloriam alius occuparet; cetera utcumque facilius dissimulari; ducis boni Imperatoriam virtutem esse.* In *Agricola*. Who are the Princes, says *Gratian*, whose Names

are written in the Book of Fame, except Warriors? To these the Epithet of *Great* is peculiar. Histories are full of their Exploits, and the World of their Reputation and Applause; for in the Arts of War there is more Glory and Grandeur, than in those of Peace. *Chap. 8. of his Hero.*

^b *Tiridates*, King of *Armenia*, said, That Dominions were to be maintained not by Indolence and Sloth, but Arms; that it was the Virtue of a private Man to preserve his own Possessions, but the Commendation of a Prince to conquer those of others. *Non ignavia magna imperia contineri; & sua retinere, privata domus; & alienis certare, regiam laudem esse.* *Tacit. Ann. 15.*

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hand, the Prince is often reduced to a private Condition, and stripped of all his Possessions, who, instead of applying to Arms, gives himself up to soft and indolent Amusements: Insomuch that the chief Cause of the Loss or Acquisition of a Sovereignty, is the being skilled or ignorant in the Art of War.

Francis Sforza, by his Arms alone, rose from a private Fortune to be Duke of *Milan*; and his Descendants, by declining the Fatigues and Hardships of War, fell from being Dukes of *Milan* to a private Condition. For of the many Evils that befall a Prince who

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and the Reader may be pleased to remember what I have observed before, concerning the Rise of Supreme Power, in the first Chapter of this Work. Princes are but Judges by their Institution; and their being Generals is only an accessory Quality. *Machiavel's* Prince is like *Homer's* Gods, who are described as very robust and strong, but never equitable. Our Author seems not to know so much as the Catechism of Justice; he builds upon no other Principles but those of Interest and Violence. He fills our Minds with little diminutive Notions: His narrow Genius embraces no other Subjects, but such as relate to the Politicks of petty Princes.

Nothing can be weaker than the Reasons he makes use of to recommend Hunting to his Prince,

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is disarmed, one is Contempt^c; and this is a kind of Infamy which he must use all Endeavours to prevent, for Reasons which I shall mention below. As there is no Proportion between a Man who is armed, and one who is defenceless; so it is not reasonable to expect that the armed Man should voluntarily obey the other; or that Sovereigns who are disarmed, should be safe and secure among their armed Subjects and Vas-

Prince, which he believes to be the means of knowing the Situation and Avenues of the Country. If a King of *France*, or an Emperor, pretended by this means to make himself acquainted with his Dominions, he would need as much Time for Hunting, as the whole Universe takes in the great Revolution of the Stars,

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* *Tacitus* gives two Examples of this in *Tiberius*: One of a Governor of a Province, who presumed in a Letter to threaten the Emperor with an Insurrection, unless he prolonged his Government: *Quia res Tiberii magis famâ, quam vi stabant*, says *Tacitus*, Ann. 6. "Because *Tiberius's* Government depended more upon Reputation than Strength." The other of

a King of the *Parthians*, who sent Embassadors to make insolent Demands upon the Emperor, and threaten him with a War, unless he complied with them: And the Reason which *Tacitus* gives, is, That the *Parthian* despised *Tiberius*, on account of his old Age, and voluptuous Life, which rendered him incapable of applying to War. *Senectutem Tiberii ut inermem despiciens*. Ibid.

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Vassals^d: For these being arrogant and disdainful, and the others suspicious, it is impossible they should ever unite and co-operate: So that a Prince unexperienced in War, besides other Misfortunes that attend him, cannot gain the Esteem of his Soldiers, nor depend upon their Fidelity.

Wherefore a Prince must never lay aside the Exercises of War; nay, he should be
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My Reader, I hope, will allow me to make a small Digression upon this Subject; as Hunting is almost the sole Pleasure and Diversion of the Nobility and Sovereign Princes, especially in Germany, and therefore will admit of a farther Inquiry. Hunting is one of those sensual Pleasures which exercise the Body, without affecting the Mind: It is

^d *Inter impotentes & validos falso quiescas. Ubi manu agitur, modestia, probitas, nomina superioris sunt. Tacit. in Germ.* "There is never true Peace between Neighbours that are powerful and ambitious, and those that are weak and disarmed. When Recourse is once had to the Sword, Modesty and fair Dealing are Names that belong to the stronger Party." *Maroboduus*, King of the *Marcomanni*, to make himself absolute, and independent of the

Romans, hardened his Troops by constant Exercise, and by making War continually upon his Neighbours; and thus enured his Subjects so much to the Fatigues of War, that he grew formidable to the *Roman* Empire. *Certum imperium vimque regiam complexus animo—imperium perpetuis exercitiis brevi in emineus & nostro quoque imperio timendum perduxit fastigium—exercitumque assiduis adversus finitimos bellis exercendo, majori operi preparabat.* *Paterculus Hist.* 8.

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employed in them more in Times of Peace, than of War itself: And this may be done two ways, either by the Application of the Body, or that of the Mind. As to the former, he ought principally to train up his Subjects to military Discipline and Exercises, and to be continually employed in Hunting^f, that he may not only inure himself to Hardships and Fatigues, but learn the Situation and

is an ardent Desire of pursuing some wild Beast, for the cruel Satisfaction of destroying it; an Amusement which renders the Body robust and active, and leaves the Mind fallow and uncultivated.

Sportsmen, perhaps, will reproach me here with Gravity and Preaching, and alledge, that I assume

* As was done by *Cassius*, Governor of *Syria*, who never ceased, even in Times of Peace, to exercise his Legions and to re-establish ancient Discipline, with as much Care, as if he had been at open War. *Quantum sine bello dabatur, revocare priscum morem, exercitare legiones, cura, provisu, perinde agere, ac si hostis ingrueret.* Ann. 12. *Seneca* observes, that the Army, during Peace, marched in Battle-order, threw up Ditches, and fatigued itself with Exercises

which were then unnecessary, that they might be the more accustomed to them, when they were needful. Ep. 18.

† This was the Practice of the Romans. *Romanis solenni viris opus, utile fama, Vitaque & membris*, says *Horace*, Ep. 18. Book 1. *Vonones* was despised by the *Parthians*, who were great Warriors, because he did not love Hunting. *Accendebat dedignantes & ipse, diversus à Majorum institutis, raro venat.* Tacit. Ann. 2.

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and Coasts of the Country, the Height and Ascent of the Mountains, the Largeness and Avenues of the Valleys, the Extent of the Plains, and the Nature of Rivers and Fens & all which he should examine with great Exactness. From this Knowledge he will reap two Advantages: First, he will be the better able to guard and defend his own Country; and

assume the Prerogative of a Priest in his Pulpit; who may assert whatever he pleases, without being afraid of Contradiction. Hunting, say they, is the noblest and most antient of all Amusements; the Patriarchs and many other eminent Men were Hunters; and by this we continue to exercise that Dominion over the Beasts, which God vouchsafed to give *Adam*.

But

* This Knowledge, says *Machiavel*, Chap. 29. Book 3. of his Discourses, is more easily acquired by Hunting, than by any other Exercise: Besides, Hunting teaches many other things which are necessary in War. And *Cyrus*, as *Xenophon* relates, said to his People, when he went to the War against the King of *Armenia*, That the Enterprize was no more than one of those Chases, to which he had led them so often before; comparing

those whom he placed in Ambush among the Mountains, to such as roused the wild Beasts from their Dens, in order to catch them in the Nets. This shews, agreeably to *Xenophon's* Opinion, that Hunting is a Representation of War; for which Reason it is commonly said, that good Soldiers ought to have the Spring and Swiftness of the Hare, the Flight of the Wolf, who retires grinning and gnashing at his Enemy, and the Defence of the wild Boar.

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and in the next place he will acquire a Facility and Exactness in judging of any new Situation, which it may be necessary for him to view : For the Hills, Valleys, Plains, Rivers, and Marshes, for Example, in *Tuscany*, differ but little from those in other Provinces ; so that a Man acquainted with the Situation of one Country, may easily come to know that of any other. The Prince who is not Master of this Art, is wanting in the first Qualification of a General : For by knowing the Situations of a Country, he learns where to observe the Enemy, where to attack them, where to encamp, how to regulate his

But no Folly is the better for being antient, especially if it is carried to Extravagance : Many great Men, I own, have been passionately fond of this Diversion ; but these had their Weaknesses as well as Perfections : Let us imitate their great Qualities, without copying after their little and idle Occupations. The same Patriarchs were not only given to Hunting, but to Polygamy ; nay, would marry their own Sisters ; and had many other Customs, which favoured of the barbarous Ages wherein they lived. They were rude, ignorant, and uncultivated, idle Men, who, to kill Time, employed it in Hunting, and threw away those Moments in useless Amusements, which they had no Capacity to employ in the Com-

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his Marches^b, draw up his Men for Battle, and besiege Towns with most Advantage. *Philopemenes*, Prince of *Achaia*, is celebrated by antient Writers, among other Qualities, for this, that in times of Peace he applied to nothing so much as Military Affairs: When he travelled with his Friends, he would often stop, and ask them, *If the Enemy were upon that Eminence, and our Army*

Company and Conversation of Men of Understanding. Let me now ask whether these are Examples to be imitated, whether these barbarous Ages, or others that were more refined, ought to be the Model of the present?

To inquire whether *Adam* received Dominion over the Beasts, would be foreign to my Subject; but it is well known, that Men have been always more cruel and ravenous than the Beasts themselves, and

^b These are the Qualities which *Tacitus* ascribes to his Father-in-law. *Loca castris ipse capere, æstuaria ac sylvas ipse prætentare; disjectos coercere.* "Agricola himself always chose the Ground for encamping; the salt Marshes, Friths, and Woods, he himself always first examined; and he took the Care of checking those who in marching did not observe their

"Duty and Rank, but were loose and straggling." And a few Lines after, *Adnotabant periti, non alium ducem opportunitates locorum sapientius legisse.* In *Agricola*. "It was observed of *Agricola* by Men of Experience, that never did any General more wisely chuse his Posts for Commodity and Situation."

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Army posted here, which of the two would have the Advantage of Situation? How could we march up to them with most Security, and without breaking our Ranks? Which way should we retreat, if it was necessary? If the Enemy retreated, how should we pursue them? And thus, in his Journey, he proposed to them all the Accidents that could happen to an Army in its March, listened to each Opinion, gave his own, and supported it with his Reasons: Infomuch that when he was at War, no Inconvenience could happen to his Army, which he had not seen before in Times of Peace, and knew not how to remove.

As for the Exercise of the Mind, the Prince ought to be conversant in History, and therein to consider the Actions of famous Men,

and make the most tyrannical Use of that Dominion they pretend to. If any thing gives us Advantage over these Animals, it is certainly our Reason; but professed Hunters, for the most part, have their Heads furnished with nothing but Horses, Dogs, Boars, Stags, and the like. They are sometimes as wild and savage themselves as the Beasts they pursue; and it may well be feared, lest they should become as inhuman to their Fellow-Creatures as they are to their Fellow-Animals;
or

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Men, examine their Conduct in War, and the Causes of their Victories and Losses; in order to avoid the one, and imitate the other. But he ought especially to follow that Method which has been taken by some excellent Men, who formed themselves upon the Models of those whose Lives have been most celebrated and glorious, and have always set their Actions before them as the Pattern of their Conduct. Thus it is said, that *Alexander* copied after *Achilles*, *Cæsar* after *Alexander*, and *Scipio* after *Cyrus*. For whoever reads the Life of *Cyrus*, written by *Xenophon*, will perceive how much *Scipio's* Glory was owing to his Imitation of that Hero, and how closely he copied that Modesty, Affability, Humanity and Liberality,

or at least that the cruel Custom of persecuting and destroying these, may take away their Sympathy for the Misfortunes of the others. And is this so noble an Occupation, so worthy of a thinking Being?

It may be objected; that Hunting is an healthful Exercise, and that those who are given to it, live to a great Age; as appears by Experience; that it is a harmless Amusement, and very proper for Sovereigns, as it displays their Magnificence; dissipates their Cares, and in times

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rality, which *Xenophon* has described in *Cyrus* ⁱ.

These ought to be the Employments of every wise Prince: In Times of Peace and Tranquillity he should never be idle or indolent, but make it his chief Endeavour to gather Strength against War and Adversity; that when Fortune frowns, she may find him prepared to ward off her Blows.

of Peace presents them with an Image of War. I would be far from condemning a moderate Use of this Exercise; but let it be remembered, that Exercise, in general, is hardly necessary to any but the Intemperate. Never Prince lived longer than Cardinal *Fleury*, Cardinal *Ximenes*, or the late Pope; and yet neither of the three was a Hunter. But is it necessary to choose an Employment which has no other Merit but that of promising long Life? *Monks* commonly live longer than other Men: Must a Man therefore become a *Monk*?

¹ *Scipio Africanus* ought to be the Model of every Prince. According to *Paterculus*, he divided all his Time between the Employments of Peace, and the Fatigues of War; being always engaged either in Arts or Arms; either enuring his Body to Hardships and Dangers, or cultivating his Mind by his Application to the

Sciences. *Neque quisquam hoc Scipione elegantius intervalla negotiorum otio dispunxit, semperque aut belli aut pacis servivit artibus, semper inter arma ac studia versatus, aut corpus periculis, aut animum disciplinis exercevit. Patere. Hist. 1. Scipio* always carried *Cyrus's* Life about him.

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Monk? There is no need of leading an indolent and useless Life, as long as that of *Metbusalem*: The more a Man improves his Understanding, and the more great and useful Actions he performs, the longer he lives.

Hunting, besides, is of all Amusements that which is least proper for a Prince: He may display his Magnificence a thousand ways, that are all more useful to his Subjects: And if it should be found, that the Peasants were ruined by the too great Number of wild Beasts; the Care of destroying these might be committed to professed Hunters, hired for that Purpose. The proper Employment of a Prince is that of improving his own Mind, and governing his People, in order to acquire more Knowledge, and consequently be able to accommodate his Government to their Interest.

It must not be omitted, that to be a great General, there is no need of being a Hunter. *Gustavus Adolphus*, Marshal *Turenne*, the Duke of *Marlborough*, and Prince *Eugene*, whose Characters, as able Generals and illustrious Men, will not be questioned, were not Hunters; nor do we read of the Huntings of *Cæsar*, *Alexander*, or *Scipio*. One may make more judicious and solid Reflections in a Walk, upon the different Situations of a Country with regard to War, than when Partridges and Setting-dogs, Stags and Hounds, and a Multitude of other Animals, with the Keeness of the Sport, distract the Attention. A great Prince, who lately made his second Campaign in *Hungary*, had like to have been kidnapped by the *Turks*, upon straying a little at a Hunting. This is an Exercise which ought to be forbid in all

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Armies, because of the Disorders it occasions in their Marches.

I conclude therefore, that it is excusable in a Prince to go a Hunting, if it is but seldom, and to refresh him after his serious and often melancholy Employments. I say once more, that I object to no honest Pleasure; but the Care of rendering a State flourishing and happy, - and of protecting and encouraging Arts and Sciences, is unquestionably a much superior Pleasure, and a much fitter Employment for a Prince; and whoever betakes himself to any other, neither consults his Pleasure nor his Interest.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Things for which Men, and particularly Princes, are applauded or censured.

IT remains now to be considered, how a Prince ought to govern with regard to his Subjects and his Friends; and as many have written before upon this Head, I fear I shall be taxed with Presumption for departing, as I possibly may do here, from the Maxims of others. But as my only Design is to write something that may be useful to Men of Understanding, I chuse rather to present

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present them with the real Truth, than with any fanciful Representation.

Many have formed in their Imaginations such Republicks and Principalities as were never known to exist^a: But so wide is the Difference between the Manner in which
People

OBSERVATIONS.

Painters and Historians have this in common, that they ought to copy Nature. The former draw the Features and Complexions of Men, the latter

Cunctas nationes & urbes populus, aut primores, aut singuli regunt. Delecta ex his & constituta Reip. forma, laudari facilius quam evenire, vel, si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest. Tac. Ann.
4. "All Nations and Cities are governed either by the People, or by the Nobility, or by single Rulers. The Frame of a State chosen and compacted out of all these three is easier applauded than accomplished, or, if accomplished, cannot be of long Duration." Machiavel, says one of his French Translators, treats only of the Way by which a Man may acquire Dominion, and preserve it; which he makes the sole View

of his Prince; refusing in this to follow the Tradition of those who wrote before him upon the same Subject, and who in their Writings have imagined a strange sort of Perfection in a Prince, which is not to be copied by Men, considering the Frailty of their Nature. On the contrary, Machiavel endeavours to accommodate his Precepts to Experience, and to the common Method of proceeding among wise Princes; esteeming it an egregious Folly to point out a Path which nobody treads, and to pass over one that all the World uses. Gaspar d'Arvergne, in his second Epistle Dedicatory to his Translation of the Prince,

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People live and that in which they ought to live, that he who leaves the Practice to follow the Duty of Mankind, seeks his Ruin rather than his Preservation. A Man that makes a Conscience of being strictly honest on all Occasions, must needs be undone among the many that act upon different Principles*. A Prince therefore must learn, for his own Security, to be virtuous or vicious according to the Exigence of his Affairs.

To

latter their Actions and Characters. There are some Painters of such a singular Cast, that they draw nothing but Monsters and Devils. *Machiavel* is of this Stamp; he makes a Hell of the Universe, and represents all Men as being in the State of the Damned. One would think this Politician had a mind to defame the whole human Race, from a particular Hatred he bore to it; and that he had undertaken to annihilate Virtue, perhaps with a View to make all the Inhabitants of this Continent as bad as the Prince he would form.

Machiavel maintains, that, in this wicked and degenerate World, it is certain Ruin to be strictly honest: For my part, I affirm, that in order to be safe, it is necessary to be virtuous. Men are commonly neither wholly good, nor wholly bad; but both good and bad; and such as are between the two will unanimously revere a powerful Prince, who is just and virtuous. I had much rather make

War

* See the Example of *Pertinax* in the 19th Chapter.

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To wave all imaginary Notions about a Prince, and to speak only of such as are well-grounded, I say that all Men, and particularly Princes, as being placed in a more conspicuous Rank, and therefore more the Subject of Discourse, are characterized by some Epithet of Praise or Censure. One is counted liberal, another penurious; one munificent, another rapacious; one cruel, another compassionate; one perfidious, another faithful; one effeminate and pusillanimous, another fierce and courageous; one humane, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere, another crafty; one harsh, another gentle; one grave, another giddy; one religious, another profane, and the like. Every Man, I know, will agree that it would be highly commendable in a Prince to possess all the good Qualities

War upon a Tyrant than upon a good King, upon a *Lewis XI.* than upon a *Lewis XII.* upon a *Domitian* rather than upon a *Trajan*; for the good King will be well served, whereas the Tyrant's Subjects will join my Troops. Let me go into *Italy* with Ten thousand Men against an *Alexander VI.* half *Italy* will side with me: But let me march with Forty thousand against an *Innocent XI.* and all *Italy* will rise in his Defence. No wise

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lities above-mentioned, without any Mixture of the bad ^b; but since the Condition of human Nature will neither suffer him to possess nor to exert them all, he should be wise enough to shun the Infamy of those Vices which might occasion the Loss of his Dominions; and, if possible, he should likewise abstain from others which might not have so fatal an Effect; but if that is impracticable, he must not be too nice; nor ought he to make any Scruple of incurring the Reproach of those Vices without which his Dominions could hardly be preserved: For if we fairly examine this Matter, we shall find that some things have the Appearance

and good King in *England* was ever dethroned by great Armies; all their bad Kings have been ruined by Competitors, who, when they began the War, could not muster Four thousand regular Troops. Every wise Prince therefore will look upon Virtue as his chief Security, and as the Means of gaining and preserving the Attachment and Fidelity of his Subjects, and striking Terror into his Enemies.

Adbuc nemo extitit, says Pliny the younger in his Panegyric, cujus virtutes nullo visiorum consortioaderentur.

“ Never yet was there any
“ Man whose good Qualities
“ had no Allay of bad ones.”

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Appearance of Virtue, which, if practised, must inevitably ruin him; and that others are seemingly vicious, which, if followed, will render him secure and happy.

* There are some Vices which do not hinder a Prince from reigning well, nor blemish his Character as a Prince. *Solomon* was much given to Women; *Trajan* to Boys and Wine. *Vicio es de hombre, no de Principe*: "It is the Vice of the Man, not of the Prince;" said the Count de Penneranda to an Emperor's Ambassador, who told him it was much to be lamented that *Philip IV.* King of *Spain* should be so much addicted to Women. In Princes we ought to distinguish their domestic from their publick Life, their kingly Virtues from those of a private Nature. In this Sense *Tacitus* must be understood, when he says, *Palam laudares, secreto male audiebant*. Hist. 1. "Their publick Character was good, their private bad." It is always commendable to do what is right, but this does not always produce good Consequences: Some things are conformable to Reason, but not to Experience; and consequently a Prince, to dis-

charge his Office well, must accommodate himself to the Exigence of his Affairs, and do for the sake of the State, what he neither would nor should do as a private Man. *Morem accommodari, prout conducatur*. Ann. 12. It is sufficient for him to be good when it is his Interest to be so. *Quoties expedierat, magnæ virtutes*. Hist. 1. It is necessary for him to know what is good, but not always expedient for him to do it. *Omnia scire, non omnia exequi*. *Tacit.* in the Life of *Agri-cola*. *Catharine de Medicis*, Queen of *France*, finding that the Pope and the King of *Spain* blamed her for concluding a Peace with the *Huguenots*, after having in vain endeavoured to reduce them by Fire and Sword, said very properly, that *the Kingdom of France was not to be governed like Alisse and Torbia* (two little desolate Towns in *Italy*); for what succeeds in a small Model, will not always succeed in a great one.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Liberality and Penuriousness.

TO begin with the two first Qualities that are observed in a Prince; I say, the Reputation of being liberal is beneficial to him. Nevertheless, when his Liberality is not so applied as to make him formidable, it proves hurtful: Now if it is used, as it ought to be, with Prudence and Discretion, it will not be known, nor will it save him from the Infamy of being penurious: For there is no gaining the Reputation of Liberality, without being sumptuous and expensive upon all Occasions: But a Prince who shuns no Expence, quickly exhausts his Treasure, and is forced at length, if he would still keep up the Reputation of being liberal, to

OBSERVATIONS.

Two famous Sculptors, *Pheidias* and *Alcamenes*, having each made a Statue of *Minerva*, the *Athenians* had a mind to chuse the most beautiful of the two, in order to place it upon a high Pillar: When both were publickly shewn, that of *Alcamenes* was immediately preferred; and the other rejected, as rough

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to overload his People with Taxes^a, and be-
take himself to Confiscations, and all other
Means whatever of getting Money: This
makes him odious to his Subjects, and but
little respected by others, because of his Po-
verty: And thus his Liberality having made
him a great many Enemies, and but few
Friends,

rough and unfinished. *Pbidias*, not at all discon-
certed at the Judgment of the Vulgar, desired
that the two Statues might each be placed upon
the Pillar. When this was done, the Beauties that
had been admired in the Statue made by *Alcarnenes*
disappeared, and the other carried the Prize.

Pbidias owed his Success to the Study of Opticks
and Proportions. The same Proportion ought to
be observed in Politicks: A Difference in Eleva-
tions occasions a Difference in Maxims; and there
is no general Rule but is defective in some particu-
lar Cases: What would be admired in a great
Kingdom, would be very unsuitable in a petty
State. Luxury, which is the Effect of Plenty, and
causes Money to circulate, makes a great King-
dom flourish, supports Industry, multiplies the
Wants of the Rich, and thus connects them with
the Poor. If any Quack-politician should banish
Luxury from a great Empire, that Empire would
quickly

* If by Ambition we ex-
haust the public Treasury,
says *Tiberius*, we must reple-
nish it by unjust and wicked

Means. *Si ararium ambi-
tione exhauserimus, per se-
lera supplendum erit.* Ann.

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Friends^b, he is in Danger of being undone by the first and slightest Misfortune that happens. When he becomes sensible of his Danger, he endeavours to prevent it by changing his Conduct. Whereupon he suddenly falls under the Infamy of Penuriousness.

If a Prince therefore cannot exercise this Virtue of Liberality so as to make it known, without Prejudice to himself, he ought not,

if

quickly fall into a languishing Condition. On the contrary, Luxury would undo a little Principality: Money being carried out in greater Abundance than brought in, such a State must needs

^b Cicero says that a liberal Prince loses the Affections of more of his People than he gains, and that the Hatred of those from whom he takes is much greater than the Gratitude of those on whom he bestows. *Nec tanta studia assequuntur eorum, quibus dederunt, quanta odia, quibus ademerunt.* Off. lib. 2. Let a Prince never give, says the younger Pliny, provided he never takes away. *Nihil largiatur Princeps, dum nihil auferat.* Paneg. Tacitus, speaking of Otho, says that he knew how to dissipate,

but not how to bestow his Treasure. *Perdere iste sciet, donare nesciet.* Hist. .1. *Faluntur*, adds he, *quibus luxuria specie liberalitatis imponit.* "They are deceived who take Luxury and Profuseness for Liberality." The younger Pliny will not allow those to deserve the Epithet of liberal, who deprive others of their Properties; and affirms that it is seeking a Name of Liberality by means of Avarice. *Qui quod huic dabant, auferabant illi, famam liberalitatis avaritia petunt.* Ep. 30. lib. 9.

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If he is wise, to mind the Scandal of being penurious: For when at length it appears that by his Parsimony his Revenues are made sufficient for all his Expences, that he not only can withstand those who make War upon him, but execute considerable Enterprizes, without loading his People, he will be counted liberal to the many from whom he takes nothing, and penurious only by the few whom he disappoints in their Expectations.

In our own Times we have seen no great Actions done by any but those who passed for being

needs fall into a Consumption, from which it would never recover. It is therefore the Duty of a Politician not to confound small States with great Empires; and in this *Machiavel* errs most egregiously in the present Chapter.

Our Author puts too indefinite and loose a Meaning upon the Word Liberality; he seems to make no Distinction between this and Prodigality. "A Prince, says he, who would execute great Enterprizes,

- o " *David* said the Lord was his God, because he had no need of any thing that belonged to him. All Subjects have the like Disposition with regard to their Prince, who suffers them peaceably to enjoy their Possessions. They are always well affected, says *Mezerai* in the Life of *Charles VI.* when they are well used, that is, when they are not molested in their Possessions.

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being penurious; all others have miscarried. *Julius II.* fought the Reputation of Liberality, in order to attain the Popedom; but afterwards neglected it, that he might be able to make War upon the King of *France*; and his long OEconomy so well supplied his extraordinary Expences, that he made a great many Wars, without laying the smallest additional Tax upon his People. The present King of *Spain*^d, had he courted the Reputation of Liberality, could never have executed so many Enterprizes. A Prince therefore who would maintain his Dominions, and shun Poverty, Contempt, and the Necessity of plundering his Subjects, in order to defend himself against his Enemies, ought to make little Account of the Reproach of being penurious; for this is one of those Vices which support his Government.

If
 “terprizes, ought to have the Reputation of Li-
 “berality, and to be actually liberal.” I know no Hero who has not had this Virtue. Say that a Prince is penurious, and you tell his Friends and Subjects that their Services will not be rewarded; and thus you extinguish that natural Zeal which every Subject has to serve his Prince.

Doubtless

^a*Ferdinand* King of *Castile* and *Arragon*.

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If any one should object, that *Cæsar* by his Liberality attained the Sovereignty of *Rome*, and that many others have by the same means risen to the highest Dignities; I answer, that you are either a Prince, or aim at being one. In the first Case, Liberality is hurtful; in the second, the Reputation of it is necessary; and *Cæsar* was one of those who aspired at the Sovereignty of *Rome*: But after he attained it, had he lived much longer,

Doubtless it is only the OEconomist who can be liberal, it is only the Man that makes a prudent Use of his own Riches, who can enrich others. We know that the immoderate Expences of *Francis I.* King of *France*, were the principal Cause of his Misfortunes; and that his Pleasures exhausted the Fund of his Glory. As at first he was not liberal, but lavish, so towards the latter End of his Life, he grew covetous and penurious: He hoarded up his Treasures; but the Treasures that are beneficial to a Prince, are those which circulate. Every private Man, as well as every King,

* *Liberalitas, ni adsit modus, in exitium vertitur*, says *Tacitus*, Hist. 3. "Liberality, when it is unbounded, is pernicious and destructive." On the other hand, OEconomy, in a Prince, is a kind of Revenue, which supplies all his necessary Expences. *Tantas vires habet frugalitas Principis*, says the younger *Pliny*, *ut tot impendiis, tot erogationibus sola sufficiat*. In a Paneg.

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longer, and not retrenched his Expences, he would have ruined that Empire. If it should be replied, That many liberal Princes have with their Armies performed great Actions; I answer, either the Prince spends his own Money and that of his Subjects, or that of others: In the first Case, he ought to be frugal^f; but in the other, liberal upon all Occasions: And the Prince whose Army is to be maintained with Free-Quarter, Plunder, and

King, who knows only how to heap up and hide Money, impoverishes others without enriching himself. The Family of *Medicis* obtained the Sovereignty of *Florence* by the Wealth as well as Ability of the great *Cosmo*, the Father of his Country, who rose from a private Merchant to be its Sovereign. A covetous Man has but a low and narrow Genius; and it was well said by the

^f Thus *Otho*, when a private Man, was more expensive than a Prince. *Luxuria etiam principi onerosa*, says *Tacitus*, Hist. 1. Every time that *Galba* feasted with him, he gave a considerable Sum of Money to each Soldier in the Cohort which attended *Galba* as his Guard. *Eo progressus est, ut per speciem convivii, quoties Galba apud Othonem epularetur, cohort-*

ti excubias agenti, viritum centenos nummos divideret. ibid. But after he became Emperor, he grew so strict an Oeconomist, that when he was dying, he distributed his Riches among his Domesticks, like a Man who had a long Time to live and enjoy them. *Pecunias distribuit parce, nec ut periturus.* Hist. 2.

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and Exactions from other People, is obliged to be liberal, otherwise his Army will desert him: And he may well be prodigal, like *Cyrus, Cæsar, and Alexander*, of what neither belongs to him nor his Subjects; for this rather adds to his Reputation than lessens it; it is only spending of his own that hurts him g. Nor is there any thing that destroys itself so much as Liberality; for in proportion as a Man is liberal, he takes away the Means of continuing so h; he becomes either poor and contemptible, or, to avoid Poverty, odious and rapacious. And there is

the Cardinal *de Retz*, That in Affairs of State, Money must never be minded. Let every Sovereign therefore endeavour to enrich himself by encouraging Commerce and Manufactures, that he may be able to spend much when Occasion requires. This will be the Way to make him esteemed and beloved by his Subjects, as well as formidable to his Enemies. Our Author represents Liberality, as the Means of rendering a Prince contemptible: This is the Remark of an Usurer. And is it thus a Man should write, who pretends to give Instructions to Princes?

g *Tacitus* observes, that *Galba* was saving of his own, and covetous of the publick Money: *Pecuniæ suæ parcus, publicæ avarus.* Hist. 1.

Henry IV. King of *France*, was of the same Character.

h *Liberalitas enim nimia profusione inarefcit.* Plin. Ep. 4. Lib. 2.

N

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is nothing which a Prince ought so carefully to shun, as Hatred and Contempt, both which are the Consequences of Liberalityⁱ. For these Reasons, it is more prudent to put up with the Scandal of Penuriousness, which does not produce Hatred, than by affecting Liberality, to lay one's self under the Necessity of being rapacious, which produces both Hatred and Infamy.

ⁱ Thus Nero, upon the Hopes of an imaginary Treasure, consumed the Riches of the Empire, brought on publick Poverty, and rendered himself the more ridiculous, as his Flatterers had rung in many Panegyricks the great Felicities of his Reign. *Nova ubertate provenire terras, & obvias opes deferre Deos—Gliscebat interim luxuria spe inani, consumebanturque veteres opes, quasi oblati, quas multos per annos prodigeret. Quin & inde jam largiebatur, & divitiarum expectatio inter causas paupertatis publicæ erat.* Ann. 16. “The Earth, said his Poets and Orators, “teemed, in his

“Reign, with Productions
“altogether new; and to
“him the Gods presented
“Treasures already stored.
—“In the mean time Nero
“rioted in Prodigality from
“these fantastical Hopes,
“and utterly consumed his
“antient Treasure; as if
“others, in their stead, were
“to be poured upon him in
“such Abundance, as to
“supply him in a Course of
“Profusion for many Years.
“Nay, out of his imaginary
“Fund, he was already distributing Largeesses; and
“the vain Expectation of
“great Riches became one
“of the Causes of publick
“Poverty.”

CHAP. XVII.

Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is best for a Prince to be feared or beloved.

TO come next to the other Qualities above-mentioned, I say that every Prince should endeavour to be thought merciful; nevertheless, great Care must be taken that his Mercy be not misapplied. *Cesar Borgia* was counted cruel; but his Cruelty reduced *Romagna*, settled it in Peace and Concord, and secured the People's Allegiance; so that his Conduct, if well considered, will appear more merciful than that of the People of *Florence*, who, to shun the Imputation of Cruelty, suffered *Pistoia* to

OBSERVATIONS.

The most precious Depositum that is put in the Hands of a Prince, is the Lives of his Subjects: As his Office gives him a Power of condemning to Death, or pardoning Criminals, so it makes him the supreme Arbiter of Justice. Good Princes look upon this Power, which is so much boasted of, as the weightiest Part of their Charge; they

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to be destroyed ^a. When a Prince would keep his Subjects united and faithful, he must not heed the Reproach of Cruelty; for if he makes a few Examples of Justice, he acts with less Cruelty than those who, through an Excess of Mercy, suffer many Disorders to arise, which occasion Rapine and Murder ^b. Now these are prejudicial to the whole Society; whereas particular Executions, which are ordered by the Prince, affect only

know they are Men themselves, as well as those whom they judge; they know that Injustices and Injuries may be compensated in this World, but that the Execution of a Sentence of Death too hastily passed, is an Evil that can never be repaired; they are only inclined to Severity, when they find Severity necessary, to prevent greater Evils, which otherwise could not be averted; they are

^a By neglecting to destroy the *Panciatichi* and *Cancellieri*, two Families which by their Quarrels and Animosities, kept up continual Com-motions in that City. *Ma-chiav.* Chap. 27. Book III. of his Discourses.

^b This is agreeable to what *Tacitus* observes of *Corbulo*; That his Severity, by which he kept up military Disci-pline, was more beneficial

than the Lenity and Indul-gence of other Generals, who by pardoning Deserters, ruined their Armies. *Quia duritatem cæli militiæque multi abnuebant, deserebant-que, remedium severitate quasitum est.—Idque usu sa-lubre, & misericordiâ melius apparuit; quippe pauciores illa castra deseruere, quàm ea in quibus ignoscebantur.* Ann. 13.

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only particular Men. Besides, all new Governments are exposed to so many Dangers, that it is impossible for a new Prince to avoid the Scandal of being cruel. Thus *Virgil* makes *Dido* say,

Res

are always merciful, except in desperate Cases, where Mercy to Particulars would be Cruelty to the Whole; and act like a Man, who having a Leg or an Arm gangrened and incurable, is willing to bear the painful Operation of having it cut off, in order to save the rest of his Body.

Ma-

• Every new Prince, says *Tacitus*, is in a tottering Condition, and liable to a thousand Misfortunes; *Novum & nutantem Principem*. Ann. 1. *Ad omnes principatus novi eventus casusque*. Hist. 5. He adds, That the People often rise up against a new Prince, for no other Reason, but because many look upon the Beginning of a Government as the fittest Time for embroiling Affairs, and enriching themselves by a Civil War. *Seditio incessit, nullis novis causis, nisi quod mutatus princeps licentiam turbarum, & ex civili bello spem præmiorum ostendebat*. Ann. 1. It was a Saying of *Lewis XI*. That unless he

had governed with Rigour in the Beginning of his Reign, he would have been one of those unfortunate Noblemen mentioned in *Boccace*. And the Reason why in our Times a Prince, upon his Accession to a Crown, can hardly refrain from Cruelty, is that his Subjects, for the most part, are licentious, thinking that the Government is not yet well enough settled, to punish their Disorders. *Usurpatâ statim libertate licentius, ut erga Principem novum*. Hist. 1. Duke *Valentine* said, That the Maxim *Oderint, dum metuant*, ought to be strictly followed by those who from a private

N 3

For

*Res dura, & regni novitas, me talia cogunt
Moliri, & latè fines custode tueri* ^d.

Nevertheless, the Prince ought not to be too credulous, or too hasty in his Motions; nor ought he to alarm himself with groundless Apprehensions; but so to temper his Conduct with Prudence and Humanity, that neither

Machiavel treats this Subject of Executions with too much Levity. With him the Lives of Men pass for nothing; with him Interest, the sole Divinity which he worships, is all in all. For this Reason he prefers Cruelty to Mercy, and advises those who are newly risen to Sovereignty, to despise more than all other Princes, the Imputation of being cruel.

Mur-

Fortune rise to a Principality; witness *Cæsar*, who enjoyed his Sovereignty but five Months, because he had neglected the good Advice that was given him by *Pansa* and *Hirtius*; which was, that by Arms he ought to keep what by Arms he had got. *Laudandum*, says *Paterculus*, *Hist. 2. experiëntiâ conciliatum est Pansæ & Hirtii, qui semper prædixerant Cæsari, ut principatum armis quæsi-*

tum, armis tueretur. Ille dictitans mori se, quam timeri malle; dum clementiam, quam præstiterat, expectat, incautus ab ingratis occupatus est. We must therefore conclude with *Salust*, that a Sovereignty is maintained by the same Means by which it was acquired: *Imperium iisdem artibus retinetur, quibus partum est.*

^d *Æneid.* Book I.

My cruel Fate,
And Doubts attending an unsettled State,
Force me to guard my Coasts—

Dryden.

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ther too much Confidence may make him unwary, nor too much Diffidence untractable. Hence arises a new Question, *Whether it is best to be feared or beloved?* It may be answered, Both are very desirable; but as both can hardly be attained, it is much safer, if one of the two must be wanting, to be feared than beloved: For, in general, Men are ungrateful, inconstant, double, timid and selfish; as long as they receive any Benefit by you, they are wholly yours; their Blood, their Fortunes, their Lives, and Children, (as I said before) are all at your Service, when you have no need of them, and your Danger is remote; but

Murder raises *Machiavel's* Heroes to the Throne, and Murder maintains them in it. When our Author wants Examples to enforce his cruel Precepts, *Cæsar Borgia* never fails to supply him. He quotes two Lines, which *Virgil* puts in the Mouth of *Dido*: But this Passage proves nothing; for *Virgil* represents *Dido* in the same manner as another Poet represents *Jocasta* in *Oedipus*: Both make them express such Sentiments as are most suitable to the Characters they give them. It is not therefore the Authority of *Dido* or *Jocasta*, but that of *Virgil* or *Sophocles*: And they are only the Examples of illustrious and virtuous Men, that can have Weight in a political Treatise.

but when it is at hand, and you have present Occasion for their Assistance, they make no Scruple to forsake you^e. The Prince who leaves himself destitute of other Securities, and wholly relies upon their Protestations, is sure to be ruined: For as to those whom he has gained by his Bounties, and not by a Greatness and Generosity of Mind, he deserves their Friendship, but has it not^f; and there-

Our Author recommends Severity particularly to the General of an Army: He compares *Scipio's* Indulgence with the Severity of *Hannibal*, prefers the *Carthaginian* to the *Roman*, and presently infers, that Rigour is the first Mover of Order and Discipline, and consequently the principal Cause of

^e *Prosperis Vitellii rebus certaturi ad obsequium, adversam ejus fortunam ex æquo detrectabant.* Tacit. Hist. 2. "Those who in the Prosperity of *Vitellius* vied with one another in Acts of Duty and Obedience, concurred to forsake his falling Fortune." *Languentibus omnium studiis, qui primo alacres fidem atque animum ostentaverant.* Hist. 1. "The very same Men fell off from their Zeal and Attachment, who had at

" first appeared faithful and
" courageous, and confident
" of Success." *Ceteris aliena pericula deserentibus.* Ann. 13. "The other Nations forsook the *Ansibarians* in Dangers, which they looked upon as foreign to themselves."
^f *Amicitias, dum magnitudine munerum, non constantia morum continere putat, meruit magis, quam habuit.* Tacit. Hist. 3. "*Vitellius* thought to secure his Friends, not by a steady
" and

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therefore to them he can never trust in Times of Danger. Besides, Men are less cautious of offending a Prince who makes himself loved, than one who makes himself feared; for Affection is a sort of Tye^g, which Men, because they are wicked, break upon every Temptation of Profit to themselves^h; whereas Fear lays them under a Dread of Punishment, which they can never shake off.

Never-

of the Success and Triumphs of an Army. *Machiavel* in this Case acts unfairly; he singles out *Scipio*, the mildest and softest of all Generals in point of Military Discipline, to compare him with *Hannibal*, and enforce the Precepts of Severity.

I own that Discipline in an Army cannot be kept up without some Examples of Rigour; for how
should

“ and unblameable Con-
“ duct, but by uncommon
“ Bounties; and therefore
“ rather deserved their
“ Friendship, than had it.”
Friendships, says an Antient,
which Interest makes, Inter-
est will unmake and de-
stroy.

* *Infirma vincula carita-
tis. In Agricola.* “ The
“ feeble Ties of Affection.”
*Timetur à pluribus, quod ple-
rumque fortius amore est.*
“ He is feared by many, says

“ the younger *Pliny*, Letter
“ 5. Book I. and Fear is a
“ stronger Tye than Affec-
“ tion.”

“ *Amicos tempore, fortu-
nâ, cupidinibus aliquando, im-
minui, transferri, desinere.*
Hist. 4. “ The Number of
“ our Friends, says *Titus* to
“ *Vespasian*, is lessened with
“ Time; they have often de-
“ serted us to follow For-
“ tune, and sometimes be-
“ cause of Desires which
“ we could not gratify.”

Nevertheless, the Prince should make himself feared in such a manner, that if he is not loved, he may at least not be hated; Now, to be feared, and not hated, are consistent enough: and this will always be his Case, if he neither invades the Possessions, nor offers any Violence to the Wives of his Subjects; and if, when he has Occasion to put any of them to Death, he does it at a time when the Cause is manifest, and when he has sufficient Grounds for his Justification: But there is nothing he ought so much to avoid as seizing their Estates; for Men sooner forget the Death of their Father, than the Loss of their Patrimony. Besides, Occasions of Confiscation never fail; and the Prince who begins to support himself by Rapine, will always find Temptations enough to seize the

should Rakes, Debauchees, Rogues, Cowards, giddy Youths, rude and mechanical Beings, be kept to their Duty, unless they were forced to it in some measure by the Fear of Punishment?

All I ask of *Machiavel* upon this Subject is a little Moderation. I own that if Clemency inclines a Man to Acts of Good-nature, Prudence on the other hand often inclines him to Acts of Severity and Rigour. But this Rigour is like that of a skilful Pilot, who never cuts away his Masts or Tackling,

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the Possessions of others: Whereas Opportunities of shedding Blood are not so frequentⁱ,

But when a Prince is at the Head of his Army, and has a Multitude of Soldiers to govern, it is absolutely necessary that he should not regard the Scandal of being cruel^k; for without that, no Army can be kept united, or in a Condition to execute any Enterprize. Among the several Instances of *Hannibal's* great Conduct, this is reckoned one, that though he had a vast Army, gathered out of many different Nations, and led to make War in a foreign Country, yet there never happened any Tumult among them, nor any Mutiny against

Tackling, but to shun the imminent Danger to which he is exposed in the Storm. 'Tis necessary on many Occasions to be severe, but never to be cruel. I had much rather be loved than feared by my Soldiers, in the Day of Battle.

I

ⁱ *When the Prince is not inclined to Rapine; (adds Machiavel, Chap. 19. Book III. of his Discourses) for when he is insatiably greedy of Money, he always finds Pretences for putting some of his Subjects to Death, in order to confiscate their Estates.*

^k *Especially (says Machiavel, Chap. 21. Book II. of his Discourses) if he has a great Reputation; because this destroys the Remembrance of all those Errors which proceed from his Rigour.*

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against their General, either in his Successes or Misfortunes¹. This could proceed from nothing but his enormous Cruelty, which, joined with his many Virtues, rendered him both awful and terrible to his Soldiers, and without which his other Virtues would never have produced that Effect. Injudicious Writers, however, on the one hand admire his great Exploits, and on the other condemn the principal Cause of them. That his other Qualities would not have been sufficient to make him awful to his Soldiers, appears from what happened to *Scipio*, one of the most extraordinary Men not only of his own, but of any Age whatever: Nevertheless his Army mutinied in *Spain*; and the true Cause of it was his too great Lenity,

I come now to his most captious Argument; he affirms that a Prince will find his Account more in making himself feared than loved; because the greatest Part of Mankind are addicted to Inconstancy, Ingratitude, Dissimulation, Cowardice and Avarice; because Affection is a Tye which the Baseness of Human Nature has rendered extremely weak and brittle; whereas the Fear of Punishment is a sort of Restraint which they rarely break

¹ He says the same thing, Chap. 19. Book III. of his Discourses.

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nity^m, which gave his Soldiers more Liberty than the Discipline of an Army would permit; for which Reason he was reproached by *Fabius Maximus* in the Senate, as the Corrupter of military Disciplineⁿ.

The Inhabitants of *Locris* having been plundered and oppressed by one of *Scipio's* Lieutenants^o, their Losses were never made up, nor was the Lieutenant ever punished. All this proceeded from the Mildness of *Scipio's* Nature, which was so remarkable, that one of the
 Senators

break through; because Men are Masters of their Affection, but not of their Fear: And therefore a wise Prince will chuse rather to depend upon himself, than upon others.

I grant there are many ungrateful and perfidious Men in the World, and that Severity upon some particular Occasions is very useful; but I affirm that every King, the sole Aim of whose Policy is to make himself feared, will reign over none but Cowards and Slaves, and can never expect that his Subjects will perform any great Action in his Service;

^m Which he was afterwards obliged to season with a little Cruelty, says Machiavel, *ibid*.

ⁿ *Natum eum ad corrumpendam disciplinam militarem arguebat.* Livy, Dec. 3. Book II.

^o *Plutarch* calls him *Pleminius*. It was on account of the Complaints made against this Lieutenant, that some proposed to deprive *Scipio* of the Government of *Sicily*, and try him for Maladministration.

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Senators^p alledged in his Excuse, that there were some who knew better how to avoid Errors themselves, than to punish the Errors of others. Now it is certain that in Time *Scipio* would have lost his Reputation and Glory, had he acted with the same Indulgence in a Principality; whereas his Error not only was unobserved, but even increased his Fame, because he lived in a Republican Government.

From whence I conclude, that since Men love only as long as they please, but fear as long as the Prince would be feared, a wise Prince

vice; for whatever is done through Fear, always bears the Marks and Characteristicks of that Passion: I affirm that a Prince who has the Talent of making himself beloved, will reign over the Hearts of his Subjects, that his Subjects will think it their Interest to obey such a Master, and that History furnishes us with numberless Examples of great and memorable Actions, which have been performed through a Principle of Affection and Attachment. I affirm that Seditions and Revolutions seem at present to have fallen into Disuse. We know of no Kingdom except *England*, where the King has any Reason to be afraid of his People; nor has the King of *England* any Reason to fear his Subjects, unless he raises the Storm himself.

Quintus Metellus.

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Prince will chuse to depend upon what is solely in his own Power, and not upon what is in the Option of others; but will take great Care withal, as I said before, to govern so as not to be hated^r.

I conclude therefore, that a cruel Prince exposes himself to Treason and Rebellion, much more than one who is indulgent; because Cruelty is insupportable, and Men are quickly tired of Fear, whereas they are never tired of Affection; and Goodness and Mildness are always amiable.

It were therefore to be wished, for the Benefit of Mankind, that all Princes were good, without being too easy and indulgent, that Goodness in them might always be a Virtue, and never a Weakness.

^r *Plutarch*, in the Life of *Lycurgus*, says, that *Eurytion* King of *Sparta* having a little slackened the Reins of Government, to gratify the People, they quickly grew licentious and insolent; and

that some of his Successors were extremely hated by the *Spartans*, for no other Reason, but because they endeavoured to resume that Authority which *Eurytion* had parted with.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

How far Princes ought to fulfil their Engagements.

EVERY one knows how commendable it is in a Prince to fulfil his Engagements, and to act a sincere, not a deceitful Part. It has nevertheless appeared by Experience, in our Times, that those Princes who made light of their Word, and artfully deceived Mankind, have alone done great things, and have at length got the better of such

Machiavel, the Preceptor of Tyrants, has the Boldness to affirm, that Princes may impose upon the World by Diffimulation. This is the first Position which I shall endeavour to refute. The extreme Curiosity of the Publick is well known; it is a Being that sees every thing, hears every thing, and divulges whatever it has heard or seen. If its Curiosity examines the Conduct of particular Men, 'tis only to fill up idle Hours; but if it considers the Characters of Princes, 'tis with an Eye to its own Interest. And indeed Princes are more exposed than all other Men, to the Conjectures, Comments and Judgment of the World; they are a sort of Stars, at which a whole People of Astronomers

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such as proceeded upon honourable Principles. We must therefore know that there are two Ways of contending, one by Right and Equity, the other by Force. The former is that of Men, and the latter that of Beasts: But because the former frequently proves ineffectual, recourse must be had to the latter. It is therefore necessary that Princes should be well skilled both how to put on the Man and the Beast. This is what the Ancients have figuratively pointed out to them, where they relate that the Education of *Achilles* and of several other Princes was committed to *Chiron* the Centaur; to signify,

nomers are continually levelling their Telescopes and Cross-staves; Courtiers who are near them are daily taking their Observations; a single Gesture, a single Glance of the Eye, discovers them; and the People who observe them at a greater Distance, magnify them by Conjectures; in short, as well may the Sun hide its Spots, as great Princes their Vices and their genuine Character, from the Eyes of so many curious Observers.

If the Mask of Dissimulation should cover, for a time, the natural Deformity of a Prince, yet he could never keep his Mask always on; he would sometimes be obliged, was it only for a Breathing, to throw it off; and one View of his naked Features would be sufficient to content the Curious. It

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will

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fy, that as the Preceptor was half Man, half Beast, so the Disciples ought to participate of both Natures, the one being of a short Duration without the other. Since therefore a Prince is obliged to assume the Beast, he ought to put on the Fox and the Lion, because the Lion is but ill-provided against Snares, and the Fox against Wolves; so that he must be a Fox to know the Snares, and a Lion to terrify the Wolves. Those who assume the Lion only, do not rightly understand their Office. From hence it follows, that a wise Prince neither can nor should fulfil

will therefore be in vain for Dissimulation to dwell in the Mouths of Princes; Craftiness in their Discourses and Actions will have no Effect: To judge of Men by their Words and Professions, would be the way to be always mistaken; we therefore compare their Actions with one another, and then with their Words; and against this repeated Examination, Falsity and Deceit will find no Refuge: No Man can well act any Part but his own; he must really have the same Character which he would bear in the World: Without this, the Man who thinks to impose upon the Publick, imposes upon none but himself.

Sixtus Quintus, Philip II. passed for Hypocrites, and enterprising Men, but not for being virtuous. Let a Prince be as artful as he would, he will never be

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fulfil his Engagements, when the Observance of them would turn to his Prejudice, and when the Causes for which he entered into them no longer subsist.

If Men were all good, this Maxim would be false; but as they are bad, and would not observe their Promises to us, we ought as little to think ourselves bound by our Engagements to them; nor will a Prince ever want justifiable Pretences to colour such a Violation. I could cite a thousand Examples; and shew how many Treaties of Peace, and
how

be able, even by following all our Author's Maxims, to gain the Character of Virtue which he has not, and avoid the Scandal of Crimes which belong to him.

Machiavel argues no better, in the Reasons he assigns for employing Trick and Hypocrisy. The ingenious, but fallacious Application of the Fable of the Centaur proves nothing; for if that Animal was half Man, half Horse, does it follow from thence, that Princes ought to be crafty and false? A Man must have a strong Inclination to inculcate Crime, who employs Arguments so weak and so far-fetched as this of the Centaur.

But here follows a Reasoning as false as any we have yet met with. Our Politician affirms, that a Prince ought to have the Qualities both of the Lion and the Fox; of the Lion, to destroy the
O 2 Wolves;

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how many Promises, have been rendered void and of no Effect, through the Perfidy of Princes, among whom those who have best known how to act the Part of the Fox have been generally the most successful. This Nature of the Fox must nevertheless be artfully disguised, and the Person who adopts it must be a thorough Master in Hypocrisy and Dissimulation. So simple are Men, and so tame to their present Necessities, that he who deceives will always find People who will suffer themselves to be deceived. I shall quote one Example, which is still fresh in

Wolves; and of the Fox, to avoid Snares: From whence he infers, that a wise Prince neither can nor should fulfil his Engagements: Here is a Conclusion without Premises. Would not any other Man blush to throw out such impious Sophistry?

If *Machiavel's* confused Notions could be strained into good Sense, and sound Morality, they might be represented thus: The World resembles a Match at Gaming, where Sharpers and fair Players are promiscuously engaged: A Prince therefore who is in the Game, and would not be cheated himself, should be well acquainted with all the Ways of cheating others; not in order to put any of these Lessons in Practice, but only that he may hinder them from being practised upon him by Gamblers.

But

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in our Memory. The sole Business and Aim of Pope *Alexander* VI. was to cozen Mankind; yet he always found Matter to work upon; and as no Man dealt in stronger Asseverations, or in more solemn Oaths than he, so no Man minded his Engagements less^a; notwithstanding which, he succeeded in every Attempt to deceive, because he thoroughly knew how to attack People on their weak Side.

It

But to return to *Machiavel's* Sophistry. Because all Men, says he, are wicked, and at all times break their Faith and Promise to you, there is no Obligation upon you to keep yours with them. Now here is a manifest Contradiction; for he says a few Lines after, that Dissemblers will always find People simple enough to be imposed upon. How can this be reconciled with the other? All Men are wicked, and yet you find Men simple enough to be imposed upon! But it is not true, that all Men are wicked: One must have a strange misanthropic Turn, not to perceive, that in every Society there are a great many honest Men, and that the major Part are neither good nor bad. But without supposing all

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^a It was said of Pope *Alexander* VI. and of Duke *Valentine* his Son, that the Father never did what he said, and the Son never said what he did; and that both went by this fundamental Rule, to give their Faith to every

Man, and to keep it with none. When they were reproached with their Insincerity, they would answer, that they had given their Oath indeed, but not their Promise.

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It is not therefore necessary that a Prince should have all the above-mentioned Qualities; but it is extremely requisite that he should appear to have them^b: I will even venture to affirm, that his having them, and putting them in Practice, would be to his Prejudice; whereas his putting on the Appearance of them must be for his Interest.

Let

the World to be wicked, how could *Machiavel* have supported his detestable Maxims? Nay, granting that Men are as wicked as he represents them, would it follow that we ought to imitate their Example? If any Man robs, or commits Murder, I conclude that he deserves to be hanged, not that I must act accordingly. If Honour and Virtue were to be banished the World, said *Charles* the Wise, they ought to find an Asylum with Princes.

After

^bA Maxim which amounts to this: You must be seemingly an honest Man, and at bottom a Villain. *Charles V.* always swore by the Faith of an honest Man, and always acted the Reverse of what he swore: The Truth is, he had read and studied *Machiavel's* Prince, which, according to a modern Historian, was one of the three Books he liked, and caused to be

translated for his own Use; *Heiff. Hist. of the Empire, Book III. Chap. 4.* This I take Notice of here, because a Minister from the Emperor one Day affirmed to me, in good Company, whereamong others the Pope's Internuntio was present, that the House of *Austria* had always abhorred the Doctrine and Politicks of *Machiavel*.

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Let him seem, and let him actually be, merciful, true to his Word, humane, religious and sincere; but at the same time let him have so much Command of himself, that if Occasion requires, he may be quite the reverse.

I must observe, that a Prince, and especially a new Prince, cannot practise all those things by which Men acquire the Reputation of Goodness; because for the Safety of his

After endeavouring to prove the Necessity of Vice, our Author would encourage his Scholars by shewing them the Facility of succeeding in it. Those who are skilled in the Art of Diffimulation, he affirms, will never be at a Loss to find Men simple enough to be duped by them. His Meaning is, Your Neighbour is a Blockhead, and you are a Man of Sense; wherefore you must cheat him.

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These

“ Though his Style seems “ too licentious, and not de- “ cent and virtuous enough “ to authorize in some Pas- “ sages what has the Appear- “ ance of Vice; yet as he “ had a mind to fall in with “ the Nature of his Subject, “ he could not write other- “ wise, without losing what “ he aimed at. For it is “ very hard for a Prince to	“ preserve his Dominions, “ when surrounded by “ powerful and ambitious “ Neighbours, and sup- “ ported by wicked and un- “ faithful Subjects, unless “ sometimes he departs “ from the Severity of the “ Rules of Conscience. “ And it is a certain Rule in “ this World, which is na- “ turally vicious, that no long “ Suc-
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his Government he will frequently be obliged to act contrary to the Dictates of Humanity, Charity and Religion. He must therefore have a flexible Disposition, so as to turn with the Winds and Variations of Fortune; and as I observed above, he should be virtuous when he can, but not scruple to be vicious when he must. In short, a Prince

These are Syllogisms for which some of *Machiavel's* Scholars have been hanged and broke upon the Wheel.

Not content with attempting to shew the Necessity and Facility of being vicious, our Author endeavours to point out the Felicities that attend Vice. But it unfortunately happens, that his Hero, *Cæsar Borgia*, the greatest and most perfidious of all Villains, was in Effect extremely miserable. *Machiavel* takes great Care not to touch upon this Part of his Life, and is forced to have recourse to the History of wicked Popes and Emperors. He maintains, that Pope *Alexander VI.* the most false and

“ Success can be met with,
 “ even in sovereign Dignities, unless a Man knows
 “ how to help himself in
 “ time of Necessity, by
 “ having recourse to Vice;
 “ that when the Necessity
 “ ceases, he may immediately
 “ return to Virtue.”
 These are the Words of

Gaspar d'Auvergne, who has been quoted before in the Notes of Chap. XV. I thought proper to put them down here, in order to shew that *Machiavel's* Doctrine is founded in Reason, and therefore ought not to be condemned upon a slight Inquiry.

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Prince ought to be strictly upon his Guard, not to let a Word drop from him which does not favour of the five Qualities above-mentioned; and to judge of him by his Looks and Discourse, he should seem to be all Goodness, Sincerity, Humanity and Religion. There is nothing of which it is more necessary to have the Appearance than of this last Quality; because Men in general judge by Sight, and not by Feeling; every one having the Faculty of seeing, few that of Perception.

and impious Man of his Time, was always successful in Deceit, because he perfectly knew the Weakness of Mankind, with regard to Credulity. Now I will venture to affirm, that the Success of Pope *Alexander* was owing not so much to the Credulity of Man, as to certain Events and Circumstances of that Time, and especially to the Rivalship between *France* and *Spain*, to the Divisions and Animosities that prevailed among the chief Families of *Italy*, and to the Passions and Weakness of *Lewis XII.*

Don *Lewis de Haro*, an able Politician, looked upon Deceit as an Error in Politicks: He used to say of Cardinal *Mazarin*, that his Eminence had one great Fault in his political Character, which was, that he always cheated. The same *Mazarin* wanting to employ the Marshal *de Faber* in making a slippery Treaty; Permit me, my Lord, says *Faber*, to refuse cheating the Duke of *Savoy*, especially in a trifling

ption. All see what you appear to be, few know what you really are, and these few dare not contradict the Opinion of the Multitude, which is backed by the Majesty of Government. In the Actions of all Men, and particularly in those of Princes, (against whom there lies no Appeal) People fix their Eyes on the Event. For this Reason let a Prince only take care to maintain his Power, and every one will praise the Means as honourable,

trifling Affair: The World knows that I am an honest Man; be pleased therefore to reserve my Integrity for some other Occasion, when it may do Good to my Country.

To say nothing either of Honour or Virtue; but only to consider the Interest of Princes; I say it is bad Policy in them to impose upon and dupe the World; for they are never sure of succeeding but once, and by one Act of Deceit they lose the Confidence of all their Neighbours.

A certain Power very lately published a Manifesto, setting forth the Reasons of her Conduct; and presently after acted in a manner quite opposite to all her Pretences. It must be owned that such glaring Deceitfulness must needs make one forfeit the Confidence of others; for the sooner the Contradiction follows the Protestation, 'tis the more palpable. The Church of *Rome*, to avoid the like Inconsistency, has very wisely prescribed a Noviciat of a hundred Years to those whom it places

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nourabled, because the Vulgar always judge by Appearances and the Event of Things. Almost the whole World comes under this Denomination, and the Opinion of the Few only takes Place where the Multitude have nothing to

places in the Number of its Saints; in which Time the Memory of their Faults and Extravagancies is entirely lost; those who knew them personally when living, and could swear against them, are dead and gone; and nothing obstructs the Notion of Saintship, which the Church would impose upon the Publick.

The Reader, I hope, will pardon this little Digression. To return to *Machiavel*; I own there are some unhappy Cases, when a Prince cannot help breaking his Treaties and Alliances: But he ought to do it with as much Honour as he can, by giving timely Notice of it to his Allies, and shewing that he is forced to it by the greatest Necessity, and for the Preservation of his People, which are the only Cases wherein it is allowable.

I shall conclude this Chapter with making one more Remark. Observe how fertiley one Vice propagates

^d *Nil gloriosum, nisi tutum, et omnia retinendæ dominationis honesta. Salust.*
 " Nothing is glorious but
 " what is safe; and there are
 " no Means of maintaining
 " Dominion but are honourable."
 " In a Prince
 " or Commonwealth, says

" *Thucydides*, nothing is unjust that is beneficial." *Tacitus* relates, that *Agrippina*, Nero's Mother, thought no Price too great for a Crown. *Decus, pudorem, corpus, cuncta regnò viliora habere. Ann. 2.*

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to judge by. A certain Prince now living, whom it is not proper to name, talks of nothing but Peace and Fidelity; but had he practised either, he must frequently have lost both his Dominions and Reputation,

propagates another in the Hands of *Machiavel*. 'Tis not enough for his Prince to be cruel, deceitful, perfidious and irreligious; he must crown all his Vices with that of Hypocrisy. *Machiavel* thinks the People will be more gained by his Devotion, than offended with his Oppressions. There are others of the same Opinion. For my own part, the World, methinks, is very indulgent as to Errors in Speculation, when they are such as do not necessarily corrupt and vitiate the Heart: A People will always be better affected to an unbelieving Prince, if he is an honest Man, and a good Master, than to one who is orthodox, but a Villain or a Tyrant. 'Tis not upon a Prince's Opinions, but upon his Actions only, that the Happiness of his People depends.

* Meaning *Ferdinand* King of *Castile* and *Arragon*, who by his Insincerity and Perfidy conquered *Italy* and *Navarre*. An *Italian* Prince,

his Cotemporary, used to say, that he would never trust to *Ferdinand's* Oaths, till he swore by some God in whom he believed.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

Princes ought to beware of growing odious or contemptible.

HAVING now considered the most important of the Qualities above-mentioned, I shall briefly treat of the rest under this general Head; That a Prince should endeavour (as I hinted before) to avoid such things as may render him odious or contemptible; and that while he succeeds in this, he acts his Part well, and will find himself in no Danger from the Imputation of any other Vices.

Nothing makes a Prince more odious, as I said above, than usurping the Properties, and debauching the Wives, of his Subjects, which are two things he ought carefully to avoid;

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Fondness for System is not a Folly peculiar to Philosophers, but grown common to them and Politicians. Our Author is as much infected with it as any Writer whatever: He would prove, that a Prince ought to be wicked and knavish; these indeed are the sacramental Words of his Religion.

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avoid; for as long as a whole People are unmolested in their Possessions, and unprejudiced in their Honour, they live contented; and their Prince has nothing to struggle with but the Ambition of a few particular Persons, which may be curbed many Ways, and with great Ease.

A Prince is contemptible, who is counted inconstant, light, effeminate, pusillanimous or irresolute^a; and these are Faults which he ought to avoid as so many Rocks; endeavouring in all his Actions to shew a Greatness of Mind, Courage, Gravity and Fortitude, to make all his Determinations in the private Affairs of his Subjects irrevocable, and to keep up such a Reputation among them, that they may never think of deluding him, or diverting him from his Purpose.

There

Machiavel has all the Wickedness of those Monsters whom *Hercules* overthrew; but has not their Strength; so there is no need of the Club of *Hercules* to demolish him. What can be more simple, more natural, and more suitable to Princes, than

^a *Vitellium subitis offensis, aut intempestivis blanditiis, mutabilem contemnebant, metuebantque. Tacit. Hist. 2.*
 " They despised *Vitellius*,
 " and dreaded him, as a

" Man who was apt to be
 " suddenly changed by every
 " Gust of Passion, or by
 " any wild Strain of Flattery."

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There is no Prince who has this Reputation but is in great Esteem; and in this Case, it will not be an easy Matter for any of his Subjects to conspire against him, nor for any of his Neighbours to invade him, as having a Character of great Worth, and of being respected by his People. For a Prince should always have two Objects of his Fear; the one at Home, with regard to his own Subjects; and the other Abroad, with regard to his powerful Neighbours. Against the latter he defends himself by good Arms, and good Allies: As he will always have good Allies when he is well armed, so when he is in no Danger from Abroad, he will always be safe at Home, unless Affairs have been already perplexed by some former Conspiracy. When he is threatened with any Invasion, if he is provided in the Manner I
men-

than Justice and Goodness? If this Position is true, *Machiavel's* Politicks must necessarily be false; and it is so evident, that we need not go about to prove it. For if he maintains, that a Prince established in the Throne ought to be cruel, knavish, perfidious, and so forth; he endeavours to make him wicked merely to undo him. And if he recommends all those Vices to a Prince who
obtains

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mentioned before, and is not wanting to himself, he will never fail to baffle the Attacks of his Enemies; as I have already shewn was the Case of *Nabis* Tyrant of *Sparta*.

When Things are quiet Abroad, what the Prince has to fear, is some secret Conspiracy at Home; and he sufficiently provides against this, by not rendering himself odious or contemptible, and by making his Subjects always satisfied with his Government; the Necessity of all which I have shewn before at large. One of the best Remedies a Prince can use against Conspiracies, is not to be hated or despised by the Body of the People; for no Man plots, but when he thinks to gratify the People by the Death of the Sovereign; whereas

obtains his Crown by Usurpation, he gives him such Advice as would set all Princes and States against him. For how is it possible, that a private Man should usurp a Sovereignty, but either by dethroning the lawful Prince, or by assuming the supreme Authority of a Republick? Certainly this is not a Practice which the Princes of *Europe* will encourage or approve. Had *Machiavel* published a Collection of Rules and Examples for the Instruction of Highwaymen, he would not have written a worse Book than this.

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whereas his believing that it would offend them, deters him from any such Enterprize: And in all Conspiracies there are infinite Difficulties. We find by Experience, that many have been set on foot, but that very few have succeeded; for no Man can conspire alone, nor can he chuse a Confederate but out of those whom he thinks discontented: And you no sooner discover your Thoughts to a Malecontent, but you give him an Opportunity of coming into Favour, and the Prospect of any Gratification by revealing your Secret ^b: So that, as the Profit
is

I must however take Notice of some of the false Reasonings in the Chapter before us. *Machiavel* pretends, that a Prince renders himself odious, when he unjustly seizes the Properties of his Subjects, and makes Attempts upon the Modesty of their Wives. Certainly a selfish, unjust, violent, and cruel Prince, cannot fail to be hated by his Subjects; but it is not so with respect to Gallantry.
Julius

^b There is a remarkable Instance of this in *Tacitus*. *Volusius Proculus* had been employed by *Nero* in assassinating his Mother *Agrippina*; but not meeting with that Preferment afterwards, which he thought so great a

Service had merited, he discovered his Discontentment and made grievous Complaints to *Epicharis*, a Woman who was then in a Conspiracy against the Emperor's Life; and to her he declared his settled Resolution of
P taking

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is certain on one side, and extremely hazardous and precarious on the other, he must either be a rare Friend to you, or an implacable Enemy to the Prince, if he does not betray you ^c. In short, on the side of the Conspirators there is nothing but Fear, Jealousy, and the Dread of Punishment; which intirely dis-

Julius Cæsar, whom they styled at *Rome* the Husband of all their Wives, and the Wife of all their Husbands; *Lewis XIV.* who was a great Lover of Women; the late *Augustus*, King of *Poland*, who enjoyed them in common with all his Subjects; none of these Princes were hated on account of their Amours. And if *Cæsar* was assassinated; if

taking Vengeance the first Opportunity. This encouraged *Epicharis* to let him into her Secret; which he had no sooner learned, but he went and betrayed it to *Nero*. *Erat Chiliarchus in ea classe Volusius Proculus, occidendæ matri Neronis inter ministros, non ex magnitudine sceleris proventus, ut rebatur. Is mulieri—dum merita erga Neronem sua, & quàm in irritum cecidissent, aperit, adjicitque questus, & destinationem vindictæ, si facultas oriretur, spem dedit posse impelli. Ergo Epicharis omnia scelera principis or-*

ditur; —accingeret modò, navaret operam, & militum acerrimos duceret in partes, ac digna prætia expectaret—Proculus ea quæ audiuit ad Neronem detulit. Ann. 15. The Man to whom you trust your Secret, becomes Master of your Liberty, says *M. de Rochefaucault*, in his Memoirs.

^c The Affection which your Accomplice bears you must needs be very great, if the Danger to which he exposes himself by the Conspiracy, does not appear much greater; says *Machiavel*, Chap. VI. of his Discourses.

dishearten them^d: But on the side of the Prince, there is the Majesty of Government, the Laws, the Assistance of his Allies and State;

if *Rome*, for its Liberty, plunged so many Daggers in his Breast, it was because *Cæsar* was an Usurper, not because he was a Man of Gallantry.

It may be objected, perhaps, in favour of our Author, that the Kings of *Rome* were expelled for the Attempt upon the Modesty of *Lucretia*. I answer, that it was not the Love which young *Tarquin* made to *Lucretia*, but the violent Manner in which he made it, that raised the Insurrection at *Rome*; and as this Outrage revived in the Memory

^d *Tacitus*, in the 15th Book of his Annals, points out all the Causes that may render a Conspiracy abortive. 1. The Hopes of Impunity, which is always an Enemy to great Attempts. *Impunitatis cupido, magnis semper conatibus adversa, and promissa impunitas.* 2. Hope and Fear. *Spes atque metus.* 3. Dilatoriness. *Accendere conjuratos, lentitudinis eorum pertæsa.* 4. The Fear of being betrayed. *Metus proditiōis.* 5. Jealousy; for he observes, that *Piso* refused to kill *Nero* in his Country-house, whither *Nero* often resorted, for fear that *Silanus* should succeed

him, or that the Consul *Vestinus* should re-establish Liberty and the Commonwealth, or else make an Emperor of his own. 6. *Proditio.* Treachery itself, which often happens the very Day before the Conspiracy should be executed, *pridie insidiarum.* 7. *Præmia perfidiæ, immensa pecunia & potentia.* The Hopes of Recompence, as also the Fear of being prevented by some other of the Conspirators. *Multos adstitisse, qui eadem viderint; nihil profuturum unius silentium; at præmia penes unum fore, qui judicio prævenisset.* There is, besides, another sort of Treachery,

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State; which defend him so effectually, that if the Affection of the People is added, it is impossible any Man should be rash enough to conspire against him: For if, in most Cases, the Conspirator has Reason to be afraid only before the Execution of his Design,

mory of the People, the other Violences committed by the *Tarquins*, they took that Opportunity of avenging themselves, and vindicating their Liberty: After all, the Adventure of *Lucretia* is perhaps a mere Romance.

I am far from saying this by way of Excuse for the Gallantry of Princes, which may be morally

Treachery, that of the Mien and Countenance, which often betray the inmost Thoughts of the Conspirator. *Ipse mæstus, & magnæ cogitationis manifestus erat.* 8. Imprudence; for Example, the making Preparations for the Conspiracy, in the Presence of Servants, as ordering them to whet a Poniard, or the like. *Pugionem asperari saxo, & in mucronem ardescere jussit;* which gives them some Suspicion of your Designs; *arreptis suspicionibus de consequentibus.* 9. The Sight of Tortures. *Tormentorum aspectus ac minæ.* 10. The Fear

that some of the Conspirators have already betrayed all, and that it is in vain to be longer silent. *Cuncta jam patefacta credens, nec ullum silentii emolumentum, edidit cæteros.* To all this we may add Chance, which often prevails in those Cases. Thus the Earl of *Leicester* failed in his Enterprize upon *Leyden*; for one of the Conspirators being seized for Debt, most of the rest ran away, believing that some of their Number had betrayed them.

* *Illum quidem,* says *Germanicus* to the Legions that mutinied against *Tiberius*, *sua majestas, imperium Romanum,*

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sign, in this Case, he ought to be as much afraid after it, as having offended the whole People, and therefore left himself no Refuge.

Many Examples of this might be produced ; but I shall content myself with one, which happened in the Memory of our Fathers. *Hannibal Bentivoglio*, Grandfather of the present *Hannibal*, was Prince of *Bologna*, and assassinated by the *Canneschi* ^f, who had conspired against him ; nor was there any of of the Family left, except his Son *John*, who was

rally bad : I only touch upon it to shew that Gallantry does not make a Prince odious. The Amours of a good King are always deemed a pardonable Weakness, if they are not attended with Injustice and Violence. Make Love like *Lewis XIV.* or *Charles II.* King of *England*, or *Augustus*, King of *Poland*, and you will be respected and caressed : But beware of imitating the Amours of a *Nero* or a *David*.

P 3

The

num, cæteri exercitus defendent. " *Tiberius* will be defended by the Majesty of " his Character, by the Roman " Empire, and by the other " Armies." He had told them a little before, that *Italy* and *Gaul* were faithful to *Tiberius*, and that all the rest of

the Empire was in a State of Tranquillity. *Italiæ consensum, Galliarum fidem extollit, nil usquam turbidum aut discors.* Ann. i.

† A Family that rivalled the *Bentivoglio's* in the Year 1445.

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was then an Infant g, No sooner was the Murder committed, but the People rose up in Arms, and slew all the *Canneschi*. Now this proceeded only from the Affection which the People of *Bologna* had at that time for the House of *Bentivoglio*: And it was so great, that after *Hannibal's* Death, being informed there was a natural Son of the Family at *Florence*^h, who till that time had passed for the Son of a Smith, they sent for him, conducting him ho-

The following, methinks, is a downright Contradiction. *Machiavel* would have his Prince gain the Affection of his Subjects, in order to prevent Conspiracies; and in the XVIIth Chapter he says, that a Prince ought especially to endeavour to make himself feared, because he can more rely upon Fear, which is in his own Power, than upon Affection, which is in the Option of others. Which of the two is our Author's real Opinion? He speaks the Language of an Oracle, and may be interpreted both

^g In Book VI. of his History of *Florence*, he says, That *John* was then six Years of Age.

^h He was the natural Son of *Hercules Bentivoglio*, *Hannibal's* first Cousin, and was called *Santi*; he passed at *Florence* for the Son of

one *Agnolo da Cascese*. *Machiavel*, *ibid.* Where he adds, that *Santi's* Conduct was so prudent, that whereas his Predecessors had all been killed by their Enemies, *Santi* lived in great Peace and Reputation, and died lamented.

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honourably to the City, and invested him with the Government, which he continued to possess till *Hannibal's* Son came of Age.

From whence I conclude, that a Prince has but little Occasion to be afraid of Conspiracies, if the People are his Friends; but there is no Man nor Thing which he ought not to fear, when the People are his Enemies. Indeed it has been the constant Business of all wise Princes, and of all well-modelled States, to content the People, and not to drive the Nobles to Despair; and this is one of the most essential Duties of a Prince. Among the best-modelled States in our Times, the Kingdom of *France* is one; which

both ways; but this, by-the-bye, is the Language of Knaves.

I must observe in general, upon this Occasion, that Conspiracies and Assassinations are now grown rare, and that Princes are safe in this respect. Those Crimes are worn away, and no longer in Fashion; and the Reasons which *Machiavel* alledges are good. There is nothing, at most, but the Enthusiasm of Priests, which can occasion such horrible Villainies. Among the judicious Observations which *Machiavel* makes

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upon

¹ That Kingdom, says more subject to the Laws, *Machiavel*, Chap. I. Book than any other we know of. III. of his Discourses, is

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which has a great many excellent Institutions, both with regard to the Liberty of the People, and the Security of the Sovereign : The most considerable of these is the Parliament^k, and the Authority with which it is invested. For he who modelled that State, was sensible, on the one hand, of the Ambition and Arrogance of the Nobles, and therefore judged it necessary to bridle them : On the other hand, he knew how much they were feared, and for that Reason hated, by the Commons ; and was therefore desirous to pro-

upon Conspiracies, there is one, remarkably good in itself, but grows bad by coming from his Pen. A Conspirator, says he, is disturbed by the Apprehension of Punishment, whereas the King is supported by the Majesty of Government, and by the Authority of the Laws. Methinks it ill becomes our political Author to talk of Laws ; he who breathes nothing but Interest, Cruelty, Tyranny, and Usurpation. *Machiavel* acts like the Protestants, who make use of the Arguments of Unbelievers, to refute the Transubstantiation of the Church of *Rome* ; and of the Arguments which the Catholicks produce for Transubstantiation, to refute Unbelievers.

Ma-

* He speaks only of the and which, he observes, is Parliament of *Paris*, which the inviolable Executor of gives Motion to all the rest, the Laws. *Ibid*.

protect them: But as he intended, that neither of these should be the Affair of the King alone, lest the King should at any time be obliged to offend either the Nobles, by favouring the Commons, or the Commons, by encouraging the Nobles; he instituted a third Judge, who, without casting any Odium upon the King, might both curb the Nobility and protect the People. Nor could any Institution be more prudent or more beneficial, or attended with more Security, both to the Sovereign and the State. Here we may make another Remark, that Princes ought to delegate invidious Affairs to their Ministers, and reserve to themselves the Distribution of all

Machiavel very justly advises a Prince to make himself loved, both by the Grandees and People, to throw upon others what might procure him the Hatred of either of these States, and for this purpose to appoint Magistrates, who may judge of such Differences as arise between them. He alledges the Government of *France* as an Example. Is it not strange that so keen an Advocate for despotick Power and Usurpation, should approve of the Authority which was formerly vested in the Parliaments of *France*? For my own part, if there was any Constitution, which for its Wisdom should be proposed as a Model, methinks it is that of *England*, where the Parliament is the

Ar-

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all Favours¹. To conclude, a Prince ought so to regard and value his Nobility, as not to render himself odious to his People.

To many, perhaps, who consider the Misfortunes that befel several of the *Roman* Emperors, it may appear that their Lives disprove the Opinion I have advanced: For even of such Emperors who possessed great Qualities, and always acted with great Wisdom, some were deposed, and some murdered by Conspiracies. In order to answer this Objection, I shall examine the Characters and Conduct of some of those Emperors, shew the Reasons

Arbiter between the King and the People, and the King has every Power to do Good, without any to do Ill.

Machiavel enters next into a large Discussion upon the Lives of the *Roman* Emperors, from *Marcus Aurelius*, down to the two *Gordians*. He ascribes the many Revolutions that happened in it, to the Venality of the Empire; but this is not the only Cause of them. *Caligula*, *Claudius*, *Nero*, *Galba*, *Otho*, *Vitellius*, were all murdered, though they did not buy *Rome*, like *Didius Julianus*. Venality was indeed an additional Motive for
assas-

¹ This is agreeable to what *Xenophon* says, that a Prince ought to delegate to others the Care of inflicting Punishments, and to bestow all the Rewards and Favours himself.

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sons of their Miscarriage and Ruin, which will not appear different from the Reasons I have before alledged, and make some Remarks, by the way, upon the History of those Times. I shall confine myself, in this Inquiry, to the Emperors between *Marcus* the Philosopher, and *Maximinus*; and these are *Marcus*, his Son *Commodus*, *Pertinax*, *Julian*, *Severus*, *Antoninus*, his Son *Carcalla*, *Macrinus*, *Heliogabalus*, *Alexander*, and *Maximinus*.

It is first to be observed, that whereas other Princes had nothing to struggle with but the Ambition of the Grandees, and the Insolence of the People; the *Roman* Emperors had a third Difficulty to surmount, which was the Cruelty and Avarice of the Soldiers: And this occasioned the Ruin of many

assassinating those Emperors; but the true Cause of so many Revolutions, was the Form of the Government. The *Pretorian* Guards were in those Days what the *Mamelucks* have been since in *Egypt*, the *Janisaries* in *Turkey*, and the *Strelits* in *Russia*. *Constantine*, with great Ability, cashiered the *Pretorian* Bands; but at length new Misfortunes which befel that Empire, exposed the Emperors to be assassinated or poisoned. I shall only observe, that the bad Emperors were generally cut off by violent

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many of those Princes; for the Task is extremely difficult to content both the Soldiery and the People; because the People prefer Peace, and therefore a Prince of a mild and peaceable Disposition; whereas the Soldiers love one of a martial Turn, one who is insolent, cruel, and rapacious^m. And these were the Qualities which the *Roman* Army had a mind the Prince should exert against

violent Deaths; but *Theodosius* died a natural Death, and *Justinian* reigned in Prosperity four and twenty Years. Now this is what I insist upon, there is scarce any wicked Prince who is long successful; nor did *Augustus* reign in Peace till he became virtuous. The Tyrant *Commodus*, the Successor of the divine *Marcus Aurelius*, was put to Death,

^m *Erant quos memoria Neronis, ac desiderium prioris licentie accendebat. Hist. 1.*
 “ Some were transported
 “ with a Fondness for the
 “ Memory of Nero, and
 “ with a Passion for recalling the Licentiousness
 “ which under him they had
 “ enjoyed.” *Neque exercitus, aut legatos ac duces, magnā ex parte luxū, egestatis, scelerum sibi conscios, nisi pollutum obstrictumque meritis suis principem pas-*

suros. Hist. 2. “ I cannot
 “ imagine that the Armies,
 “ or the Lieutenant-Generals and Leaders, Men,
 “ for the most part, wallowing in Prodigality, pressed
 “ by Indigence, and under the Guilt and Horrors of
 “ Enormities black and manifold, would have suffered any Prince to reign
 “ over them, except one polluted with Crimes,
 “ and under Obligations to them for their wicked
 “ Services.”

against the People, that their Pay might be the more increased, and their Avarice and Cruelty glutted. Whence it happened, that those Emperors who had not Credit or Art enough to keep both these Parties in Order, always miscarried: Most of them, and especially such as had risen from a private Fortune,

Death, notwithstanding the great Veneration which was had for his Father's Memory. *Caracalla* was not able to maintain his Authority because of his Cruelty. *Alexander Severus* was killed by the Treason of that *Maximinus* the *Tbracian*, who passed for a Giant; and the same *Maximinus*,
having

"Services done him." One of the Causes why *Galba* lost both the Empire and his Life, was a Saying of his, *That he had chosen his Soldiers, and not bought them: Legi à se militem, non emi.* Hist. 1. Another was, that he had used too much Severity towards those who were disused to the antient Discipline, and accustomed by *Nero* to Licentiousness. *Nocuit antiquus rigor, & nimia severitas, cui jam pares non sumus.* And elsewhere, *Laudata olim & militari fama celebrata severitas ejus, angebat coaspermantes veterem disciplinam, atque ita XIV*

annis a Nerone assuefactos, ut haud minus vitia Principum amarent, quam olim virtutes venerabantur. Hist.

1. "That Severity of *Galba*, a Quality so admired of old, and by the antient Armies ever distinguished with Applause, was very grievous to a slothful Soldier, who scorned the primitive Discipline, and for fourteen Years were so much habituated to the base Reign of *Nero*, that at this Time they no less admired the Vileness and Vices of their Princes, than of old they had adored their Virtues."

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tune, perceiving the Difficulty of managing these two different Tempers, applied themselves only to content the Army, and made but little account of the Injuries they did to the People. Such a Conduct, indeed, was very necessary; for if a Prince cannot help being odious to some particular Persons, he should make it his chief Endeavour, in the first place, to avoid the Hatred of the whole Body of his Subjects; and when that is impracticable, to avoid the Hatred of the stronger Party.

Accordingly those Emperors who had need of extraordinary Support, as being new Princes, courted rather the Soldiers than the People; nevertheless this Conduct proved beneficial or hurtful, just as they knew how to keep up their Reputation with the Army. For these Reasons it happened, that *Marcus Aurelius*, *Pertinax*, and *Alexander*, who were

having exasperated the whole Empire by his Barbarities, was assassinated in his turn. *Machiavel* pretends, that this Emperor was destroyed because of the Contempt in which he was held for his obscure Birth. But this is a Mistake: A Man, who by his Courage and Ability raises himself to an Empire, has no longer any Parents: His Subjects

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were all mild and good Princes, Lovers of Justice, Enemies of Cruelty, humane and beneficent, came all to an untimely Death; except *Marcus*, who lived and died extremely honoured: And the Reason was, that *Marcus* succeeded in the Empire by Inheritance, without having any Obligation for it either to the Army or the People: Besides, as he possessed many Virtues that gained him Esteem and Veneration, he was able, during his whole Reign, to keep both these Parties within their proper Bounds, without being either hated or despised. *Pertinax*, on the contrary, was created Emperor against the Will of the Soldiers; and these being accustomed to a licentious and dissolute Life under *Commodus*, could never endure that Regularity and Virtue, to which *Pertinax* endeavoured to bring them back: And therefore this Prince having incurred their Hatred, and fallen besides into Contempt,
on

jects consider his Power and Dignity, rather than his Extraction. *Pupian* was the Son of a Country Farrier, *Probus* of a Gardener, *Dioclesian* of a Slave, *Valentinian* of a Rope-maker, and yet they were all respected. *Sforza*, who conquered *Milan*, was the Son of a Peasant; *Cromwell*,

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on account of his great Ageⁿ, was cut off
in the very Beginning of his Reign *.

Here

ⁿ Old Age renders Princes contemptible. *Ipsa etas Galbae & irrisui & fastidio erat assuetis juventae Neronis.* Hist. 1. "To those who were accustomed to behold the Youth and gay Person of Nero, even the Age of Galba was matter of Derision and Hate." Either because old Men are less enterprising; *reputante Tiberio extremam etatem.* Ann. 6. Or because their Enemies think they are not able to defend themselves. *Artabanus senectutem Tiberii ut inermem despiciens.* Ann. 6. Or because it is thought they begin to dote; *fluxam senio mentem obiectando.* Ibid. Besides, old Age is often the Cause of their suffering themselves to be governed by others. *Invalidum senem, T. Vinus & Cornelius Laco, odio flagitiorum oneratum, contemptu inertiae destruebant.* Hist. 1. "Titus Vinus and Cornelius Laco, Galba's worthless and wicked Ministers, derived upon him the Weight and Infamy of all their own numberless Crimes, brought Scorn upon the Impotency of the Administration, and

involved their Prince, already enfeebled with Age, in utter Ruin." Add, that those who enter upon the Ministry towards the End of the Prince's Reign, make haste to enrich themselves by plundering all manner of ways.---*Offerebant venalia cuncta praepotentes liberti: servorum manus subitis avidae, & tanquam apud senem festinantes.* "Galba's Freedmen, indulged in immoderate Power, exposed to common Sale all the Honours and Emoluments of the State: His Bondmen too were greedy to make Advantage of their present Sunshine, and eager to convert into hasty Gains the short Reign of an antient Master." And so much the rather, because a declining Sovereign is but little feared. *Cum apud infirmum & credulum minore metu, & majore praemio peccaretur.* Hist. 1. "Under a Prince so feeble and credulous, the Iniquities of his Ministers were attended with the smaller Peril, and with the greater Gains."

* In the third Month.

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Here it must be observed, that Hatred is procured as well by good Actions as bad °; and therefore, as I said before, a Prince who would maintain his Dominions, is often forced not to be good. For when that Party, whose Support you find necessary, whether it is the People, or the Army, or the Grandees, is grown corrupt and vicious, you are not at Liberty to be good; you must needs gratify their Humour; and in this Case good Actions would be prejudicial and pernicious.

But let us come to *Alexander*, of whom, among other Encomiums which have been given him, it is related, that during the fourteen

well, who subjected *England*, and made all *Europe* tremble, was the Son of a Country Gentleman. The great *Mahomet*, Founder of the most flourishing Religion in the Universe, was bred up a Merchant; *Samon*, the first King of *Sclavonia*, was a *French* Merchant; the famous *Piaſt*, whose Name is still revered in *Poland*, was elected King,

Q

while

° His Easiness of Access, Part of his Manners, good or his flowing Courtesy, (says bad, was equally subject to *Tacitus* of *Venones*) were Hatred, because foreign from Virtues unknown to the their own. *Et quia moribus ipsorum aliena, perinde odium pravis & honestis.* Ann. 2.

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teen Years of his Reign, he governed with so much Equity and Goodness, that no Man was ever put to Death without a fair Trial. Nevertheless, as he passed for effeminate, and for being under the Management of his Mother, he quickly fell into Contempt, and the Army conspired against him, and murdered him *. On the other hand, *Commodus*, *Severus*, *Antoninus*, *Caracalla*, and *Maximinus*, were extremely cruel and rapacious; and, to satisfy the Soldiers, committed all manner of Injustices and Outrages against the People. These Emperors however came all to an untimely Death, except *Severus*, whose Reign was prosperous and happy: For *Severus* was a Prince of so great Courage and Magnanimity, that notwithstanding he grievously oppressed the People, yet both the People and the Army so admired him for his great

while he still wore wooden Shoes; and he lived many Years in great Respect. How many Generals, how many Ministers of State and Chancellors, have we seen of the lowest Extraction? *Europe* is full of such Instances, and is the happier for it; these being the Rewards of Merit, and

* With his Mother at *Meyenne*.

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great Qualities, that the former were, in some measure, stunned and amazed, and the latter always obedient and submissive. As the Actions of this Emperor, considered as a new Prince, were very remarkable, I shall briefly shew how well he knew to put on both the Fox and the Lion; two Animals whose Natures, as I said before, it is necessary for every Prince to imitate.

Severus, knowing the Slothfulness and Effeminacy of the Emperor *Julian*, persuaded the Army under his Command in *Sclavonia*, to go to *Rome*, and revenge the Death of *Pertinax*, who had been murdered

and Incitements to it. I say not this with a View to shew any Disrespect for the Blood of the *Vitiks*, the *Charlemains*, or the *Ottomans*: I ought on the contrary, for more Reasons than one, to love the Blood of Heroes; but I love Merit still more.

It must not here be omitted, that *Machiavel* is greatly mistaken in believing, that in the Time of *Severus*, an Emperor needed only to preserve the Good-will of the Soldiery in order to maintain his Power: This is what the History of the Emperors contradicts. The more those indisciplinable Pretorian Bands were courted, the more they felt their own Strength and Importance; and it was equally dangerous to flatter and to check them. The

dered by the *Pretorian Guards* ^P. Under this Colour, without shewing any Ambition for the Empire, he marched his Army directly to *Rome*, and was in *Italy* before his Departure was known. Being arrived at *Rome*, the Senate, through Fear, elected him Emperor, and *Julian* was put to Death. After this prosperous Beginning, he had but two Difficulties to remove, in order to make himself Master of the whole Empire; one was in *Asia*, where *Pescennius Niger*, General of the *Asiatick* Army, had taken the

Soldiery at present are but little to be feared, as they are all divided into small Bodies, which keep a Watch upon each other; as the Sovereign has the Disposal of all Preferments; and as the Execution of the Laws is better secured. The Reason why the *Turkish* Emperors are so liable to be strangled, is, because they have not made use of this Political Institution: For the *Turks* are the Slaves

^P *Scelus cuius ultor est, quisquis successit.* Hist. 1.

The Murder of a Prince is a Crime which his Successor, whoever he be, is sure to revenge. *Omnes conquiri & interfici iussit non honore Galbae, sed tradita Principibus more, munimen-*

tum ad praesens, in posterum ultionem. Ibid. " *Vitellius*

commanded Search to be made for the Murderers of *Galba* and *Piso*, and all of them to be put to the Sword; not from any Tenderness or Regard for *Galba*, but out of a Policy

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the Title of Emperor; the other in the West*, where *Claudius Albinus* likewise set up for Emperor. Thinking it dangerous to declare against both these Competitors at once, he resolved to attack *Niger*, and to couzen *Albinus*: He wrote therefore to *Albinus*, that being chosen Emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that Dignity with him; accordingly he gave him the Title of Emperor, and with the Consent of the Senate admitted him his Collegue. All this

Slaves of the Sultan, and the Sultan of his Janissaries. In *Christendom* a Prince must treat equally well all the different Orders of Men over whom he reigns, and avoid making any Distinctions, which would never fail to raise Jealousies fatal to his Interest.

Q 3

The

“ licy common and tradi-
 “ tional among Princes, and
 “ which is a sort of Security
 “ against such Traitors, du-
 “ ring their own Reigns, and
 “ a Precedent of Vengeance
 “ left by them to their Suc-
 “ cessors.” *Claudius* put to
 Death *Chereas* and *Lupus*,
 who had killed *Caligula*;
 though that Murder was the
 Occasion of his being made
 Emperor. As *Vitellius* or-
 dered all those who had been

concerned in the Murder of
Galba and *Piso* to be slain;
 so *Domitian* put to Death
Epaphroditus for helping
Nero to kill himself; though
Nero had been condemned
 by a Decree of the Senate.
Ferdinand, Great Duke of
Tuscany, put to Death *Bi-
 anca Capella*, his Sister-in-
 law, who had poisoned the
 Grand Duke *Francis*, her
 Husband.

* In France;

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this was accepted by *Albinus*, and taken in good Earnest. But after *Severus* had overcome and slain *Niger*, and settled the Affairs of the East, being returned to *Rome*, he complained in the Senate of *Albinus*, as of a Person upon whom he had laid great Obligations, and who notwithstanding had endeavoured treacherously to murder him; and told them, that he was obliged to go and punish his Ingratitude. Whereupon *Severus* marched into *France*, deprived *Albinus* of his Authority, and put him to Death.

If therefore we strictly examine the Conduct of *Severus*, we shall find that he had in him the Ferocity of the Lion, and the Craftiness of the Fox; and that he was feared and respected by his People, without being odious to his Army: Nor will it be thought surprising, that this Prince, who from a private Fortune raised himself to so vast an Empire, was able to preserve it; for his great
Re-

The Model of *Severus*, which *Machiavel* proposes to such as raise themselves to an Empire, is therefore as pernicious, as that of *Marcus Aurelius* would be beneficial. But how is it possible

Reputation protected him against the Hatred which the People might have conceived against him on account of his Rapine. His Son *Antoninus* was likewise a Man of extraordinary Parts, which gained him the Admiration of the People and the Affection of the Soldiers; for he was martial by Nature, patient of Labour and Hardships, and a great Despiser of all Sensuality and Softness; and this highly recommended him to the whole Army. Nevertheless his Fury and Cruelty were so enormous, as having upon many private Occasions destroyed great Numbers of the People at *Rome*, and all the Inhabitants of *Alexandria*, that he became extremely odious to the whole World, and began to be dreaded even by those who were about his Person; so that he was murdered by a Centurion in the very Middle of his Camp.

Here it is to be observed, that Assassinations of this kind, which proceed from the ob-

sible to propose in the same Breath, *Severus*, *Cæsar Borgia*, and *Marcus Aurelius*, as Models? This is uniting Wisdom, and the purest Virtue, with the most horrible Villainy. I cannot conclude without ob-

obstinate Courage of a single Man, cannot be avoided by any Prince; for every one who despises his own Life, has the Prince's in his Power^e: But these Assassinations are the less to be feared, as they happen but seldom. The Prince must only beware of doing any grievous Injury to those who are near his Person, either in the Service of his Household, or in that of the State. This was the Error of *Antoninus*, who had put a Brother

serving once more, that the inhuman *Cæsar Borgia*, with all his Abilities, died very miserable, and that *Marcus Aurelius*, that Imperial Philosopher, always good and always virtuous, met not with the least Reverse of Fortune during his whole Reign.

“ *Quisquis vitam suam contempnit, tuæ dominus est.*

“ Whoever despises his own Life, is Master of yours.”

Periculum ex singulis, said *Vespasian* to those who exhorted him to seize the Empire; *quid enim profuturas cohortes alasque, si unus alterque, præsentis facinore, paratum ex diverso præmium petat?—facilius universos impelli, quam singulos vitari.*

Hist. 2. “ There is not an individual Soldier, from

“ whom Danger is not to be apprehended: For indeed what Security can Squadrons of Horse and Battalions of Foot afford, if one particular Man, or two, are resolved by a bold Murder to earn a ready Reward from the opposite Party? ’Tis a much easier Task to excite them in a Body to any Design, than to escape the wicked Designs of any particular Man.”

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ther of that Centurion to an ignominious Death, and was daily threatning the Centurion himself †, and yet continued him in his Guards: Now this was a rash and pernicious Action, and sufficient to ruin him, as it actually did.

As for *Commodus*, he might have easily kept the Empire, because he had come to it by Inheritance, as the Son of *Marcus*; and might have contented both the Army and the People, had he only followed his Father's Footsteps. But being of a cruel and brutal Disposition, and wanting to plunder and oppress the People, he indulged the Army in all manner of Licentiousness. Besides, as he prostituted his Dignity, by descending often upon the Theatre to fight with Gladiators, and by many other vile Actions, much beneath the Majesty of an Emperor, he quickly grew contemptible to the Army: Thus as he was hated by one Part, and despised by the other, they conspired against him, and murdered him. It only now remains that we speak of *Maximinus*.

The

† To threaten any Man, is to furnish him with Arms against you.

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The Army, having slain *Alexander*, whom for his Effeminacy they despised, as I mentioned before, chose *Maximinus* in his room: This was a very warlike Prince, but did not long enjoy the Empire†, for two Reasons: One was the Meanness of his Birth, which rendered him contemptible in the Eyes of all his People; for it was universally known, that he had been a common Shepherd in *Thrace*. The other was his neglecting to repair immediately to *Rome*, upon his coming to the Throne, and to take Possession of his Imperial Seat; for the Barbarities committed in the mean time by his Lieutenants over the whole Empire, and particularly at *Rome*, gave him the Reputation of being extremely cruel, and this rendered him highly odious: Infomuch that being universally scorned for the Meanness of his Birth, and universally hated and dreaded for his Fury and Cruelty; first *Africk*, then the Senate, with the whole People both of *Rome* and *Italy*, conspired against him; and were joined afterwards by his own Army, who were then laying Siege to *Aquileia*. Whereupon his Soldiers, harrassed with the Length of that Siege, ab-

† Scarce above two Years.

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abhorring *Maximinus* for his Cruelty, and fearing him less, as they saw he was universally hated, fell upon him and slew him f.

I shall pass over *Heliogabalus*, *Macrinus*, and *Julian*, because they were all Men of contemptible Parts, and were therefore quickly destroyed.

To conclude this Discourse, I say, that modern Princes have much less Occasion to content the Soldiery by extraordinary Means; for though some Consideration must always be had for them, yet as no Prince in our Time has Armies inveterated in the Government of any Part of his Dominions, as was the Case of the *Roman* Armies, he has less Occasion to court them, than the *Roman* Emperors had. For if in those Times it was necessary to content the Soldiers rather than the People, because the Soldiers were the stronger Party; it is at present necessary for every Prince to content the

* They killed his Son also, though still a Child; saying, That of so wicked a Race not one ought to be left alive.

† Witness the *German* Legions, who boasted that they had the *Roman* Empire in their own Hands. *Sua in manu sitam rem Romanam,*

suis victoriis augeri Remp. in suum cognomentum adscisci imperatores. Ann. 1. " In " their Hands lay the Power " and Fate of Rome, by " their Victories the Empire " was enlarged, and from " them the *Cæsars* took, by " way of Compliment, the " Sur-

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the People rather than the Soldiers, because the People are more powerful. I except the *Turk* and the Sultan of *Egypt*: For as the former is always attended with a Guard of Twelve thousand Foot and Fifteen thousand Horse, upon whom the Security and Strength of his Empire depend, he is obliged to preserve their Friendship and Attachment, without any Consideration for the People. The Empire of the Sultan is like that of the *Turk*; as being entirely in the Power of the Soldiers; so that the Sultan is likewise obliged to wave all Regard for the People, and keep the others his Friends at any Rate.

Here it may be observed, that the Government of the Sultan is very different from all other Principalities, and resembles that of the Pope in *Christendom*, which cannot be called either hereditary or new; not hereditary, because the Sons of the deceased Prince are not his Heirs and Successors in the Empire; for it goes to him who is chosen by those who

" Surname of *Germanicus*."
Evulgato imperii arcano, posse principem alibi quàm Romæ fieri. Hist. 1. "The Secret of Government was then first disclosed, that an Emperor might be created

" elsewhere than at *Rome*."
And posse ab exercitu principem fieri. Hist. 2. "They discovered that an Emperor might be created by the Army."

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who have the Power of Election: And as this Custom of electing is antient, the Principality cannot be said to be new, because it is not accompanied with any of the Difficulties that are met with in new Principalities; for though the Power and Title of the Prince are new, yet the Laws and Ordinances of the State are old and settled, and by virtue of them he is received as if he were an hereditary Prince.

But to return to my Subject: Whoever considers what I have said, will find that the Ruin of those Emperors proceeded only from Hatred or Contempt; and will be able to judge how it happened that some of them following one Course, some another, in their Administration, Part succeeded, and Part miscarried, on both Sides. *Pertinax* and *Alexander* were new Princes, and therefore it was not only a vain, but a fatal Attempt in them to imitate *Marcus*, who had succeeded by Right of Inheritance. Nor was it less fatal Conduct in *Caracalla*, *Commodus* and *Maximinus*, to take *Severus* for their Pattern, since they had not Ability enough to follow his Footsteps. Upon the Whole, a new Prince, as he cannot imitate the

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the Actions of *Marcus*, and has no need of imitating those of *Severus*, ought to copy the latter in what is necessary for founding and establishing his Principality, and the former in what conduces to preserve it with Reputation and Glory, after it is settled and firm.

CHAP. XX.

Whether Citadels, and many other Things which Princes often make use of, are useful or prejudicial.

SOME Princes, for the greater Security of their Dominions, have disarmed their Subjects; others have kept up Parties and Divisions in their Towns; some have created Enemies on purpose, others

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The Heathens represented *Janus* with a double Face, to denote his thorough Knowledge of Things past and future: Taken in an allegorical Sense, the Image of that God is very applicable to Princes. They ought like *Janus* to see backward into the History of all former Ages, which furnishes them with useful Instructions for their Conduct and Behaviour;

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others have endeavoured to gain such as they suspected in the Beginning of their Reign; some have built Cities, and others have demolished them. Though in all these Cases no certain and fixed Rule can be prescribed, without particularly considering the State where it is to be used; nevertheless I shall speak of them all in as general a manner as the Subject will permit.

New Princes were never known to disarm their Subjects; on the contrary, when they found them disarmed, they have always put Arms into their Hands: For these Arms with which you trust them, are employed in your

haviour; like *Janus* they ought to look forward, with that Force of Discernment and Penetration which draws Inferences from the Likeness of Circumstances, and in the present Conjunctions reads those that must naturally follow.

Machiavel proposes five Questions to Princes, as well to those who have made new Conquests, as to others whose Politicks wholly turn upon securing their old Possessions. Let us see what Prudence will advise in comparing the past with the future, and in forming such Conclusions as are always consonant to Reason and Justice.

His first Question is, Whether a Prince ought to disarm the People whom he conquers? We must constantly remember, how much the Method of making

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your Service; those whom you suspected become faithful, those who were faithful are confirmed, and all your Subjects side with you. As it is impossible to arm them all, so if you are favourable to those whom you have armed, you can act more safely with respect to the rest; for by distinguishing the former, you lay them under Obligations^a; and the others will readily excuse you, thinking it must needs be that those have most Merit, who are most exposed to Danger: Whereas, if you disarm them, you give them Offence, and shew them that you are distrustful either of their Courage or their Fidelity;

making War is altered since *Machiavel's* Time. Countries are now defended always by disciplined Armies, more or less strong; and a Body of armed Peasants would be greatly despised. If in Sieges sometimes the Burghers take Arms, the Enemy does not allow of it, and, in order to prevent it, threatens

^a Thus the fourteenth Legion continued always faithful to *Nero*, and had always great Regard for his Memory, in Return for the Honour he had done them, in chusing them, as the most valiant Legion of his Army, for the reducing of *England*, which at that time had re-

volted. *Addiderat (Quartadecumanis) gloriam Nero, eligendo ut potissimos; unde longa illis erga Neronem fides, et erecta in Othonem studia* (Their great Attachment to *Otho's* Person and Cause, proceeded from the Resemblance between his Temper and *Nero's*). Hist. 2.

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delity; and your suspecting either of the two tends to make them hate you: As you cannot subsist without Soldiers, you will be forced in this Case to entertain mercenary Troops, the Nature of which I have formerly described; and even if it were safe to employ them, they can never be numerous enough to defend you both against powerful Enemies, and suspected Subjects. Wherefore, as I said before, a new Prince, in a new Principality, has always armed his Subjects; as appears from numberless Examples in History. But when a Prince conquers a new State, and annexes it, as a Member, to his old Dominions, it is then necessary

threatens them with Bombs and red-hot Bullets. In general, Prudence seems to require, that the Inhabitants of a conquered Town should be disarmed at first, especially if there is any Cause to fear a Revolt. The *Romans*, having subdued *Great Britain*, and finding it impossible to keep that Country quiet, on account of the turbulent and warlike Disposition of the Inhabitants, made it their Business to effeminate them, in order to quell their fierce and martial Instinct; which in the End succeeded to their Wish. The *Corficans* are a Handful of Men not less brave and resolute than those old *Britons*; and in my Opinion nothing but Prudence and Moderation will subdue them at last. To maintain the Sovereignty of that Island, I think

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fary his new Subjects should be disarmed, all but such as appeared for him in the Conquest; whom nevertheless he ought to take all Opportunities of rendering soft and effeminate, that in Time the whole Strength of his Dominions may be transferred to his natural Troops, which he is accustomed to keep up in his hereditary State.

Our Ancestors, and those especially who were accounted wise Men, used to say, that it was necessary to keep *Pistoia* by Factions, and *Pisa* by Fortresses: Accordingly in several Towns under their Subjection, they fomented Parties and Divisions, in order to preserve them with more Ease. This indeed was a prudent Conduct at that Time, when *Italy* was unsettled, and in a State of Suspense;

it absolutely necessary to disarm the Inhabitants, and to soften their Manners. One may observe by the way, from the Example of the *Corficans*, how much the Love of Liberty inspires Men with Courage and Bravery; and that in such a Case Oppression is as dangerous as it is unjust.

The second Question turns upon the Confidence which a Prince, after having just subdued a Country, ought to repose either in such of his new Subjects as assisted him in the Conquest, or in such as preserved their Fidelity to their lawful Prince. When

pense; but I am far from thinking that it should be made a Precept for us to follow: Nor indeed can I believe that Factions and Divisions do any Good at all; for a Town that is divided, must needs fall into the Hands of the Enemy as soon as ever he approaches, because the weaker Party will be sure to join with him, and the other will not be able to hold out. The *Venetians* fomented the Factions of the *Guelfs* and *Ghibelins* in the Towns that were under their Jurisdiction; and though they never suffered them to come to Blows, yet they encouraged their Animosities, for no other Reason, I believe, but that the Townsmen taken up with their Feuds, might have no
Leisure

When a Town is taken by Intelligence, and by the Treachery of some of the Inhabitants, it would be highly imprudent to trust the Traitors, as they may probably betray you; and it is to be presumed that those who were loyal to their old Masters, will likewise prove so to their new Sovereigns: For it is commonly wise Men, and such as are happily settled in a Country, who love Order, and to whom every Change is prejudicial. Nevertheless it is a prudent Maxim to trust none rashly.

Let us suppose, that a People roused by Oppression, and forced to shake off the Yoke of Tyranny,

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Leisure to think of revolting. Nevertheless this Policy did not answer the Expectation of the *Venetians*: For after they were defeated at *Vayla**, one of the Factions took Arms against them, and stripped them of all their Dominions.

Such a Conduct as this argues the Weakness of a Government: For one that is sound and vigorous, will never suffer such Divisions†; because they are useful only in Times of Peace, when perhaps they may contribute to the more easy Management of the People; but when War comes

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ny, should call in another Prince to govern them: I am of Opinion, that the Prince ought in all respects to answer the Confidence that has been placed in him; and that if on this Occasion he should not keep his Word to those who have trusted him with every thing they value most, it would be the basest Return of Ingratitude, and would fix a perpetual Reproach on his Memory. *William* Prince of *Orange* preserved to the End of his Life his Confidence and Friendship for those who put the Crown of

* A Village in the Country of *Ghiarra d'Adda*. because that would imply there was a Party against him, whereas the King will suffer no Parties at all. Chap. 27. Book III. of his Discourses.
 † Witness the King of France, (says *Machiavel*) who suffers nobody to call himself of the King's Party, courses.

on, the Fallacy of those Councils quickly appears. It is not to be doubted but that Princes aggrandise themselves when they surmount the Difficulties and Obstacles that oppose them; and therefore Fortune, when she would exalt a new Prince, who has more Need of Reputation than one who is hereditary, raises up Enemies, and encourages Enterprizes against him, that he may have an Opportunity of conquering them, and ascending to a greater Height of Power by such Steps as his Enemies have supplied him with^b. For this Reason

of England upon his Head; such as opposed him, left their Country, and followed King James. In elective Monarchies, where the greatest Part of Elections are procured by Intriguing, and where the Crown is venal, I believe, whatever others may

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^b Thus Fortune used Tiberius, whose Life, before he came to the Empire, was full of Dangers and Crosses. *Cassus primâ ab infantiâ anticipes—Ubi domum Augusti privignus introiit, multis æmulis conflictatus est, dum Marcellus & Agrippa, mox Caius Luciusque Cæsares vixere—Sed maxime in lubrico egit, acceptâ in matrimonium Julia, impudiciam uxoris tele-*

rans aut declinans. Tacit. Ann. 6. " From his first " Infancy his Life was chequer'd with various Turns " and Dangers.—When taken in the Quality of Son-in-law into the Family of " Augustus, he long struggled there with many potent " Rivals, during the Lives " of Marcellus and Agrippa, " and next of the young " Cæsars, Caius and Lucius. " —But

Reason many have thought that a wise Prince, when Opportunity offers, should artfully encourage and foment some Enmity against himself, that by destroying it afterwards he may increase his own Reputation and Power.

Princes, and particularly such as are new, have met with more Fidelity and Assistance from those whom in the Beginning of their Reign they suspected, than from others in whom at that Time they trusted most.

Pandolphus

may think, that the new Sovereign will find it an easy Matter to buy off those who had opposed him, in the same manner as he procured the Favour of those who chose him to that Dignity.

Poland furnishes us with Examples of this. The Crown there is so grossly set to Sale, that it seems to

“---But nothing threatened
“or distressed him so much
“as his Marriage with *Fu-*
“*lia*, whether he bore the
“Prostitutions of his Wife,
“or relinquished the Daugh-
“ter of *Augustus*.” Thus
Fortune used *Caractacus*,
quem multa ambigua, multa
prospera extulerant, ut cete-
ros Britannorum Imperatores
præmineret. Ann. 12. “*Ca-*
“*ractacus*, who surpassed in
“Credit all the other *British*

“Commanders, was a Man
“renowned for many Vic-
“tories and many Disasters.”
And thus she used that Ro-
man General, whose Distres-
ses as well as Prosperities had
rendered him intrepid. *Cæ-*
cina secundarum ambigua-
rumque rerum ferens, eoque
interritus. Ann. 1.

* In this Sense *Diogenes*
said, That it was necessary to
have rude Enemies,

dolphus Petrucci Prince of *Siena* employed in the Government of his State rather those whom he had suspected, than others. But as this Matter cannot be treated of in a general manner, because it varies according to particular Circumstances, I shall only say, That if those who opposed the Prince in the Beginning of his Government, are such as want the Support of others, he will hardly find any Difficulty to gain them; and they will be the more obliged to serve him with Fidelity, as they know it is only their good Carriage that can remove the unfavourable Opinion he had of them. Thus will

to be done at a public Market. The Liberality of a King of *Poland* removes all Opposition: He has it in his Power to gain over the great Families by Palatinates, Governments, and other Employments, which he confers upon them; but as in point of Favours the *Poles* have a very short Memory, he will often be obliged to return to the Charge: In a Word, the Republick of *Poland* may be compared to the Sieve of the *Danaids*; the most generous King will shower his Favours upon them to no Purpose; they will never be full. Nevertheless, as a King of *Poland* has a great many Favours to bestow, he may keep many Resources in Store, by being liberal only to those Families whose Assistance he has need of.

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will the Prince always receive more Benefit by them, than by others, who serving him with more Security, commonly neglect his Affairs^d. This Subject will not suffer me to omit reminding the Prince, who has newly acquired a Country by means of the Inhabitants, to consider well upon what Motive they acted in assisting him; whether they were guided by any natural Affection to his Person, or only by Pique and Animosity against the former Government.

Machiavel's third Question properly regards the Security of a Prince in a hereditary Kingdom; Whether it is better for such a one to promote Unity or Division among his Subjects? Possibly there might have been room for this Question at *Florence* in the Time of *Machiavel's* Ancestors; but at present I do not think any Politician would adopt it, blunt and indigested as it is, without some Mitigation. It would be sufficient to quote here the beautiful and well-known Fable of *Menenius Agrippa*, by which he restored Unity among the *Roman* People, Commonwealths indeed ought to encourage a sort of

^d Thus *Marius Celsus*, who was *Galba's* faithful Friend to the last, proved afterwards as faithful to *Otho*. *Marium Celsum Conf. Galbæ usque in extremas res amicum fide-* que. Hist. 1. *Otho intra intimos habuit. — Mansitque Celso velut fataliter etiam pro Othone fides integra.* Ibid.

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ment. In this last Case it will cost him infinite Trouble and Difficulty to keep them his Friends, because it will be impossible for him to content them: If we look either into modern or antient Examples, we shall find the Reason of this to be, that it is much easier for a Prince to gain the Friendship of those who lived quietly under the former Government, and consequently were his Enemies, than of such as were discontent, and therefore became his Friends, and helped to make him Master of that State.

It has been a Custom among Princes, for the greater Security of their Dominions, to build of Jealousy between their Members, because if one Party does not watch over another, their Form of Government will be changed into a Monarchy.

There are Princes who look upon a Misunderstanding between their Ministers as necessary for their Interest: They fancy they are less in Danger of being imposed upon by Men whom a mutual Hatred

e Multi odio praesentium, et agitantur, sine publicâ curâ. cupidine mutationis. Ann. 3. Hist. 1. "Several are influenced by their private Actions by their Hatred Views and Hopes, without any Concern about the Publick."
"Change." Privatas spes

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build Fortresses, in order to bridle and overawe the Mutinous, and to have a sure Place of Refuge in Times of Rebellion. I approve of this Method, as it is of old Standing. Nevertheless in our own Times *Nicolas Vitelli* thought fit to demolish two Fortresses in the City of *Castello*, in order to preserve that Place. *Guidubaldo* Duke of *Urbino*, having recovered his Dutchy, of which he had been dispossessed by *Cæsar Borgia*, demolished all the Fortresses of that Province, thinking it would be more difficult to dispossess him a second time, if his State was not guarded with

Hatred obliges to watch over one another's Actions. But if this Hatred produces such an Effect, it likewise produces one of a very dangerous Kind; for whereas these Ministers ought to concur in serving their Prince, it happens that, while they study to hurt, they continually thwart one another, and confound the Interest of their Sovereign, as well as the Good of the People, in their particular Quarrels. Nothing contributes more to the Strength of a Monarchy, than a close and inseparable Union between

^fHe says, Chap. 24, Book III. of his Discourses, that the Duke of *Urbino* demolished them, because being beloved by his Subjects, he was afraid of losing their Af-

fection, by shewing any Distrust of them; and besides, he was not able to defend these Fortresses against his Enemies, without having an Army in the Field.

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with Citadels: And the *Bentivoglio's* did the like after their Return to *Bologna* g.

Fortresses therefore are useful or not, according to the State of Affairs; and if in some Cases they do Good, they do as much Mischief in others. A Prince, for Example, who is more afraid of his Subjects, than of his Neighbours, should build Fortresses: But he

between all its Members; and to settle this ought to be the Purpose of every wise Prince.

My Answer to *Machiavel's* third Question may in some measure serve as a Solution to his fourth Problem. Let us however examine in a few Words, Whether a Prince ought to foment Factions against himself, or whether he ought to gain the Affection and Friendship of his Subjects? A Man who makes Enemies in order to overcome them; what else does he but raise up Monsters for himself to contend with? It is more agreeable to Nature, Reason and Humanity, to make Friends: Happy are the Princes who know the Charms of Friendship! more happy still are those, who deserve the Love and Affection of their People!

I come now to *Machiavel's* last Question, viz. Whether a Prince ought to have Fortresses and Citadels,

* The *Bentivoglio's* grew
wise at the Expence of Pope
Julius II. who having built
a Citadel at *Bologna*, and ap-
pointed a Governor who

caused many of the Citizens
to be assassinated, lost both
that and the Town, as soon
as the Townsmen took Arms.
Ibid.

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he who fears his Neighbours more than his Subjects, ought to dispense with them. The Castle which *Francis Sforza* built at *Milan*, has done and will do more Mischief to the Family of *Sforza*, than any Disorder whatever in that Stateⁿ. There is no better Fortrefs, than not to be hated by the

tadels, or whether he ought to demolish them? As to what concerns petty Princes, I think I have given my Opinion on this Head in the tenth Chapter. Let us now consider it with regard to Kings. In *Machiavel's* Time the World was in a general Ferment; the Spirit of Revolt and Sedition prevailed every-where; there was nothing to be seen but Factions and Tyrants: Frequent Revolutions obliged Princes to build Citadels upon the Emi-

Because the *Sforza's* became more bold, and consequently more violent. If you build Fortresses, says *Machiavel*, in the same Chapter, you will find them serviceable in Time of Peace, because they make you more bold in oppressing your Subjects: But in Time of War they will be of no Advantage; for they will be attacked both by your Enemies and your Subjects, and cannot possibly hold out against both.—If you would recover a State that is lost, it

will never be done by Fortresses, unless you have an Army strong enough to fight your Enemy who has dispossessed you. Now, if you have such an Army, you will be able to recover your State without any Fortresses at all. As for the Castle of *Milan*, *Machiavel* adds, that in Time of Distress it was of no Service either to the *Sforza's* or the *French*, but on the contrary did them hurt; as it made both neglect to treat the People better.

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the People: Nor will any Fortrefs be fufficient to protect you, if the People are your Enemies, becaufe they will no fooner take Arms but Foreigners will come in to their Affiftance. In our Times we have not feen any Instance of the Advantage of thefe Fortreffes, except

Eminences of Towns, in order to bridle the reftlefs Difpofition of the Inhabitants.

Since that barbarous Age, whether it be that Men are grown weary of destroying one another, or rather that Sovereigns have a more abfolute Power over their Subjects, we do not hear fo much of Revolts and Seditions; and that turbulent Spirit, after having fufficiently fatigued itfelf, may be faid to be reduced at prefent to a State of Tranquillity; fo that there is no further Occafion for Citadels to fecure the Fidelity of Towns and Provinces. It is not fo with regard to fuch Fortifications as are defigned againft foreign Enemies, and as a further Security to the State.

Armies and Fortreffes are of equal Service to Princes; for their Armies, in cafe they are worfted, may retire under the Cannon of their Fortreffes; and if the Enemy attempts the Siege of them, the Prince has Time to recover himfelf, and to levy new Troops, with which and the reft, he may raife the Siege.

In the late Wars in *Flanders* between the Emperor and *France*, hardly any Progreff was made, by reafon of the Multitude of ftrong Places in that Country: Victories won by an Army of a Hun-

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except one: The Countess of *Furli** after the Murder of Count *Jerom*† her Husband, was able, by means of her Citadel, to withstand the Fury of the Populace, till Succours arrived from *Milan*, and re-established her in the Government: And such was the State of Affairs at that Time, that Foreigners were not

Hundred thousand Men over another equally numerous, were only followed by the Surrender of a Town or two. By the next Campaign the Enemy, having had Time to repair their Losses, appeared again in the very Field where they had been defeated, and disputed a Victory which had been decided the Year before. In a Country that abounds with fortified Places, Armies numerous enough to cover two Miles of Ground may make War for thirty Years together; and if they are prosperous, may gain after twenty Battles a Country ten Miles in Compass. In an open Country it is quite otherwise; a Battle, or a Campaign or two, terminates the War, and makes the Conqueror Master of whole Kingdoms. *Alexander, Caesar, Gergisckam, Charles XII.* owed their Glory to their meeting with few fortified Places in the Countries they subdued. The Conqueror of the *Indies* made but two Sieges in all his glorious Campaigns; the
Arbiter

**Catharine Sforza*, Daughter of *Francis*, and Sister of *Lewis the Moor*, both Dukes of *Milan*.

†*Jerom Reari* Nephew of Pope *Sixtus IV.*

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not in a Condition to assist the People. But afterwards, when she was attacked by *Cæsar Borgia*, who was joined by her own Subjects, she found it had been more prudent Conduct, both at that Time and before, to have gained the Good-will of the People, than to have depended upon Fortresses. Upon the Whole, I approve of those who build Fortresses, and of those who do not; but I must needs blame those who trust so much to them, as to make but little Account of being hated by their Subjects.

Arbiter of *Poland* never made more. *Eugene, Villars, Marlborough, Luxemburg*, were great Generals; but the Brightness of their Successes and Glory was damped, as it were, by the Number of Fortresses they met with. The *French* are very sensible of the Usefulness of Fortresses; for from *Brabant* to *Dauphiny* there runs, as it were, a double Ridge of strong Places: The Frontier of *France* towards *Germany* resembles the open Jaws of a Lion, guarded with two Rows of dreadful Teeth, that seem prepared to devour every thing. This may suffice to shew the great Usefulness of fortified Towns.

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CHAP. XXI.

*How a Prince ought to act in order
to gain Reputation.*

Nothing makes a Prince so highly esteemed, as great Enterprizes, and giving signal Proofs of his Abilities. We have in our Days an Example of this in *Ferdinand* King of *Arragon*, the present King of *Spain*, who may not improperly be called a new Prince, as having from a small and weak King become, for Reputation and
Glory,

OBSERVATIONS.

This Chapter of *Machiavel* contains some Lessons that are good, and some that are bad. I shall first point out his Errors, and confirm what is just and commendable in him; and afterwards venture to give my own Sentiments upon some Things that have a natural Connection with this Subject.

Our Author proposes the Conduct of *Ferdinand* of *Arragon*, and of *Bernard* of *Milan*, as a Pattern to those who would distinguish themselves by great Enterprizes, and by Actions that are singular and extraordinary.

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Glory, the first Monarch in *Christendom*. If we consider his Exploits, we shall find them all great and remarkable, and some of them extraordinary. In the Beginning of his Reign, he invaded the Kingdom of *Granada*, and that Enterprize was the Foundation of his Grandeur: He began it leisurely, and without any Suspicion of meeting with Obstacles; he kept the Barons of *Castile* employed in that Service, and so intent upon the War, that they had no Leisure to think of Innovations; whilst in the mean time he got Reputation,

Machiavel hunts after the Marvellous, both with regard to the Boldness of the Enterprizes, and to the Rapidity of their Execution. That may be great, I own; but can only be commendable so far as the Enterprize of the Conqueror is just. "You who boast of exterminating Robbers, said the Scythian Embassadors to *Alexander*, are yourself the greatest of all Robbers; for you have conquered no Nation which you have not plundered: If you are a God, you should be beneficent to Mortals, and not strip them of what they lawfully enjoy; if a Man, remember what you are."

Ferdinand of *Arragon* was not always content with making War; but often employed Religion as a Veil to cover his Designs; and made no Scruple to profane the Sanctity of Oaths; Justice was in all

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putation, and ere they were aware, increased his Authority over them. He found out a way to maintain his Army, at the Expence of the Church and the People, and by the Length of that War to establish such Order and Discipline among his Troops, that afterwards they gained him many glorious Victories. Besides, to prepare himself for greater Enterprizes, *Ferdinand*, always making Religion his Pretence, had Recourse to a sort of pious Cruelty, and plundered and banished all the *Jews*; nor could there be a more deplorable, or more signal Instance of his Conduct

his Professions, but Injustice and Violence in all his Actions. In his Conduct *Machiavel* commends every thing that others blame in it.

Our Author produces in the next Place the Example of *Bernard of Milan*, to insinuate that Princes ought to reward and punish in some conspicuous manner, in order that all their Actions may bear a Stamp of Grandeur and Excellence. Generous Princes will never fail to get Reputation; especially if their Generosity proceeds from a Greatness of Mind, and not from Self-love; the Goodness of their Hearts may alone make them greater than all other Qualities. *There is nothing greater in your Fortune, said Cicero to Caesar, than the Power of saving so many Citizens; nor is there any thing more worthy of your Goodness, than the Will to do it. The Punish-*

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Conduct than this. Under the same Cloak of Religion, he invaded *Africa*, made his Expedition into *Italy*, and has now at length attacked *France*. Thus *Ferdinand* has been continually employed in some Attempt, which always kept the Minds of his Subjects in Suspense and Admiration, and busied in attending to the Event: And these Enterprizes have so grown out of one another, that the People have never had Time to rest, or to plot against him.

It is likewise of great Advantage to a Prince, to give Proofs of his Abilities in his Administration at home (such as are related of *Bernard*

Punishments therefore which a Prince inflicts, should be less than the Offence, and the Rewards which he bestows greater than the Service he receives.

But here follows a downright Contradiction. In this Chapter our Political Doctor would have Princes observe their Alliances, and in the eighteenth Chapter he expressly discharges them from their Engagements. He acts like those Fortune-tellers, who say White to some, and Black to others.

If thus far *Machiavel* reasons ill, his Observations are just concerning the Prudence with which Princes ought to avoid engaging, upon slight Occasions, with others who are more powerful, and who instead of succouring would oppress them. This Maxim was well known to a great

Bernard Lord of *Milan*^a), when he wants a Man to perform something in the Government that is either signally good, or signally wicked; and to find some Means of rewarding or punishing him, that may be much talked of in the World. But especially the Prince should endeavour in all his Actions to aim at a Reputation of Greatness and Excellence^b. A Prince is likewise much esteemed when he shews himself a true Friend, or a true Enemy: By a true Enemy I mean one who without Hesitation openly declares in favour of one Party against another, which is
always

Prince in *Germany*, equally esteemed by his Friends and Enemies: Whilst this Prince with all his Troops assisted the Emperor upon the *Rhine*, in the War against *France*, the *Swedes* invaded his Dominions. His Ministers, upon the News of this sudden Irruption, advised him to call in the Czar to his Assistance: But having more Penetration than his Ministers,

^a And those which *Philip de Comines* relates of *Lewis XI.* his Master. He dealt in Punishments, says that Author, to make himself feared, and that he might not lose the Obedience of his People. He would displace Statesmen, cashier Officers, retrench Pen-

sions, and make and unmake whom he pleased, and was more talked of in France than any King whatever. Mem. Book III. Chap. 8.

^b *Præcipua rerum ad famam dirigenda*, says *Tacitus*, Ann. 4. "One of the main Designs of a Prince in all his

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always better Policy than standing neuter: For when two of your powerful Neighbours are at War, they are either so strong, that you have Reason to be afraid of the Victor, or they are not. Now in both Cases it is most prudent to declare yourself, and to make a fair War: For if you stand neuter, you will always fall a Prey to the Victor; and it will be a great Pleasure to the Vanquished, to see you his Fellow-sufferer: Nor will you meet with Pity or Protection; for the Victor will have no suspected Friends, and such as will not assist him in his Misfortunes; and

nisters, he answered, That the *Russians* were a sort of Boars whose Chains it was dangerous to take off, lest it should be impossible to put them on again; and therefore he generously resolved to be his own Avenger, and had no Cause to repent his Resolution. If I was to live in the next Age, I should certainly mention this Article of History, with suitable Reflections; but it is not for me to judge of the Conduct of modern Princes: and in Affairs of this World a Man should know where to speak and where to be silent.

S 3

The

his Conduct should be to Ornament to every thing he
 "gain himself Reputation." says or does. *Omnium quæ*
 Like *Mucianus*, he should *diceret, aut ageret, arte quâ*
 give a sort of Grace and *dam ostentator.* Hist. 2,

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and the Vanquished will not receive you, because you would not take Arms, and with him expose yourself to the Chance of War.

Antiochus, upon the Invitation of the *Etolians*, passed into *Greece*, in order to expel the *Romans*; and sent Embassadors to persuade the *Achaians*, who were then in Alliance with the *Romans*, to observe a Neutrality: On the other hand, the *Romans* sent to persuade them to take Arms on their Side: The Affair was debated in the Council of *Achaia*; where the Embassador sent by *Antiochus* pressing them to stand neuter, the *Roman* Embassador replied: *As for what he endeavours to persuade you, that it is most useful, and most consistent with the Interest of your State,*
not

The Subject of Neutrality is as well handled by *Machiavel*, as that of Alliances. Long Experience has shewn, that a Prince who stands neuter, exposes his Country to the Depredations of both the contending Parties, that his Dominions become the Theatre of War, and that he is sure to lose on the one hand by a Neutrality, without ever being able to make any solid Acquisition on the other. There are two ways by which a King may aggrandize himself; one by Conquest, when a warlike Prince by the Force of Arms extends the

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not to engage in the War between us, nothing can be more prejudicial to you; for if you declare on neither Side, you will be sure to fall a Prey to that which conquers, without any Merit with them, or Reputation to yourselves c. And it will always happen, that he who is not your Friend, will intreat you to stand neuter, and that he who is, will press you to declare yourself, and to take Arms for him. Imprudent Princes, to avoid some present Danger, commonly take

the Limits of his Empire; the other by good Government, when an industrious Prince encourages all the Arts and Sciences, and by making them flourish, renders his Dominions more powerful, and better regulated. As this whole Book treats only of the first way of aggrandizing a Prince, I shall say something here of the second, which is much more innocent and just than the other, and not less useful.

S 4

The

** Quippe sine dignitate pretium victoris eritis.* Livius, Book 35. "You will be the Booty of the Victor, without any Reputation to yourselves". No Prince should stand neuter between two Neighbours at War, but when he is more powerful than either

of them; for in this Case he can make himself Arbitrator of their Differences whenever he pleases. Neutralities are always prejudicial to petty Princes: So that you must either be strongest yourself, or side with the strongest.

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take the neutral Way, and are commonly undone by it. But when you boldly declare for one Party, though the Prince to whom you adhere is more powerful than yourself, and therefore has you at his Discretion, if he overcomes, yet he is connected with you both by Obligation and Friendship: And Men are never so dishonest, as to oppress, with the most shameful Ingratitude, those who have obliged them. Besides, Victories are never so clear and complete, as to disengage the Victor from all Considerations, and especially from those of Justice. But if your Confederate is worsted, he will be sure to receive, and to assist you, when he can, and you become the Companion of his Fortune, which may possibly be retrieved.

In

The Arts that are most necessary in Life, are Agriculture, Commerce, and Manufactures: Those that do most Honour to the Mind of Man are Geometry, Philosophy, Astronomy, Eloquence, Poetry, Painting, Musick, Sculpture, Architecture, Engraving, and the other polite Arts.

As the Nature of Countries is very different, so there are some whose Riches and Strength depend upon Agriculture, others upon Vineyards, some upon Manufactures, and others upon Commerce; and in some few Countries we see all these Arts flourish

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In the second Case, when the contending Parties are not of such Strength, that you have Reason to fear the Conqueror, you ought in Prudence to declare yourself the sooner; because by assisting one, you contribute to the Ruin of the other, whom your Confederate, had he been wise, ought rather to have preserved; and as, with your Assistance, he must needs overcome, he must, of Course, lie at your Mercy. Here it is to be observed, that a Prince should always beware of associating with one who is stronger than himself, in an offensive War, unless he is compelled to it by Necessity, as I said before *: For if your Associate overcomes, you are

flourish together. Princes therefore who chuse this mild and amiable way of increasing their Power, will be obliged to study the particular Nature of their Country, in order to know which of those Arts is most likely to thrive in it, and consequently which of them they ought most to encourage. The *French* and *Spaniards* have at length perceived their want of Trade, and therefore have contrived to ruin the Trade of the *English*: If they succeed, *France* will increase its Power more considerably by this means, than by the Conquest of twenty Towns, and a thousand

Vil-

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are wholly at his Discretion; and there is nothing which Princes ought more carefully to avoid, than exposing themselves to the Discretion of others. The *Venetians*, without any real Necessity, associated with *France* against the Duke of *Milan*, and this Association was the Cause of their Ruin. But when such a Step cannot be avoided, as happened to the *Florentines*, when the Pope and the King of *Spain* sent their Armies to invade *Lombardy*; the Prince, in this Case, ought to associate, for the Reasons above-mentioned. Nor let any Prince or State imagine, that in such Cases they can take a sure and infallible Course: For there is not any

Villages; and *England* and *Holland*, the two finest and richest Countries in the World, will dwindle away by Degrees, like a Man who is continually dying of a Consumption.

In Countries whose Riches consist in Corn and Vineyards, two things are to be considered: In the first place, it is necessary to grub up all the untilled Land, that there may hardly be a single Spot of Ground which does not yield something: In the next place, Care must be taken to increase the Sale of that natural Produce, to make the Transportation of such Merchandizes cheap and easy, and to be able to sell them at low Prices.

As

any Course whatever, but is doubtful and hazardous; and such is the Condition of all Affairs, that there is no Possibility to avoid one Inconvenience without running into another: It is the Part of a wise Man to know the Nature of Inconveniencies and Dangers, and always to make Choice of the least ^d.

A Prince ought besides to shew himself a Lover of all the valuable Arts, and to honour those who excel in them. Nor must he neglect to encourage his Subjects in their several Employments, and especially in Merchandize and Agriculture; that finding themselves

As for Manufactures of all kinds, these, perhaps, of all other things, are the most useful and profitable, as they provide not only for the Necessities, but for the Luxury of your Inhabitants, impose upon your Neighbours a sort of Tribute to your Industry, and, while they hinder the exporting of your own, promote the importing of foreign Coin.

I

^d He who waits for all Conveniencies, (says *Machiavel*, Book II. of his History) either undertakes nothing, or miscarries in all his Undertakings. I have observed in all Affairs of this World, says another *Italian*

Politician, that nothing more precipitates a Man into Dangers, than too much Care to avoid them, and that too much Prudence commonly degenerates into Imprudence. Father *Paul*.

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selves secure and unmolested, they may neither forbear to improve their Estates, through the Apprehension of losing them, nor to enlarge their Trade, for fear of Impositions *: Nay, he ought to propose Rewards to be bestowed on those who set any Improvements on foot, for enriching his Dominions. Besides in, the proper Season of the Year, the People ought to be entertained with Festivals and publick Shews e; and as every City is divided either into

I have always believed, that the want of Manufactures partly occasioned those prodigious Transmigrations of People from the North, of those *Goths* and *Vandals*, who so often over-run the Southern Countries. In those early Times, no Art was known in *Sweden*, *Denmark*, or the greatest Part of *Germany*, except Agriculture and Hunt-

* Sir William Temple justly observes, that Trade never flourishes in a despotick Government, because no Man is sure of long enjoying his Property; whereas the Loss of it is not to be apprehended in a free State. Whereupon he concludes, that a Republick seems to be much more proper than a Monarchical Government, for cultivating and preserving Trade; witness *Tyre*, *Car-*

thage, *Athens*, *Syracuse*, *Agrigentum*, and *Rhodes*, where it began to decline, as soon as those Cities fell into the Hands of an absolute Prince. See Chap. 6. of his Observations upon the *Netherlands*.

e Thus the *Romans*, as *Tacitus* observes, subdued Nations rather by Voluptuousness than by Arms. *Voluptatibus, quibus Romani plus adversus subjectos, quam armis*

into Companies or Wards, the Prince should have a Value for these several Societies, be sometimes present at their Entertainments, and give Instances of his Goodness and Magnificence,

Hunting: Arable Lands were divided among a certain Number of Proprietors, who tilled them, and whom they were sufficient to subsist. But as the Race of Men has always been very fertile in those cold Climates, it soon happened, that they had twice as many Inhabitants as could subsist by Agriculture: Whereupon the younger Sons of good Families herded together, and were forced by Necessity to become illustrious Robbers, to invade and plunder other Countries, and dispossess their Proprietors. Accordingly we find, that both in the Eastern and Western Empire, those Barbarians

armis valent. Hist. 4: And particularly Agricola; who, by introducing Luxury and Voluptuousness among the Britons, dissolved the fierce Courage of that Nation to such a Degree, that they gave the Names of Politeness and Humanity to what was really Part of their Servitude. Ut homines dispersi ac rudes, eoque bello feroces, quieti & otio per voluptates assuescerent.—Idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset. Tacit. in Agricola.

† As Augustus did. *Indulserat ei ludicro Augustus—neque ipse abhorrebat talibus studiis, & civile rebatur misceri voluptatibus vulgi.* Ann. 1. “Augustus had countenanced the Players in the Roman Games, and their Art; nor indeed had he any Aversion to those favourite Amusements of the Populace; he rather judged it an acceptable Courtesy to mingle with the Multitude in their Pleasures.” For the People, who are fond of their Pleasures, are de-

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nificence, but always keeping up the Majesty of his Rank; for that must never be laid aside upon any Occasion.

barians commonly demanded nothing but Lands to cultivate for their Subsistence. The Northern Countries are not less populous at present, than they were in those Days: But Luxury, as it has wisely multiplied our Wants, so it has produced Manufactures, and all those Arts, that support and maintain whole Nations, who would otherwise be forced to seek their Subsistence elsewhere.

These ways of rendering a State prosperous and flourishing, are, as it were, Talents that are trusted with the Wisdom of Sovereigns, and which they must always put to Use, and improve. The surest Proof we can have, that a Country is under a wise and happy Government, is when the polite Arts spring up and flourish in it. These are Flowers that

delighted to find the Prince their Companion in them. *Ut est vulgus cupiens voluptatum, &c., si eodem Princeps trahat, letum.* Ann. 14. And thus did Vitellius: *Comitia Consulium cum candidatis civiliter celebrans, omnem infimæ plebis rumorem in theatro, ut spectator; in circo, ut fautor, affectavit.* Hist. 2. "Vitellius, in holding the Assemblies for creating Consuls, assisted with great Moderation, and behaved towards the Candidates as their Equal.

"Nay, he studied to gain the good Graces and Applause of the Rabble, whom he courted by frequenting the Theatre as a Spectator among them, and the Circus as a Partizan."

"Ita ut nec illi, aut facilitas auctoritatem, aut severitas amorem diminuat. In Agricola. "His Complaisance must neither weaken his Authority, nor his Severity make him less amiable."

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that never fail to bloom in a rich Soil, and a happy Climate; but that wither and die off, when the Soil is barren, or the Air tempestuous.

Nothing makes a Reign more illustrious, than when Arts flourish under its Protection. The Age of *Pericles* is as famous for the Men of Genius who then lived at *Athens*, as for the Battles which were then fought by the *Athenians*. That of *Augustus* is more remarkable for producing *Cicero*, *Ovid*, *Horace* and *Virgil*, than for the Proscriptions of that cruel Emperor, who, after all, owes great Part of his Reputation to the Writings of *Horace*, and the Esteem that is had for them. That of *Lewis XIV.* is more illustrious for the *Corneilles*, *Racines*, *Molieres*, *Boileaus*, *Descartes*, *Le Bruns*, and *Girardons*, whom it produced, than for the marvellous Passage of the *Rhine*, which has been so much exaggerated, than for those Sieges where *Lewis* himself was present, and for the Battle of *Turin*, which Marshal *Marsin*, by Order of the Cabinet Council, made the Duke of *Orleans* lose.

When Princes distinguish and reward Men of uncommon Merit, when they encourage those superior Genius's who devote themselves to the perfecting of our Knowledge, and the Discovery and Improvement of Truth, they do Honour to human Nature. Happy are those Sovereigns who themselves cultivate the Sciences, and who think with *Cicero*, that *Roman* Consul, who was the Saviour of his Country, and the Father of Eloquence, " These are Studies that form and
 " improve us in our younger Years, and soften
 " and chear us in our old Age; they adorn us
 " in Prosperity, and comfort and relieve us in
 " Ad-

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“ Adversity ; whether we are at home or abroad,
 “ in the World or in Solitude, at all Times and
 “ in all Places, these are the Delights and Em-
 “ bellishments of our Life.”

Laurence of Medicis, the greatest Man of his Nation, was the Peace-maker of *Italy*, and the Restorer of the Sciences. His Probity procured him the general Confidence of all the Princes of his Age. *Marcus Aurelius*, one of the greatest Emperors of *Rome*, was not a less fortunate Warrior than wise Philosopher ; and joined the Practice of the severest Morality, with the Profession he made of it. Let us conclude with these Words :
 † When a King in all his Actions is guided by Justice, the Universe is his Temple, and every virtuous Man his Priest.

C H A P. XXII.

Of the Secretaries of Princes.

THE chusing of Ministers is not an Affair of little Importance ; and the Choice is either well or ill made, according to the Wisdom of the Prince : The first Judgment that is passed of his Capacity, is from those who are about his Person :
 When

* *Tacitus* observes, that Omen of his future Reign ; the Choice which *Nero* made as it shewed, that a Door was of *Corbulo* for his General, now open for Merit, and was looked upon as a happy that *Nero* employed good Coun.

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When they are Men of Parts and Fidelity, you may always infer that he is a wise Prince, because he has been able to know their Worth^b, and to keep them faithful. But when

OBSERVATIONS.

There are two sorts of Princes in the World ; those who see with their own Eyes, and govern their Dominions themselves ; and those who trust to the Integrity of their Ministers, and suffer themselves to be governed by such as have got an
T Ascen-

Counsellors. *Daturum plané documentum, honestis, an secus, amicis uteretur, si ducem egregium, quam si pecuniosum, & gratiâ subnixum deligeret.* And a few Lines after, *Læti---quod Domitium Corbulonem præposuerat, videbaturque locus virtutibus patefactus.* Ann. 13. "The Senate sincerely rejoiced, that for the Re-conquest of Armenia, Nero had preferred Domitius Corbulo, whence a Door seemed to be opened for the Reward of Virtue and Merit." And, methinks, (says Philip de Comines, Chap. 3. Book II. of his Memoirs) one of the greatest Proofs a Prince can give of his good Sense, is to employ about his Person

Men of Virtue and Honesty ; for the World will believe, that he is of the same Disposition and Nature with those who are near him. It was for this Reason the Prince of Orange said, That one might judge of the Cruelty of Philip II. King of Spain, by the many Cruelties which the Duke of Alva committed with Impunity in the Netherlands.

^b For as one can never judge well of a Statuary, Painter, or Sculptor, without being Master of his Art, so none but a wise Man can discover the Wisdom of another. *Ut enim de pictore, sculptore, fictore, ni artifex judicare, ita nisi sapiens non potest perspicere sapientem.* Plin. Ep. 10. Lib. I.

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when they are not, you may always conceive an unfavourable Opinion of him; for in the very first thing he did, which was chusing his Ministers, he committed an Error. There was no Man who knew *Anthony da Venefro* to be the Minister of *Pandolphus Petrucci*, Prince of *Siena*, but judged that *Pandolphus* was a very wise Prince, because he had such a Minister. Now the Capacities of Men may be divided into three Classes: Some understand things of themselves; others understand as much as is explained to them; and others neither understand of themselves, nor by any Explanation. The first sort of Capacity is excellent, the second commendable, and the

Ascendant over them. Sovereigns of the first sort, are the Life and Soul of their Dominions; the Weight of their Government rests upon themselves, like the World upon the Shoulders of *Atlas*; they regulate Affairs both foreign and domestick; and fill at once the Posts of first Magistrate of Justice, of General of the Armies, and of High Treasurer. In Imitation of the Supreme Being,

An antient Poet says, *Laudatissimus est, qui per se cuncta videbit. Sed laudandus & is, qui paret recta monenti.* He who sees things himself, is highly to be commended: And he deserves Commendation likewise, who follows the good Advice of others.

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the third quite useless. One must therefore necessarily agree, that if *Pandolphus* was not of the first Class, he was of the second: For when a Prince has Judgment enough to know the Good or the Bad in the Words or Actions of others, though he has no Invention himself, yet he knows the good and bad Actions of his Minister; he rewards the one, and punishes the other; and the Minister, as he cannot hope to impose upon him, will continue to act honestly ^d.

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Being, who employs Intelligences superior to Men, in the Execution of his Will, they have Men of Penetration and Industry, to execute their Designs, and to accomplish every particular Part of what they have projected in general; and their Ministers are properly no more than the Tools and Utenfils of a skilful Artificer.

Sovereigns of the other kind, for want of Genius, or from a natural Indolence, are plunged in a sort of lethargick Indifference. If the State, ready to sink, because of the Imbecillity of the Sovereign, must be supported by the Wisdom and Application of the Minister, the Sovereign is

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nothing

^d For this Reason *Sejanus*, who well knew the Ability and Penetration of *Tiberius*, at first endeavoured to gain the Reputation of a wise and

faithful Counsellor. *Sejanus, incipiente adhuc potentiâ, bonis consiliis notescere volebat.*
Ann. 4.

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To distinguish between a good and a bad Minister, there is one Rule that never fails. When you see that your Minister thinks more of himself than of you, and that all his Actions have a private Tendency to his own Advantage; you may always conclude, that he is a bad Minister, and that you can never repose any Confidence in him: For he who has the nothing but a Shadow, though a necessary one, because he represents the State; we can only wish that he may make a happy Choice.

It is not so easy a Matter as is imagined, for a Sovereign to sound the Disposition and pry into the Characters of those whom he would employ; and as, on the one hand, a Prince can hardly conceal his most secret Thoughts from the Eyes of the Publick; so, on the other, a private Man may easily disguise himself before the Prince, and elude his Penetration. If *Sixtus Quintus* could impose upon seventy

* After *Sejanus* had exposed his Life to save *Tiberius*, in a Cave at a Villa, thence called *Spelunca*, *Tacitus* says, that *Tiberius* put an intire Confidence in him, as a Man who had been more careful of the Prince's Life than of his own. *Major ex eo, &c. ut non sui anxius, cum fide audiebatur.* Ann. 4. And *Tigellinus*, to undo his Rivals, alledged to *Nero*, that

he was not in the same Case with *Burrhus*, who had several Pretensions and Hopes, whereas all his Ambition was to watch over the Safety of the Prince. *Non se, ut Burrhum, diversas spes, sed solam incolumitatem Neronis spectare.* Ann. 14. All Ministers make the same Professions, but their Hearts and their Actions often give their Mouths the Lye.

Dominions of a Prince in his Management, ought never to mind his own, or any Interest, but that of the Prince; nor to entertain him with any Discourse that is foreign to it. The Prince, on the other hand, to keep his Minister faithful, ought to have as much

seventy Cardinals, who ought to have perfectly known his Character, how much easier must it be for a private Man to impose upon his Prince, who has not so many Opportunities of observing him? The Prince, indeed, if he is a Man of Parts, may easily judge of the Parts of those whom he would employ; but as for their Integrity and Fidelity, it is scarce possible to discover them beforehand. How many Men have appeared virtuous, only for want of an Opportunity

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to

For this Reason *Tiberius* turned a Senator into Ridicule, who pretended to discourse in the Senate of the private Affairs of his own Family. *Nec ideo à majoribus concessum est, egredi aliquando relationem, & quod in commune conducit loco sententiae proferre, ut privata negotia, res familiares nostras hic augeamus. — Efflagitatio intempestiva & improvisa, cum aliis de rebus conveniunt patres, consurgere.* Ann. 2. *Our Ancestors, when they permitted any Man*

“ to depart from the Que-
“ stion, permitted it in or-
“ der to hear some Affair of
“ greater Importance to the
“ State, and not that we
“ might in the Senate talk
“ of our domestic Affairs,
“ and seek to augment our
“ private Rents. But this,
“ indeed, is not a Petition
“ of *Hortatulus*; it is a De-
“ mand made against Order,
“ and made by Surprise;
“ whilst you are assembled
“ upon other Affairs, he
“ stands up, and interrupts
“ your Proceeding.”

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much Regard for his Interest, to honour him, enrich him, attach him to himself, and confer such Dignities and Employments upon him, that he may have no Occasion to desire more Wealth, or more Honour; and that, perceiving it would be scarce possible for him to keep, under another Master, what he enjoys

to shew their Wickedness? How many have renounced all Honesty, as soon as their Virtue was put to the Trial? *Tiberius, Nero, Caligula*, had no bad Reputation at *Rome*, before they ascended the Throne: But Opportunity ripened and displayed the Wickedness of their Nature, which perhaps would have otherwise produced no Effect.

There

“ This was *Tiberius's* Sense of the Matter, when he said to *Sejanus*, *Ipse, quid intra animum volutaverim, quibus adhuc necessitudinibus immiscere te mihi parem, omittam ad præsens referre. Id tantum aperiam, nihil esse tam excelsum, quod non virtutes istæ, tuusque in me animus, mereantur; datoque tempore, vel in senatu, vel in concione non reticebo.* Ann. 4. “ The “ secret and constant Pur-
“ poses of my Heart towards
“ you, and with what fur-
“ ther Ties of Affinity I am
“ contriving to bind you

“ still faster to me, I shall at
“ present forbear to men-
“ tion. Thus much only I
“ will declare, that there is
“ nothing so high, but those
“ Abilities, and your singular
“ Zeal and Fidelity towards
“ me, may justly claim; as,
“ when Opportunity pre-
“ sents, either in the Senate,
“ or in a popular Assembly,
“ I shall not fail to testify.”
Philip II. King of *Spain*, used
to say to *Ruy Gomez*, his first
Minister, *Do you mind my
Affairs, and I will mind
yours.*

enjoys by the Favour of the present, he may be afraid of suffering by any Change. When the Prince and his Minister act in this manner, they may always rely upon one another; but when they act otherwise, either the Minister or the Prince must needs be undone at last.

There are some Men who have great Wit, great Cunning, and many Talents, but are withal in their Nature full of Perfidy and Ingratitude; and there are others who possess all the Qualities of the Heart, without excelling so much in those of the Head. Wise Princes have commonly preferred the latter in domestick Employments, and the former in foreign Negotiations. For as at home it is only necessary to maintain Order and Justice, in this Case Honesty is sufficient; whereas, when there is occasion for persuading foreign Princes, and discovering the Intrigues of a neighbouring Court, Probity is not so much wanted, as Address and Penetration.

A Prince, methinks, can never sufficiently reward the Fidelity and Zeal of his Ministers: There is in our Nature some Sentiment of Justice, which, as it were, forces us to be grateful. Besides, the Interest of the Great absolutely requires that they reward with Generosity, as well as punish with Clemency. But certainly Ministers, when they perceive that Virtue will be the means of raising their Fortune, will never have recourse to Vice; and must naturally prefer the Bounty of their Master, to the Bribes of others. Prudence there-

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fore and Justice agree perfectly in this Point : And without question, it is not more ungenerous than imprudent in a Prince, to put the Fidelity of his Minister to a dangerous Trial, by neglecting to reward it.

There are some Princes who give into another Error, not less dangerous than the former ; they change their Ministers upon the slightest Occasions, and punish the least Irregularity in their Conduct with excessive Rigour. Ministers who are employed under the immediate Inspection of the Prince, when they have been some time in Place, cannot wholly conceal their Faults from him ; and the more he is penetrating, the sooner will he discover them. Sovereigns who are not Philosophers, quickly lose their Patience, take Offence at the Weaknesses of those who serve them, and disgrace and ruin them.

Princes who reason more profoundly, know Men better, and remember that they all bear some distinguishing Mark of Humanity ; that there is nothing perfect in this World ; that great Qualities are allayed, and, as it were, balanced, by as great Defects ; and that Men of Genius partake of both. For these Reasons, except in Cases of Prevarication, they continue their Ministers, with all their Faults, and prefer those whom they have tried and founded, to others who are new to them ; much in the same manner, as skilful Musicians chuse rather to play upon Instruments whose Excellencies and Defects they know, than upon others with whose Properties they are not acquainted.

C H A P. XXIII.

How Flatterers are to be avoided.

I Will not pass by one Error of very great Consequence, which it is hard for Princes to guard against, unless they have great Prudence and Discernment: It is that of suffering themselves to be flattered, of which we have numberless Instances in all Histories^a. For Men have commonly so much Self-love, and so easily impose upon themselves in their own Affairs, that it is

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O B S E R V A T I O N S.

There is not a single Book, moral or historical, where the Weakness of Princes, with regard to Flattery, is not severely censured. The World justly desires, that every Prince should love Truth, and be accustomed to hear it: But, as indeed it often happens, they expect things that are contradictory. They expect that Princes should have so much Self-love, as to be fond of Glory, and perform great Actions; and at the same time so much Self-denial, as willingly to renounce the Reward of their Atchievements: They would have them

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^a Adulation is an Evil as *id in republicâ malum*, says old as Government. *Vetus Tacitus*, Ann. 2.

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extremely difficult for them to escape this Contagion; and in endeavouring to escape it, they expose themselves to another Danger, which is that of falling into Contempt: For as there is no other way of guarding against Flattery, but letting Men know that they do not offend you by telling you the Truth; so, if every one has leave to tell it, you quickly lose Respect^b. Wherefore a prudent Prince ought to take a third way, which is that of chusing out of his Subjects a few wise Men, and permitting them only to declare the Truth to him, and only in such Things as he inquires of them, never suf-

endeavour to purchase Fame, and to despise it. This is expecting too much from human Nature: It is doing Princes great Honour, to suppose that they should have more Power over themselves, than over others.

Contemptus Virtutis ex contemptu famæ. There have been no Princes indifferent as to Fame, who were not voluptuous Men, abandoned to Sloth and Effeminacy, mere Lumps of some contemptible Substance, animated with no Virtue. Some cruel

^b For this Reason *Tiberius*, though he hated Flattery, could not suffer Freedom of Speech; so that it was scarce possible to know how

to speak to him. *Augusta & lubrica oratio sub Principe, qui libertatem metuebat, adulationem oderat.* Ann. 2.

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suffering them to talk to him of any thing else : But then he ought to be inquisitive about all Affairs, to listen to their Opinions, and afterwards take such a Resolution as is agreeable to his own Sentiments ; always behaving to each of them in such a manner, that they may find, the more freely they speak, the more they are acceptable to him *. As he ought to give Ear to none but them, so he should be slow to take his Resolution, but afterwards firm and inflexible in the Pursuit of it. The Prince who acts otherwise, must either be distressed by his Flatterers, or often change his Mind, according

cruel Tyrants, indeed, have loved Praise ; but in them it was an odious Vanity, and even a Vice, as they desired Esteem, whilst they deserved Infamy.

With vicious Princes, Flattery is a deadly Poison, which multiplies the Seeds of Vice : With those who have Merit, it is a sort of Rust, that sticks to their Glory, and diminishes the Lustre of it. A Man of Sense is immediately shocked at gross Adulation, and repels the unskilful Flatterer. There is another sort of Flattery, which aims at

* After the Example of *John II. King of Portugal*, who being asked by one of his Courtiers to bestow a

vacant Post upon him, answered, *I keep it for a Man that never flattered me.*

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ing to the Diversity of Opinions; and thus fall into Disesteem.

I shall here give one Example in our own Times: Father *Lucas*, speaking of his Master *Maximilian*, the present Emperor, said, *That his Majesty never consulted any body, and yet never did any thing his own way.* This proceeded from his acting contrary to what we have mentioned: For the Emperor is very reserved, communicates his Secrets to none, and takes nobody's Advice; But when his Designs are to be executed, and

extenuating the Faults of Princes by its sophistical Rhetorick, supplies them with Reasons for indulging their Passions, gives Justice the Character of Austerity, and draws so perfect a Resemblance between Generosity and Profusion, that it is hard to distinguish one from the other: This sort of Flattery would disguise Debauches under the Veil of Amusements and Pleasures, and is particularly intent upon amplifying the Vices of others, in order to erect a Trophy to its Hero. Most Men give

As weak Princes do;
*Ipse modo huc illuc, ut quem-
que suadentem audierat,
promptus. " Claudius, says
" Tacitus, was now inclined
" to one Wife, then to
" another, and was always
" led by his last Adviser."*

Ann. 12. *Huc illuc circum-
agi, quæ jusserat, vetare;
quæ vetuerat, jubere. Hist. 3.*
" Vitellius was tossed about
" from one Design to an-
" other; would forbid what
" he had just ordered, and or-
" der what he had just forbid.

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come to be known, those who are about him begin to oppose them; and *Maximilian*, being of an easy Temper, presently gives them over: Thus what he does one Day, he undoes the next; no Man can ever know what he desires or designs, nor depend upon any of his Resolutions^d.

A Prince therefore ought always to consult others; but to do it at his own Pleasure, and not at theirs. Nay, he should deter them from offering him their Advice in any Affair, when he does not demand it: But he ought not to be sparing in his Demands, and should patiently hear what they answer; and if he finds that any one conceals the Truth upon any Consideration whatever, he ought to shew his Displeasure and Resentment.

Those give into the kind of Flattery, which justifies their Taste, and is not wholly false: They can have no Aversion to these who speak well of them for what they are convinced merits Commendation. Of all Flatteries, that which rests upon a solid Basis, is the most subtle; and great Discernment is necessary, in order to discover the Shadowings

^d A Failing which it is said the Emperor *Leopold* inherited from *Maximilian* I.

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Those who think that a Prince who has the Reputation of Wisdom, may owe it not to his own natural Parts, but to the good Counsellors he has about him, are certainly mistaken: For it is a general and never-failing Rule, that a Prince who is not prudent himself, can never be prudently advised; unless by chance he puts himself wholly under the Management of a single Person, who has great Sagacity. In this Case he may indeed be well governed, but cannot reign long; for that Governor will in a short time set up for himself, and turn him out. If such a Prince

dowings which it gives to Truth. It will never send Poets to attend the Prince at a Siege, in order to write his History; it will never compose Opera-Prologues, stuffed with Hyperboles, or insipid Prefaces, or servile Epistles; it will never stun the Hero with high-swollen Accounts of his Victories; but will put on the Air of Sentiment, usher itself in with great Delicacy, and appear frank

* The Worth of the Minister, says a wise Spaniard, has never lessened the Glory of his Master; on the contrary, all the Honour of the Success falls to the Master, as well as the Blame of a Misfortune. Fame always applies itself to the principal

Authors, and never says, *This Man had good or bad Ministers*, but *This Man has been a good or bad Prince*. A Prince must therefore endeavour to chuse his Ministers well, since upon them depend his Fame and Immortality. *Gratian*, in his Manual Oracle.

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Prince employs more Counsellors than one, their Counsels will be divided, and the Prince has not Parts enough to unite them^f; each of these Counsellors will be byassed by his own private Interest g, and the Prince will not be able to correct or even to discover this Error: Nor is it possible for to him find others that are less interested; for Men will always be wicked, unless you lay them under a Necessity to be virtuous. I conclude therefore, that good Counsels, whomsoever they come from, must needs be owing to the Wisdom of the Prince, and not the Wisdom of the Prince to them.

frank and natural. How can any Man, and much more a Prince, or a Hero, be displeased to hear a Truth, which the Vivacity of a Friend seems to let slip from him? How could *Lewis XIV.* who perceived that his Air could alone command Respect, and who took Delight in that Superiority over Men, be offended at an old Officer, who trembled and faltered when he spoke to him, and stopping short in his Discourse, told him,

^f *Neque alienis consiliis regi, neque sua expedire.*
Hist. 3. "Vitellius would
"neither follow the Coun-
"sels of others, nor execute
"his own."

^g *Sibi quisque tendentes.*
Hist. 1. *Quia apud infir-
mum minore metu, & majore
præmio peccatur.* Ibid.

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him, *Sir, I do not tremble thus before your Enemies?*

Princes who have been Men before they were Kings, will remember what they were, and not so easily accustom themselves to the Food of Flattery. Those who have reigned all their Lives, have always had Incense offered to them, as to the Gods; and would be starved, if they were not flattered.

It would therefore be more just, methinks, to lament the Condition of Kings, than to condemn them. It is Flatterers, and still more Calumniators, who deserve the Censure and Hatred of the Publick, as well as all those who are Enemies enough to the Prince to conceal the Truth from him. But let us distinguish Flattery from Praise. *Trajan* was animated to Virtue by *Pliny's* Panegyrick, and *Tiberius* was confirmed in Vice by the Adulation of the *Roman* Senators.

C H A P. XXIV.

How the Princes of Italy came to lose their Dominions.

WHEN those things which I have mentioned, are prudently followed, the new Prince appears a Sovereign by Inheritance, and quickly becomes more secure and better settled in his Principality, than if it had been transmitted
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to him by a long Succession of his Forefathers: For as the Actions of a new Prince are more narrowly examined, than of one who succeeds by Inheritance, so when they are known to be prudent and judicious, they gain upon and oblige the People much more than the Antiquity of Descent: And the Reason is, that Men are more affected with things which are present, than with those that are past; and when they find themselves happy in their present Condition, they sit down to enjoy it, without looking out for any thing else^a; nay, when in other things the Prince is not wanting to himself, the People will in this Case employ all their Strength in his Defence.

Thus

OBSERVATIONS.

The Fable of *Cadmus*, who sowed in the Earth the Teeth of the Serpent, which he had overcome, from whence sprung up a People of Warriors who destroyed one another, is an Emblem of the *Italian* Princes in *Machiavel's* Time: The Perfidies and Treacheries which they committed against each other, were the true Cause of their Ruin. Whoever reads the History of *Italy* towards the latter End of the fourteenth Century as far as the

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^a *Tuta & præsentia, quàm Ann. 1. Anteponunt præ-*
vetera & periculosa malunt. sentia dubiis. Hist. 1.

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Thus he gains double Honour, as having laid the Foundation of a new Principality, embellished it, fortified it by good Laws, good Forces, good Allies, and good Examples; whereas he who is born a Prince incurs a double Infamy, by losing his Principality through his own Imprudence.

If we consider the Conduct of the Sovereign Princes of *Italy*, who in our Times have lost their Dominions, as the King of *Naples*, the Duke of *Milan*, and others; first we shall find one Error common to them all, which is that of employing Mercenary or Auxiliary Troops, as I have shewn before at large: In the next Place it will appear, that some of them either were hated by the People; or if beloved by them, knew not

Beginning of the fifteenth, will meet with nothing but Cruelties, Seditions, Violences, Confederacies among them to extirpate one another, Usurpations, Assassinations, and, in short, a most enormous Multitude of Crimes, the very Idea of which will inspire him with Horror.

The Prince who, according to *Machiavel's* Precepts, endeavours to destroy Justice and Humanity, aims at nothing less than destroying Mankind; for a Deluge of Crimes would quickly dispeople the whole Globe. As the Iniquities and

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not how to secure themselves against the Grandees: For without these Errors, no Principality can be lost, that has Men and Money enough to keep an Army in the Field.

*Philip of Macedon**, not the Father of *Alexander* the Great, but he who was conquered by *Titus Quintus*, had but a small Territory, when compared with that of the *Romans* and *Grecians*, who both attacked him; nevertheless, as he was a martial Prince, and knew how to keep the Good-will of the People, and to secure himself against the Grandees, he sustained a War for several Years against both these Nations; and if at length

Barbarities of those *Italian* Princes cost them their Dominions, so the false Politicks of *Machiavel* must inevitably ruin those who have the Folly to be guided by them.

Not but I must own, that the Sloth and Cowardice of some of those Princes may have concurred with their Wickedness to bring on their Ruin: The Weakness of the Kings of *Naples* unquestionably distressed their Affairs. But in spite of all the political Arguments and Subtleties you can use, of all the Examples you can produce, and of any System you can form, you will find

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* The Father of *Perseus*, the last King of *Macedon*.

length he lost a few Towns, yet he was able to preserve his Kingdom. For these Reasons our *Italian* Princes, who for many Years had been settled in their Dominions, must not impute the Loss of them to Fortune, but to their own Sloth: For as it is a common Failing among Men, not to think of a Storm when the Weather is calm; so these Princes, in Times of Peace, had no Apprehension of a Change; and therefore, when they were invaded, they thought of making their Escape, not their Defence; in Hopes that the People, loathing the Insolence of the Con-

find yourself at length obliged to have recourse to Justice.

I would ask *Machiavel*, what he means by saying, That a new Prince, (that is, an *Usurper*) who is prudent and judicious, will gain the Attachment of the People more than one who owes his Greatness to his Birth; because Men are more affected by the present, than the past; and, when they find their present Situation happy, sit down to enjoy it, without looking out for any thing else? Does he suppose, that of two Men, equally brave, and equally wise, a whole Nation will prefer him who is the Usurper, to the other who is their lawful Prince? Or does he mean a Prince void of all Merit, and an Usurper who is a Man of Courage and Capacity? The first can hardly be supposed to

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Conquerors, would soon recal them. Such a Resolution is good, when no other can be taken: But to neglect all other Securities, and trust to that alone, is certainly much to be blamed. No Man will suffer himself to fall, in Hopes that somebody will come by and take him up: For either that does not happen, or if it does, you are not safe, because the Means of your Relief are contemptible, and do not proceed from yourself. And there is no good, certain and lasting Defence, which does not proceed from the Prince's own Courage and Ability.

to be our Author's Meaning, because it is contrary to common Sense: Nor will any Nation ever prefer an Usurper to a lawful Prince who is every way equal to him in Merit.

Machiavel must therefore mean an Usurper who is superior in Parts to the lawful Prince: And even in this Case his Position is almost as absurd as in the other. For let that Usurper have ever so great Qualities, it will be granted that the Action by which he attains his Authority is a flagrant Injustice. Now what can the People expect from a Sovereign who begins his Reign with an Act of Violence and Wickedness, but a violent and tyrannical Government? It is the same Case with that of a Husband, who should find his Wife guilty upon the Wedding-Day;

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methinks he would not much depend upon her being chaster afterwards.

In this Chapter *Machiavel* passes Sentence of Condemnation against himself. He expressly affirms, that without the Affections of the People, and of the Grandees, and without an Army, it is impossible a Prince should maintain himself in the Throne. Truth itself seems to have wrung this Confession from him, and to have forced him to pay this Homage to it; much in the same manner as Divines tell us, that the Angels of Darkness own the Deity, while they blaspheme him. For how is it possible for a Prince to gain the Affections of the People and the Grandees, without having not only a Capacity for Affairs, but a Fund of Virtue, Humanity and Beneficence?

It is with the Office of a Prince, as with all others; no Man, whatever his Employment may be, can gain the Confidence of others, without Justice and Integrity, as well as Prudence: The most vicious Men always chuse to deal with the most virtuous; in the same manner as those Princes who have the least Capacity for Governing, trust to him who passes with them for having the most. And why should Vice be more necessary to the Office of Sovereignty, than to that of the meanest Magistrate? Upon the whole, a Prince who would preserve his Dominions, as he must gain the Hearts of the People, so for that purpose he is obliged to be just, virtuous, and beneficent, and not, as *Machiavel* through the whole of this Work endeavours to form him, unjust, cruel, ambitious, and solely intent upon aggrandizing himself, by any means whatever.

Thus

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Thus have I endeavoured to unmask this Politician, who passed in his own Age for an extraordinary Man, whom several Ministers of State have thought a dangerous Writer, and yet have followed his abominable Maxims, and recommended the Study of them to their Masters, an Author who yet was never expressly answered, and whom several Statesmen follow, without thinking it any Reproach to them. Happy would be the Man who were able to banish such Doctrines out of the World! I have here endeavoured to shew the Inconsistency of them; and it is incumbent on those who rule over others, to shew it by their Example, and to set the Publick right, with regard to the false Notion they entertain of Politicks, which should only be a System of Wisdom, but commonly passes for a Breviary of Fraud and Imposture: It is incumbent on them to banish Subtleties and Insincerity, which are so common in Treaties; to revive Honesty and Candour, which, in Truth, are very rare among Sovereigns, and to shew themselves as indifferent about conquering the Provinces of their Neighbours, as jealous of preserving their own. The Prince who would possess every thing, is not less absurd than the Man who would devour every thing, and expects he could digest as much as he devours. Whereas he who is content to govern wisely what he justly possesses, is like the Man who loads his Stomach with nothing more than it is able to digest.

CHAP. XXV.

How great Influence Fortune has in Human Affairs, and in what Manner she may be withstood.

I KNOW it has been, and is still the Opinion of many, that the Affairs of this World are so governed by Fortune and Providence, that human Wisdom cannot amend or alter them, or even apply any Remedy at all: From whence they would infer, that we need give ourselves but little Trouble about any thing, and should leave all to the Govern-

OBSERVATIONS.

The Question concerning the Liberty of the Will is one of those Problems that have put Philosophers to the greatest Nonplus; and has often forced Anathema's from the Divines. The Partizans of Liberty alledge, that if Men are not free, it must be God that acts in them; and that in Cases of Murther, Robberies, or any other Crimes, they are no more than the Tools of the Divine Power; a Doctrine which is manifestly opposite to the Nature of the Deity. In the next Place they alledge, that if the Supreme Being is the Author of Vices, those that commit them, as they cannot be charged with

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Government of Chance^a. This Opinion has the more prevailed in our Times, by reason of the many strange Revolutions that have lately been seen, and daily happen, beyond all human Conjecture.

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with any Guilt, so they ought to suffer no Punishment, and there will be neither Vice nor Virtue in the World. Now, as it is impossible to think of this hideous Doctrine, without perceiving all the Contradictions it implies, we can do no better, say they, than declare for the Liberty of the Will.

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^a Tacitus, who was an Epicurean, says something like this, in the sixth Book of his Annals. *Mibi--in incerto judicium est, fato ne res mortaliū, & necessitudine immutabili, an sorte volvantur.* "For my own part, whilst
" I listen to these and the
" like Relations, my Judgment wavers, whether
" Things human are in their
" Course and Rotation determined by Fate, and immutable Necessity, or left
" to roll at random." He adds a little after, *Fatum quidem congruere rebus putant, sed non ē vagis stellis, verūm apud principia & nexus naturalium causarum; ac tamen*

electionem vitæ nobis relinquunt: quam ubi eligeris, certum imminentium ordinem.
" Others believe a Fate to preside over Events; a
" Fate however not resulting from wandering Stars,
" but coeval with the first
" Principles of Things, and operating by the continued Connexion of natural Causes. Yet their Philosophy leaves the Course of our Life in our own free Option; but that, after the Choice is made, the Chain of Consequences is inevitable." As for what Machiavel says, that human Prudence has no Influence in Affairs of the World, or at least

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When I sometimes reflect on this, I am a little inclined to their Opinion: Nevertheless, that our Free-will may not be quite exploded, I think it may be said, that Fortune is the Mistress of one half of our Actions, but leaves the other half, or little less, to be governed

The Partizans of absolute Necessity alledge, on the other hand, that God would be worse than a blind Workman, or one at least who works in the Dark, if, after having created this World, he had been ignorant what should happen in it: A Watch-maker, say they, knows the Action of the smallest Wheel in the Watch; since he knows the Movement which he has given it, and the End for which it is designed; and shall God, a Being infinitely wise and powerful, be thought the curious and

least very little, *Tacitus* gives a beautiful Example of it, speaking of *Claudius*; whom Fortune designed for the Empire, when any other Successor was expected. *Mibi quanto plura recentium, seu veterum revolve, tanto magis ludibria rerum mortalium cunctis in negotiis observantur, quippe famâ, spe, veneratione, potius omnes destinabantur imperio, quàm quem futurum Principem fortuna in occulto tenebat.* Ann. 3.

To me, the more I revolve

“ the Events of late, or of
“ old, the more of Mockery
“ and Slipperiness appears in
“ all human Wisdom, and
“ the Transactions of Men;
“ for in popular Fame, in
“ the Hopes, Wishes, and
“ Veneration of the Publick,
“ all Men were rather de-
“ stined to the Empire, than
“ he for whom Fortune had
“ reserved the Sovereignty
“ in the Dark.” Fortune,
says *Gratian*, which is so
famous, and yet so little
known, is nothing but that
great

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governed by ourselves^b. Fortune I compare to a rapid and impetuous River, which, when it swells and rages, overwhelms the Plains, destroys the Trees and the Houses, forces away the Earth from one Place, and carries it to another; every one flies before it, and dreads its Fury, without being able to resist it. Yet this does not hinder, but that when it is quiet and calm, there may be Ditches, Banks,

and impotent Spectator of human Actions! How should that Being, all whose Works bear so many Marks of Harmony and Order, and are all subject to certain and invariable Laws, suffer Man alone to enjoy Independence and Liberty? The World, in this Case, would be no longer governed by Providence, but by the Caprice of Men. Since therefore we must make our Option between the Creator and the Creature, which of the two is the mere Machine? Is it not more reasonable to believe that it is the Being who is weak and dependent,

great Parent of Accidents, and that Offspring of the sovereign Providence, which concurs with all secondary Causes, either by moving them, or permitting them to act. Fortune is a Queen absolute, impenetrable, inexorable; smiles upon some, and frowns upon others; sometimes a Mother, at other

times a Stepmother, not through an Effect of Passion, but by an incomprehensible Secret of the divine Appointments. Chap. 10. of his Hero.

^b Success, says *Seneca*, Ep. 14. is not in the Power of the Wise; we begin Things, but it is Fortune that finishes them.

Banks, and other Preparations made to confine it; so that when it swells again, it may either be carried off by some Canal, or at least be less impetuous and destructive. So it is with Fortune, who shews her Power where there is no Preparation made to withstand it, and turns all her Force and Impetuosity where she knows there are no Banks, or other Fences, to restrain her. If you consider

dent, than the Being in whom resides all Power? Accordingly Reason and the Passions are, as it were, the invisible Chain by which the Hand of Providence guides Mankind, and makes all their Actions terminate in those Events which Divine Wisdom had ordained to happen in the World, that each Individual might fulfil his Destiny.

Thus, to avoid *Charybis*, they run upon *Scylla*; and Philosophers force each other into an Abyss of Absurdities, while Divines grope in the Dark, and devoutly damn one another out of Charity. These two Parties carry on their War much in the same manner as the *Carthaginians* and the *Romans* did of old. When it was feared that the *Roman* Army would invade *Africa*, the Scene of War was presently shifted to *Italy*; and when the *Romans* wanted to rid themselves of *Hannibal*, they sent *Scipio* at the Head of their Legions to besiege *Carthage*. Philosophers, Divines, and most of the Heroes in Argument, have the Genius of the *French* Nation; they make a vigorous Attack, but are undone if
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sider *Italy*, which is the Theatre of all these Revolutions, and even has set them in Motion, you will find it an open Field, without any Trench or Bank to secure it; and that if it had been sufficiently fenced, like *Germany*, *Spain* and *France*, such an Inundation of Foreigners would never have happened, or at least would not have made so great Progress.

I shall say no more with respect to opposing Fortune in general; and shall now confine myself to Particulars. It is not rare to see a Prince happy and flourishing one Day, and ruined the next, without observing the least Change in his Disposition or Conduct. This, I be-

you reduce them to the Defensive. For this Reason it was said by a Man of Wit, that God was the Father of all religious Sects, since he had equally supplied them all with good Arms, and given them a strong Side and a weak one.

This Question concerning Liberty and Predestination is transplanted by *Machiavel* from Metaphysics to Politicks: But this nevertheless is a Soil which is entirely improper for it, and can never nourish it; for in Politicks, instead of reasoning whether we are or are not free, whether Fortune or Chance has any or no Influence upon our Actions; we must only consider how far our Penetration and Prudence may be perfected.

Fortune

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I believe, proceeds from the Causes which I have mentioned before at large; for the Prince who relies wholly upon Fortune, is undone whenever she changes. I likewise believe, that he whose Manner of Proceeding agrees with the Times, is happy; and that he is unhappy, who cannot accommodate his Conduct to them. For we see that Men, to arrive at the End which they all propose, namely the acquiring of Glory and Riches, take very different Courses; one acts with Moderation, another with Impetuosity, one with Violence, another with Art, one with Patience, another with Fury, and yet they may all arrive at the same End. We see

Fortune and Hazard are Words without any Meaning, and in all Probability owe their Rise to the profound Ignorance in which the World groped when they gave loose and indefinite Names to Effects whose Causes they knew not. What is commonly called the good Fortune of *Cæsar* signifies properly all those Conjunctions which favoured the Designs of that ambitious Man. What is meant by the bad Fortune of *Cato*, are those unforeseen Accidents which happened to him, those Crosses and Disappointments where the Effects so suddenly followed their Cause, that his Prudence could neither foresee nor prevent them.

What

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see likewise that of two Persons equally moderate, one succeeds, the other miscarries; and that two Persons of different Turns, one moderate, the other impetuous, are equally successful: This proceeds from nothing but the Nature of the Times, which either suits or disagrees with their Manner of proceeding. Thus it happens, as I said before, that two different Persons, who take different Courses, attain the same End; and of two others, who take the same Course, one succeeds,

What is meant by Hazard cannot be better explained than by a Game at Dice. It is owing to Hazard, say you, that my Dice come up twelve rather than seven. To unravel this Phænomenon in a physical manner, one must have Eyes quick enough to see the Way in which the Dice are put into the Box, the Motions of the Hand more or less strong, more or less repeated, which make them turn, and communicate to them a Motion more or less swift: And these Causes taken all together are what goes by the Name of Hazard.

Whilst we are but Men, that is, Beings very much circumscribed, we shall never be superior to what we call the Blows of Fortune. We ought to make all Advantages of Hazard, as soon as it happens. But our Life is too short, and our Understanding too limited, to perceive all its Combinations.

I shall

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ceeds, the other miscarries. Upon this also depend the Vicissitudes of Good; for when a Man acts always with Moderation and Patience, if the Times and Affairs turn so favourably as to suit his Conduct, he prospers; but if the Face of Affairs and the Times change, he is undone, because he does not change likewise. Nor is there any Man so wise as to know how to suit himself always to the Times, either because he cannot resist his

I shall mention two Events which will clearly shew the Insufficiency of Human Wisdom. The first is the Surprize of *Cremona* by Prince *Eugene*, an Enterprize concerted with all imaginable Prudence, and executed with infinite Valour. It miscarried after this manner: The Prince was admitted into the Town in the Morning through one of the common Sewers, which was opened to him by

• *Peter Soderini*, says *Machiavel*, proceeded with great Gentleness and Humanity in all his Actions; and whilst this Conduct was suitable to the Times, he and his Country (*Florence*) prospered. But when the Times changed, and it was necessary to lay aside Moderation and Humility, Peter was at a Loss, could not depart from his former Measures, and therefore he and

his Country were both ruined. Chap. 9. Book III. of his Discourses. And Chap. 3. he observes that if Peter had exerted all that Authority which belonged to him as *Gonfalonier* for Life, he might have ruined all the Family of *Medicis*, and by that means preserved the Liberty of his Country, which he had restored.

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his natural Inclination, or because he can hardly be persuaded to take a different Course from that which has always carried him to his End: Accordingly a moderate Man cannot act with Impetuosity, when the Times require it, and therefore is ruined; whereas, could he turn with the Times, Fortune would never forsake him^d.

Pope *Julius II.* in all his Enterprizes acted with Passion and Vehemence; and the Times and Circumstances of Affairs were so suitable to his Manner of proceeding, that he always came off with Success. Consider
his

by a Curate with whom he held Intelligence; and he would infallibly have made himself Master of the Place, if two unforeseen Accidents had not happened. First, a Regiment of *Swiss*, who were to perform their Exercise that Morning, were in Arms
X
fooner

^d What makes Fortune abandon a Man (says *Machiavel* in the same Chap. 9.) is that she changes the Times, and he does not change his Measures. A King of *Sparta*, being accused of Inconstancy, answered, *It is not I that change, but Affairs*: To shew that we must fall in with the Times, *morem*

accommodari, prout conducit.
Ann. 12. *Remissum aliquid & mitigatum quia expedierit.*
Ann. 3. It has always been esteemed the Part of a wise Man, says *Cicero*, to yield to the Times, and to comply with the Necessity of Affairs. *Tempori cedere, id est, necessitati parere, semper sapientis est habitum.* Ep. 9. Book I.

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his first Enterprize against *Bologna*, when *John Bentivoglio* was still living: The *Venetians* took Umbrage at it, the Kings of *Spain* and *France* complained of it, the Pope nevertheless marched to *Bologna*, himself, and by his Ferocity and Impetuosity kept both the *Spaniards* and the *Venetians* in Suspense and Inaction; the *Venetians* were afraid to stir, and the *Spaniards* ambitious to recover the whole Kingdom of *Naples*.

sooner than ordinary, and made Resistance till the rest of the Garison were brought together. In the next Place, the Guide who led the Prince of *Vaudemont* to one of the Gates of the Town, of which that Prince was to make himself Master, missed his Way, and therefore that Detachment arrived too late.

The second Event is the separate Peace which *England* made with *France* towards the End of the War concerning the Succession in *Spain*. Neither the Emperor *Joseph's* Ministers, nor the greatest Philosophers, nor the ablest Politicians, could ever have suspected, that a Pair of Gloves would have changed the Destiny of *Europe*, and yet this is literally true. The Dutchess of *Marlborough* was Groom of the Stole to Queen *Anne* at *London*, whilst her Husband was gathering Laurels and Riches in his Campaigns in the *Netherlands*. The Dutchess by her Favour at Court supported the Interest of the Hero, and the Hero by his Victories abroad

sup.

Naples; whilst the King of *France*, seeing the Pope already in Motion, and being desirous to make him his Friend in order to humble the *Venetians*, thought he could not deny him his Assistance without doing him an open Injury.

Thus supported the Credit of his Wife. The Tories who opposed them, and wished for Peace, were able to do nothing, whilst that Dutchess was all-powerful with the Queen. She lost her Favour by a very slight Accident. The Queen and the Dutchess had both given Orders at the same time for a Pair of Gloves. The Dutchess was so impatient for hers, that she pressed the Glover to serve her before the Queen. In the mean time *Anne* was likewise in Haste for her Gloves: A Lady whose Name was *Masbam*, and who was an Enemy to the Dutchess, informed the Queen of all that had passed, and aggravated every thing with so many malicious Particulars, that the Queen from that Moment considered the Dutchess as a Favourite whose Insolence was no longer to be supported. The Glover soured the Queen still more by the Account she gave of the Affair, which she told her with all imaginable Malignity. This Leaven, though but slight, was sufficient to put all the Humours into Fermentation, and to season every thing that accompanies a Disgrace. The Tories, and Marshal *Tallard* at their Head, made a proper Use of this Accident, which gave a decisive Blow to their Antagonists. The Dutchess

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Thus Pope *Julius*, by his violent and impetuous Measures, succeeded in an Enterprize, which no other Pope, with all the Wisdom of Man, could ever have effected; for had he put off his Departure from *Rome* till every thing was settled and prepared, as
any

of *Marlborough* was soon disgraced; and with her fell the *Whig* Party, and that of the Emperor's Allies. Such are the Frolicks of Fortune in the most important Things of this World. Providence laughs at human Wisdom, and human Greatness. Causes frivolous, nay sometimes ridiculous, often determine the Fate of entire Monarchies. Upon that Occasion a sorry Quarrel among Women delivered *Lewis* XIV. from a calamitous War, out of which all his Wisdom, Forces and Power would perhaps have proved insufficient to extricate him; and reduced the Allies to a Necessity of making Peace. Such Events, I own, happen but seldom, so that their Authority alone is not sufficient to discredit human Prudence and Penetration: It is with them as with some Diseases, which, though they may impair our Health for some time, do not hinder us from enjoying for the rest of our Lives the Advantage of a vigorous Constitution.

It is therefore necessary that those who are appointed to govern others, should endeavour to perfect their Penetration and Prudence: But this is not all; for in order to captivate Fortune, they must learn to make their Tempers pliable to the different Conjunctions of Affairs; which indeed is no easy
Task.

any other Pope would have done, *France* would have made a thousand Excuses, and the other Powers would have given him a thousand Apprehensions, and thus his Attempt must needs have miscarried. I shall pass by the rest of his Enterprizes, which were

Task. I only speak in general of two Sorts of Tempers, one bold and enterprising, and the other wary and slow; and as these moral Causes proceed from one that is physical, it is almost impossible a Prince should be so much Master of himself as to assume all Colours like the Chameleon. There are some Ages which favour the Glory of Conquerors, and of those bold and enterprising Men who seem to be born for mighty Wars, and mighty Revolutions. But they are especially favourable to those giddy, daring and fiery Spirits, who embroil Sovereigns, and furnish the common Enemy with an Opportunity of profiting by their Quarrels: And to such Men almost all Conquerors owe their Success; even *Ferdinand Cortez* was favoured in the Conquest of *Mexico* by the civil Broils of the *Americans*.

There are other Times when it would seem that the World, being less ruffled and disturbed, requires to be governed only by Gentleness and Moderation; and when nothing is necessary but Circumspection and Prudence. This is a sort of happy Calm in Politicks, which commonly follows a Storm; then it is that Negotiations are more effectual than Battles, and that you may gain by the Pen what could not be acquired by the Sword.

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were all of the same Kind, and all equally successful. The Shortness of his Reign saved him from any Reverse of Fortune; for had he lived to see such Times as made it necessary to proceed with Caution and Moderation,

A Prince who would make Advantage of both these different Conjunctions, must learn to accommodate himself to each of them, and always to steer, like a skilful Pilot, according to the Times. If a General was bold and wary upon the proper Occasions, he would be almost invincible. *Fabius* supplanted *Hannibal* by his Delays; he was not ignorant that the *Carthaginian* Army wanted both Recruits and Money, and therefore would quickly dwindle to nothing, if a Battle was avoided. *Hannibal's* Policy on the other hand was to come to an Engagement: His Power was only temporary and transient; he was willing therefore to lose no Time in making all the Advantages of it that were possible, in order to render it more lasting and solid, by that Terror which bright and shining Actions never fail to spread, and by those Resources which are met with in a conquered Country.

In
Nardi observes that Pope *History*. To this Pope we
Julius owed his constant may justly apply that Saying
 Success rather to his For of *Paterculus*, *Vir*, inquires,
 tune than his Prudence, *et ultra fontem temerarius*:
 and that he could not have Though a Man of great Bra-
 died at a Time more fortu- very, yet he was still more
 nate or more glorious for his rash than brave.
 Popedom. Book 6. of his

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tion, he would have certainly been ruined; because he could never have departed from his natural Impetuosity.

I conclude therefore, that as Fortune is changeable, the Prince who always persists in the same Measures, succeeds as long as the Times fall in with them, but is sure to miscarry

In the Year 1704. if the Elector of *Bavaria* and Marshal *Tallard* had not left *Bavaria*, and advanced as far as *Blenheim* and *Hockstedt*, they would have continued Masters of all *Swabia*; for the Army of the Allies, not being able to subsist in *Bavaria* for want of Provisions, would have been obliged to retire towards *Mentz*, and even to separate. It was for want of Circumspection therefore at a Time when Circumspection was seasonable, that the Elector put to the Hazard of a Battle, for ever memorable and glorious for the *Germans*, what was in his own Power to preserve. This Imprudence was punished by the total Defeat of the *French* and *Bavarians*, by the Loss of *Bavaria*, and of all that Country which lies between the Upper Palatinate and the *Rhine*.

Those who have been undone by their Temerity, are commonly forgot; and the few are only remembered whose Rashness was favoured by Fortune. It is with them as with Dreams and Prophecies; we preserve the Memory only of the few that have been accomplished; the rest are sunk in Oblivion. The World ought to judge of Events by their Causes, and not of Causes by the Event.

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miscarry when the Times alter. I believe indeed, that of the two it is better to be impetuous, than cautious; because Fortune is a Woman with whom it is impossible to succeed without Blows and Violence; and it appears by Experience, that she more easily submits

I conclude therefore, that a People venture much when their Prince is bold and enterprising, and are threatened with continual Danger; whereas a wary Sovereign, if he is not fit for atchieving great Exploits, seems to be more fit to govern than the other; one ventures, but the other preserves.

If either of them would be great Men, they must come into the World at a seasonable Time; otherwise their Talents will be more pernicious than profitable. Every reasonable Man, and especially those whom Heaven hath appointed to govern others, ought to lay down some Plan of their Conduct, and to make it as well connected and as conclusive as a geometrical Demonstration: By closely adhering to such a System, they will be sure to act consistently, without ever departing from their main Design: By this means every Conjunction and Event might be made to promote, and every thing to concur in, the Execution of these Projects which they have concerted.

But who are those Princes from whom we expect so many rare Talents? They will always be Men, and it may be truly said, that human Nature is not sufficient for so many Duties. The Phenix of the Poets, the Unity of the Metaphysicians, will sooner be

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submits to those who are fierce and boisterous, than to such as are cool and deliberate; and that, like Woman, she favours young Men, because they are more rash, audacious and violent^f.

be met with than such a Man as *Plato* describes. Justice requires that the People should be content with those Efforts which Sovereigns make to arrive at Perfection; among whom the best accomplished will always be those whose Characters are most remote from that of *Machiavel's* Prince. It is but an Act of Justice to bear with their Failings, while these are counterpoised by the Qualities of the Heart, and by good Intentions; we must never forget, that Error and Weakness are the Lot of every Man, and that there is nothing perfect in this World. There is no Country so happy as that where a mutual Indulgence prevails between the Sovereign and his Subjects, and gives Society those

Witness what *Tacitus* says of *Cerialis*, one of *Vespasian's* Relations and Generals: *Cerialis parùm temporis ad exsequenda imperia dabat, subitus consiliis, sed eventu clarus: aderat fortuna, etiam ubi artes defuissent.* " *Cerialis* indeed allowed his Men but little Time for executing his Orders; he was sudden in forming his Resolutions, yet he gained signal Renown from the

Event of them: Fortune aided him even where his Conduct failed." *Hannibal* therefore had good Reason to call Fortune the Step-mother of Prudence. The Marquis of *Marignan* said to the Emperor *Charles V.* that she was not only inconstant like Woman, but capricious and wanton like Youth. *Gratian*, Chap. II. of his Hero.

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those Charms without which Life itself would be a Burden, and this World a Valley of Bitterness instead of a Scene of Pleasures.

CHAP. XXVI.

An Exhortation to deliver Italy from the Barbarians.

WHEN I reflect upon all that has been said in the preceding Chapters, and consider with myself whether the present Juncture of Affairs in *Italy* would be favourable to a new Prince, and furnish him with an Opportunity of introducing such a Form of Government as might do

OBSERVATIONS.

Of the different Sorts of Negotiations, and of the Reasons which may be called just for making War.

We have seen in the Course of this Work, the Fallacy of those Arguments with which *Machiavel* pretended to impose upon us, by disguising Villains under the Mask of great Men. I have endeavoured to pull off that Veil of Virtue with which he would cloak Vice, and to undeceive the World in an Error held by many, with regard to the Politicks of Princes. I have told Kings, That their true Policy was to excel their Subjects

do Honour to himself, and prove beneficial to the whole Country, methinks so many Things concur to promote such an Enterprize, that I know not whether there was ever a Time more proper for it than the present. If, to discover the Worth of *Moses*, it was necessary, as I said before, that the *Israelites* should be Captives in *Egypt*; to shew the Magnanimity and Courage of *Cyrus*, that the *Persians* should be oppressed by the *Medes*; and to display the excellent Qualities of *Theseus*, that the *Athenians* should be banished and dispersed*; so, to evince the Courage and Capacity of an *Italian Spirit*,
it

jects in Virtue, that they might not find themselves obliged to condemn in others what their own Practice authorized. I have observed, that bright and glorious Actions were not alone sufficient to establish their Reputation, and that true and lasting Fame was only to be purchased by such Actions as tend to the Benefit of Mankind. I shall here add a few Remarks upon the Subject of Negotiations, and upon the Reasons, which may truly be called just, for undertaking a War.

The Ministers of foreign Courts are Spies by Privilege, who are to watch the Conduct of those Princes

* See Chap. VI. where he treats of the three Law-givers.

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it was necessary that *Italy* should be reduced to its present Condition, that it should be in greater Servitude than the *Jews*, in greater Subjection than the *Persians*, more dispersed than the *Athenians*, without Head, without Order or Laws, harrassed, plundered, mangled and over-run, and should have been involved in every sort of Calamity.

Though from time to time some Man of superior Courage has started up, whom it was hoped that God had sent for the Deliverance of *Italy*, yet so it has always happened, that in the very Height of his Career, Fortune has cast him off; insomuch that *Italy*, now ready to expire, still looks for some Deliverer, who may put an End to the Devastations in *Lombardy*, to the oppressive and galling

Princes with whom they reside, to pry into their Designs and Proceedings, and to foresee their Actions, in order to give their Masters early Intelligence. The principal Design of their Embassy is to strengthen the Tyes of Friendship between Princes; but instead of being the Artificers of Peace, they are often the Instruments of War. By Flattery, Cunning, and Seduction, they endeavour to delude Ministers into a Discovery of the Secrets of State; they gain the Weak by their Address, the Proud by their Fawning, and the Interested by their

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galling Taxations in the Kingdom of *Naples*^a, and in *Tuscany*^b, and heal up all those Wounds, and festered Sores, which Length of Time has rendered almost incurable. 'Tis evident that she prays God to send her some Person who may deliver her from the Cruelty and Insolence of the Barbarians: 'Tis evident how much she is prepared and disposed to follow the Standard which any one sets up. And now at length she can have

their Bounty: In short, they do all the Mischief they can; their Profession allows them to transgress; they sin out of Duty, and are sure of Impunity.

'Tis against the Wiles of those Spies that Princes ought to be chiefly upon their Guard: When the Subject of the Negotiation grows important, they ought to examine the Conduct of their Ministers with the greatest Rigour, in order to discover whether any Shower of *Danaë* may not have melted away the Austerity of their Virtue.

In

^a *Machiavel* speaks here to his Patron *Laurence* of *Medicis*, agreeably to the Predictions of the Astrologers which were made in the Beginning of the Popedom of *Leo X.* viz. That *Julian* his Brother should be King of *Naples*, and *Laurence*

his Nephew Duke of *Milan*. *Nardi's History of Florence*, Book VI.

^b The same Historian relates in two Passages of the same Book, that *Laurence* had a mind to make himself Sovereign of *Florence*.

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have no Hopes but in your illustrious Family, whose Valour and Fortune, favoured both by God and the Church, of which it now holds the Principality, may induce it to become the Champion of her Deliverance; nor will the Task be difficult, if you place before you the Lives and Actions of the Princes above-mentioned.

Though

In more critical Junctures, when they treat of Alliances, their Vigilance must be still greater; they must dissect the very Nature of those Articles which they are willing to yield, that they may be able to fulfil their Engagements. A Treaty considered only in the Lump, is very different from one that is examined in all its Views, and with all its Consequences. What appears at first Sight a real Advantage, will often be found, upon strict Examination, a wretched Palliative, which tends to the Ruin of the State. To these Precautions must be added great Care in defining and clearing up the Terms of the Treaty; and the punctilious Grammarian should always take place of the skillful Politician, that no room may be left for any fraudulent Distinction between the Letter and the Spirit of the Treaty.

In Politicks, one should make a Collection of all the Errors which Princes have committed through Precipitation, for the Use of those who would make Treaties or Alliances. The Time which they employed in reading it, would give them

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Though these were Men of rare and wonderful Abilities, nevertheless they were but Men, and none of them had so fair an Opportunity as the present. Their Enterprizes were not more just or more easy, nor was God more their Friend, than yours. Justice is on your Side; for every War is just that is necessary; and it is an Act of Piety towards our Country, to take Arms for it, when Arms are its only Resource. The People are universally disposed; and where the Disposition is so great, the Difficulty cannot be considerable, if you do but follow the Example of such as I have proposed

them Leisure to make Reflections that could not fail to be useful.

Negotiations are not all carried on by Persons of Figure; Ministers are often sent without any Character to neutral Places, where they make Proposals with the more Freedom, as they no-wise endanger the Honour of their Master. The Preliminaries of the late Peace between the Emperor and *France* were concluded in this manner, without the Knowledge of the Empire, and of the maritime Powers: This Accommodation was made in the House of a Count*, whose Estate lies upon the *Rhine*,

Victor Amadeus, the most able, and withal the most artful Prince of his Time, perfectly knew the Art

* The Count of *Newwied*.

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posed for your Imitation. Besides, we here see Things extraordinary and unparalleled effected by the divine Power: The Sea has been opened, a Cloud has pointed out the Way, a Rock has yielded Waters, the Heavens have rained down Manna, every thing has concurred in promoting your Greatness; the rest is left for you to effect. God will not do every thing himself, that he may not deprive us of our Free-will, and of that Share of Glory which belongs to us. Nor is it surprising that none of the fore-mentioned *Italians* were able to do what may be hoped from

Art of concealing his Designs. *Europe* was imposed upon more than once by his Finesse; especially when Marshal *Catinat*, in a Monk's Habit, and under Pretence of taking care of the Salvation of that Prince, withdrew him from the Emperor's Interest, and made him a Profelyte to *France*. That Negotiation between the King and the General, was concluded with so much Dexterity, that the Alliance between *France* and *Savoy*, which immediately followed, was to *Europe* a most unexpected and extraordinary Phenomenon in Politicks.

I am far from proposing the Conduct of *Victor Amadeus* in this Case, to the Imitation of Sovereigns: I only commend his Ability and Discretion; Qualities which, when they are made use of to promote

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from your illustrious Family: If, in so many Revolutions, and so long Continuance of War in *Italy*, it has always appeared that our military Valour was extinct, the Reason is, because our old Discipline was not good, and nobody was able to invent a better.

Nothing does so much Honour to a new Prince, as inventing new Laws, and new Discipline, which, if they are well founded, and give an Idea of Grandeur, make him venerable

promote a good End, are absolutely necessary to every Prince.

It is a general Rule, That in difficult Negotiations, you must employ Men of the most exquisite Parts; that you must not only chuse those who are cunning, intriguing, supple, and insinuating, but those who have so quick and piercing an Eye, as to read in the Faces of others, the Secrets of their Hearts, in order that nothing may escape their Penetration, and the Force of their Reasoning.

Cunning must not be too often employ'd: It is with this, as with Spices, the too frequent Use of which blunts the Taste, and takes off that Tartness, which a Palate that is but seldom used to them, always feels. Probity, on the contrary, is for all Times, and resembles that simple and natural Food which agrees with every Constitution, and renders the Body robust, without over-heating it.

Y

A Prince

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nerable and awful; and *Italy* is susceptible enough of any new Form. It is not her Soldiers that are wanting in Courage, but their Commanders: Witness Duels and Combats, in which the *Italians* have the Advantage by their Strength, their Dexterity, and Stratagem; whereas, in Battles, they are generally worsted, which is owing to the Inability of their Generals: For those who pretend to have Skill, will never obey; and every

A Prince whose Candour is known, will never fail to gain the Confidence of *Europe*; he will be successful and happy without having recourse to Fraud, and powerful by means of Virtue alone. The Peace and Prosperity of the State are, as it were, a Center, where all the Paths of Politicks ought to unite; and to which all Negotiations ought ultimately to tend.

The Tranquillity of *Europe* is principally founded upon the Support of that wise Equilibrium, by which the superior Force of a single Monarchy is counterbalanced by the united Powers of several Princes. If this Equilibrium should fail, it might be feared lest an universal Revolution should happen, and a new Monarchy be established upon the Ruins of Princes weakened by their Disunion.

The Politicks of the Princes of *Europe* seem therefore to require them never to neglect Alliances and Treaties, by which they may match the Power

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every one thinks himself skilful: Nor has any Man to this Day, been raised by his Valour and Fortune, to such a Height of Reputation, as to prevail with others to obey him. From hence it happened, that in the many Wars, during the last twenty Years, no Army that consisted only of *Italians*, has been successful; as appeared first at *Tarus*, afterwards at *Alexandria*, *Capua*, *Genoa*, *Vayla*, *Bologna*, and *Mestri*. If therefore your illustrious

Power of an ambitious Prince: They ought always to be distrustful of those who would sow Dissention among them: Let them remember that Consul, who, to shew the Necessity of Union, made several vain Attempts to pull away the Tail of a Horse all at once; but when he had separated the Hairs, and plucked one after another, he easily succeeded. This Lesson is as proper for certain Sovereigns in our Time, as for the *Roman* Legionaries: Nothing but their reuniting will be able to make them formidable, and to maintain the Peace and Tranquillity of *Europe*.

The World would be very happy if there was no other way but that of Negotiation to maintain Justice, and to re-establish Peace and Concord among Nations. Arguments would then be employ'd instead of Arms, and People would dispute with, instead of butchering one another. An unhappy Necessity obliges Princes to have recourse to Means that are much more cruel; there are Occa-

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illustrious Family would tread in the Steps of those excellent Persons, who delivered their Country from a foreign Yoke; it is necessary, as the true Foundation of all great Enterprizes, to provide yourselves with an Army of your own Subjects, who will always be more faithful, and better Soldiers than any others. And though each of them is brave, yet, if they are united, they will be more so, when they find themselves commanded, preferred and rewarded by their own Prince.

It is in such Cases where the Liberty of the People, whom the Enemy would oppress by Injustice, must be defended by Arms; where you must obtain by Violence what is unjustly refused, and where Sovereigns must commit the Cause of their People to the Fate of Battles. It is in such Cases the Paradox is true, that a good War procures and confirms a good Peace.

What makes a War just or unjust is the Cause of it. The Passion or Ambition of Princes often casts a Mist before their Eyes, and represents the most criminal Actions in the most advantageous Colours. War is a Resource in Extremity; so it ought only to be employ'd with Precaution, and in desperate Cases; and a Prince should well examine, whether he is induced to it by the Illusion of Pride, or by solid and indispensable Reasons.

Some

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It is necessary therefore to be furnished with these Forces, before you can be able with *Italian* Valour to vindicate your Country from the Oppression of Foreigners. Though the *Swiss* and the *Spanish* Infantry are counted terrible, yet both have their Defects; inso- much that a third Sort of Infantry might be com-

Some Wars are defensive, and these unquestionably are the most just : Some Wars are made for Interest, when Kings are obliged to undertake them in order to maintain their contested Rights ; they plead their Cause with Sword in Hand, and Battles decide the Validity of their Reasons.

There are some Wars made for the Sake of Precaution, and which Princes do well to undertake : They are offensive indeed, but just. When the excessive Grandeur of a Prince threatens to overwhelm and swallow up the Universe, Prudence requires that Ditches and Banks should be made to oppose him, and to stop the impetuous Course of the Torrent, while that is practicable. We see Clouds that gather, a Storm that is approaching, and Lightning that foretels it ; and the Sovereign who is threatened with such a Danger, without being able to escape the Tempest, will unite himself, if he is wise, with all those who may be involved in the same Distress, and consequently have the same Interest with him. If the Kings of *Egypt*, of *Syria*, and *Macedon*, had joined together against the *Roman* Power, it would never be able to have overturned those Empires : An Alliance wisely concerted, and

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composed, that would be able not only to withstand, but to defeat them. For the *Spaniards* cannot sustain the Charge of the Horse; and the *Swiss* have Reason to be afraid of the Foot, when they meet with such as are as obstinate as themselves. Accordingly we have seen, and may yet see, by Experience, that the *Spaniards* cannot sustain the Fury of the

a War vigorously pushed, would have rendered those ambitious Designs abortive, the Accomplishment of which fettered the Universe. As it is Prudence to prefer lesser Evils to greater, as well as Certainty to Chance; a Prince ought rather to engage in an offensive War, when he has it in his Power to make his Option between the Olive and the Laurel, than to wait till desperate Times come on, when a Declaration of War can only put off his Slavery and Ruin for a few Moments. It is a certain Maxim, That a Prince should rather prevent, than be prevented: Great Men have always been successful, when they made use of their Forces before their Enemies had taken such Measures as tied their Hands, and suppressed their Power.

Many Princes have been engaged by Treaties, in the Wars of their Allies, and obliged by Stipulation, to furnish them with a certain Number of auxiliary Troops. As Sovereigns cannot be without Alliances, since there is no Prince in *Europe* who can support himself against the rest by his own Power alone, they engage mutually to assist one another in

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the *French* Cavalry; and that the *Swiss* have been overthrown by the Infantry of *Spain*. Of this last indeed we have had no perfect Experiment: Nevertheless, we had some Instance of it at the Battle of *Ravenna*; where the *Spanish* Foot being engaged with the *German* Battalions, (which observe the same Order

in case of Need; and this contributes to their Security and Preservation. The Event determines which of the Allies reaps most Advantage by the Alliance. At one time, a lucky Opportunity favours one of the contracting Parties; at another time, some unexpected Incident promotes the Interest of another; It is therefore, not only an honest, but a wise Conduct in Princes, religiously to keep their Faith and Promise, and to be punctual in fulfilling their Engagements; the rather because their Alliances make the Protection which they give to their Subjects more effectual and lasting.

All Wars therefore, whose sole Design is to guard against Usurpations, to maintain unquestionable Rights, to guarantee the publick Liberty, and to ward off the Oppression and Violence of the Ambitious, are agreeable to Justice. When Sovereigns engage in Wars of this Kind, they have no room to reproach themselves with Bloodshed, as they are forced to it by Necessity; and in such Circumstances War is a less Evil than Peace.

This Subject naturally leads me to speak of Princes, who deal in the Blood of their People; a Sort of Merchandize unknown in ancient Times:

and Discipline with the *Swiss*) the *Spaniards* by the Agility of their Bodies, and the Protection of their Bucklers, broke in upon their Pikes, and killed them securely, while the *Germans* could make no Defence, and would have been all cut off, had not their Enemies been charged by the Horse. Wherefore, as
 the

Their Court is, as it were, a publick Market, where their Troops are sold to those who bid the greatest Subsidies. Soldiers were originally designed for the Defence of their own Country: To hire them out to others, like Dogs and Bulls, to bait and be baited, is, methinks, perverting at once the Design both of Trade and War. It is said, That sacred Things are not allowed to be sold: What can be more sacred than the Lives of Men?

As for Civil Wars about Religion, they are, for the most part, the Effect of the Princes Imprudence: He must needs have unseasonably favoured one Sect, at the Expence of another: He must either have too much promoted, or too much discouraged, the publick Exercise of certain Forms of Worship: He must have added Weight to Party Quarrels, which are only transient Sparks of Fire when the Sovereign does not interfere, but become Conflagrations when he fomentes them.

To maintain the Civil Government with Vigour, to grant every Man a Liberty of Conscience, to act always like a King, and never to put on the Priest, is the sure Means of preserving a State from those

the Defects of these two Sorts of Infantry are known, it is possible to invent a third Sort that may be able to withstand the Horse, and may yet have no need of fearing the Foot: And this will be effected, not by changing their Arms, but their Discipline. 'Tis this Sort of Inventions and Improvements, that gives Reputation and

Autho-

those Storms and Hurricanes, which the dogmatical Spirit of Divines is continually labouring to conjure up.

Foreign Wars about Religion are the very Height of Injustice and Absurdity. To leave *Aix la Chapelle*, and go Sword in Hand to convert the Saxons, as was done by Charles the Great, to equip a Fleet for Egypt, in order to propose the Christian Religion to the Sultan, are very strange and unaccountable Enterprizes. The Fury of Crusades is now over: Heaven grant it may never return!

War in general is so full of Calamities, the Event of it is so uncertain, and its Consequences are so ruinous to a Country, that Princes cannot be too cautious of engaging in it. The Violences which your Armies commit in your Enemies Country, are inconsiderable Advantages, when compared with the Misfortunes which immediately fall upon your own Dominions. To undertake a War is so serious and important a Consideration, that it is surprising how so many Princes have easily taken such a Resolution.

I am persuaded, that if Kings were to see a true and faithful Picture of the Miseries that are brought upon

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Authority to a new Prince. The present Opportunity therefore should not be let pass; that *Italy*, after so long Expectation, may at length see her Deliverer appear. Nor can it be expressed, with what Affection, with what Thirst of Revenge, with what Fidelity, with what religious Attachment, and with what Tears, such a Champion would be received in all the Provinces that have suffered by these Inundations of Foreigners. What Gates would

upon a People by a Declaration of War, it would not fail to move them. Their Imagination is not lively enough, to give them a natural Representation of those Calamities which they never felt, and against which they are protected by the Eminence of their Rank. How can they feel those Taxes and Duties which overload and oppress the People? The Scarcity of Inhabitants, when the young Men are carried off to recruit their Forces? Those contagious Distempers which sweep off almost intire Armies? The Horror of Battles, and the still greater Horror of bloody Sieges? The Misery of the Wounded, when the Sword of the Enemy has deprived them of those Limbs which were the only Instruments of their Industry and Subsistence? The Grief of Orphans, who, by the Death of their Fathers, have been deprived of the only Support of their Weakness? Or the Loss of so many Men who were useful to the State, and whom Death has mowed down in their Youth?

Princes

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would be shut against him! What People would deny him Obedience? What Malice would oppose him? What true *Italian* would refuse to follow him? Every one abhors and nauseates this Domination of *Barbarians*. Let your illustrious Family therefore undertake this Enterprize with all that Courage and Confidence wherewith just Enterprizes are attempted; that under your Banner this Country may be ennobled, and by
blow the

Princes whose only Aim it is to make their People happy, ought well to consider, before they expose them to every thing that human Nature has most Occasion to dread.

Others who look upon their Subjects as their Slaves, endanger them without Pity, and see them perish without Regret; but those Princes who consider Men as their Equals, and look upon their People as a Body of which they themselves are the Soul, are as sparing of the Blood of their Subjects, as of their own.

To conclude this Work, I would beseech all Sovereigns not to take Offence at the Liberty with which I speak to them: My sole Design is to make them acquainted with Truth, to animate them to Virtue, and to flatter none. The good Opinion I have of the Princes who reign at present in *Europe*, makes me believe them worthy to hear the Truth: It is only to a *Nero*, to an *Alexander VI.* a *Cesar Borgia*, or a *Lewis XI.* that there would be Danger
in

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the Favour of your auspicious Fortune it may
be truly said with *Petrarch*:

Virtù contr'al furore

Prendrà l'arme; & fia il combatter corto,

Che l'antico valore

Ne gl' Italici cuor' non è ancor morto.

True Courage then shall furious Rage oppose,

Nor shall it long for Victory contest;

Our Foes shall feel that antient Valour glows,

With *Roman* Warmth, in each *Italian* Breast.

in telling it. Thank God, we can reckon no such
Men among the Princes of *Europe* in our Days;
and the greatest Encomium that can be given them,
is to say, that in their Presence one may boldly con-
demn all those Vices which degrade Royalty, and
are inconsistent with the Sentiments of Humanity
and Justice.



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